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
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**THE AETIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN POLITICS:  
ANALYSING VIOLENCE AND POWER IN HANNAH  
ARENDT'S *Crisis of the Republic* (1972).**

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**BY**

**NALIONGE Maxmillianus EWOKO**

*(Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy)*

The University of Yaoundé I

Matriculation Number: 10F298

**JURY**

**Quality**

**Name**

**University**

**President** : MINKOULOU Thomas, *Associate Professor*

Yaoundé 1

**Supervisor** : Adder Abel GWODA, *Associate Professor*

Maroua

**Examiner** : Oumarou MAZADOU, *Professor*

Yaoundé 1

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To

My parents

*(Mr. Roudolfe EWOKO VEFONGE & Mrs. EWOKO née Rebecca LIKOKE)*

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## FORWARD

Joanna Hannah Arendt was born in Hannover, Germany, on October 14, 1906 from her Jewish parents, Paul and Martha Arendt, and died on December 4, 1975. Her parents were politically leftists<sup>1</sup> and religious sceptics, but permitted Hannah as literates to attend the Synagogue and receive religious instructions especially in Judaism. Zionism<sup>2</sup> was a phenomenon in Germany which was recognized by both the assimilated or bourgeois Jews, but it was neither a hitch to the parents nor daughter until the Nazi's made it one. They moved to Konigsberg in 1909, and 4 years later, Paul Arendt died of paresis<sup>3</sup>. Forced to raise her 7-year-old girl alone without a husband, Martha Arendt developed a harsh and intolerable attitude towards the random anti-Semitic insults enacted on her daughter by schoolmates, and teachers who made pejorative statements about the Jews. As a result of this, Hannah learned that one ought to defend him or herself against hostilities, but this attitude died down before the First World War (WWI). Faced with her father's insanity and eventual death, rampant childhood illnesses, the remarriage of her mother in 1920, she dedicated her time for reflection. At 18years in 1924, she became a student of Martin Heidegger in Marburg, went into a relationship which lasted for 4 years. Contrary to Heidegger, she found a tutor in Heidelberg with human integrity under whose supervision she wrote her doctorate dissertation; *Concept of love in St. Augustine* in 1929, in the person of Karl Jaspers. She learned a lot on philosophy and theology as a student of Jaspers, and her study on Augustine's notion of love, provided her with connotative meanings of neighbourly love and the love of God. In the same year after her defence, alongside her first husband Gunther Stern the writer, she moved to Berlin, and it was here that she witnessed the real manifestation of Nazism which was politically hostile towards the Jews. Reconsidering her position for Zionism, she met with Kurt Blumenfeld, joined and led many groups against Nazism<sup>4</sup> and Stalinism<sup>5</sup>. Her home became a meeting place for leftists and others fleeing arrest, but was later on arrested herself. Released 8 days after through the help of a sympathetic interrogator, she left for Paris and reunited with her husband who had fled there. Following her Zionist activities, she met Heinrich Blucher, who will become her second husband till death in 1970. After immigrating in the United States of America (USA) in 1941, and living with her mother who had followed them as a result of her divorce, being a stateless person for 14 years (1937–1951) struggling with her husband and mother for survival, she discovered that refugees have no State to secure their civil rights, the only rights they have to fall back on are human rights. This marked the Arendtian interest on practical politics as an eventual citizen of the USA, and why she based her epistemic unfoldment on concepts like human condition, totalitarianism, evil, power, politics and most especially amongst others, lies and violence.

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<sup>1</sup> These are activists of all political ideas, parties and movements that are radical, reforming or revolutionary. All left-wingers work for social change and are either willing to work with an existing government or prefer revolution.

<sup>2</sup> This was the urge for the formation of a Jewish State in Israel, which sprung in 1892 by Nathan Birnbaum and declared on 14 May 1948 from the partition of Palestine.

<sup>3</sup> An organic mental disorder, a condition of muscular weakness caused by nerve damage or disease. It's partial paralysis.

<sup>4</sup> An ideology and practice associated with the 20<sup>th</sup> Century German Nazi party, subscribing to the theories of racial hierarchy and social domination.

<sup>5</sup> Implemented by Joseph Stalin, it was a governing policy in the Soviet Union which involved state terror, centralized state, and rapid industrialization.



## ABSTRACT

The major preoccupation of this epistemic adventure is to examine the concept of violence in politics and emerge with possible pillars for the culture of nonviolence. To achieve this, the present essay concentrates on the Arendtian evaluation of lies, violence and power in *Crisis of the Republic*. In a historico-analytical method, Arendt's examination of violence and power can be apprehended at two levels: theoretically and practically. Theoretically, it lays the foundation for a philosophical reflection on concepts such as power, lies, and violence. Moreover, it implicitly explains how through the use of a lie, a government can lead citizens to seek a response through movements such as civil disobedience, and may push them to adopt violent behaviors. Practically, it matches with contemporary challenges as movements of violence and civil disobedience continue to sit at the apex of world information. In order to demonstrate her point of view, Arendt derives from the everyday reality of proven facts and examines them from the angle of philosophy. This examination poses the problem of the logical pertinence or consistency of Arendt's analysis of violence and power. Arendt's solution seems utopic or politically idealistic when confronted with political realism. In fact, political realism stipulates that power is an independent political phenomenon and should not be thwarted with traditional moral values. This is not only illustrated by how power is exercised in the modern state but it is also amplified by the political existentialism of Sartre and Fanon. Despite the explicit and implicit limitations of Arendt's thesis, it still preserves an incomparable philosophical significance. Firstly, Arendt in her pacifism calls for a paradigm shift from a totalitarian democracy to a federal democracy that is to be grounded on inclusive dialogue. Secondly, her conception sets the pace for the establishment of the key pillars of the culture of nonviolence, and her thesis can contextually be interpreted as a panacea to the African political scene which is marked by chaos and violence today. This is because she does not only give reasons for African rulers to inculcate humanism and values like consensus in exercising power but also challenges citizens to be patriotic and nonviolent in expressing their civil and human rights while striving for a more stable society .

**Key Words:** Violence, political power, nonviolence, civil disobedience, consensus, governance.

## RESUME

La préoccupation majeure de cette aventure épistémique est d'examiner le concept de violence en politique et d'établir les possibles piliers pour une culture de la non-violence. Pour y parvenir, la présente thèse se concentre sur l'évaluation arendtienne du mensonge, la violence et le pouvoir dans « *Crisis of the Republic* ». Dans une méthode historico-analytique, l'examen arendtien de la violence et du pouvoir peut être appréhendé à deux niveaux : théorique et pratique. Théoriquement, il pose les jalons d'une réflexion philosophique sur des concepts tels que le mensonge et la violence, et explique de manière tacite comment en usant du mensonge un gouvernement peut conduire les citoyens à chercher une réponse à travers des mouvements tels que la désobéissance civile et peut les pousser à adopter des comportements de violence. De façon pratique, l'ouvrage va en droit ligne avec les difficultés contemporaines telles que les mouvements de violence et de désobéissance civile qui continuent d'occuper le sommet de l'actualité mondiale. Pour soutenir son point de vue, Arendt emprunte à la réalité quotidienne des faits avérés et les examine sous l'angle de la philosophie. Cet examen pose le problème de la pertinence logique ou de la cohérence de l'analyse arendtienne de la violence et du pouvoir. La solution d'Arendt semble être utopique ou politiquement idéaliste face au réalisme politique. En fait, le réalisme politique stipule que le pouvoir est un phénomène politique indépendant et ne doit pas être contrecarré par les valeurs morales traditionnelles. Ceci est non seulement illustré par la façon dont le pouvoir est exercé dans l'État moderne, mais aussi amplifié par l'existentialisme politique de Sartre et de Fanon. Malgré les limites explicites et implicites de la thèse d'Arendt, elle conserve encore une portée philosophique incomparable. Premièrement, Arendt, dans son pacifisme, appelle à passer d'une démocratie totalitaire à une démocratie fédérale fondée sur un dialogue inclusif. Deuxièmement, sa conception donne le ton pour l'établissement des piliers clés de la culture de la non-violence, et sa thèse peut contextuellement être interprétée comme une panacée à la scène politique africaine qui est aujourd'hui marquée par le chaos et la violence. En effet, elle ne donne pas seulement des raisons aux dirigeants africains d'inculquer l'humanisme et des valeurs telles que le consensus dans l'exercice du pouvoir, mais invite également les citoyens d'être patriotes et non violents dans l'expression de leurs droits civils et humains tout en luttant pour une société plus stable.

**Mots Clés :** Violence, pouvoir politique, non-violence, désobéissance civile, consensus, gouvernance.



## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

*“Political questions are far too serious to be left to the politicians”<sup>6</sup>*

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<sup>6</sup> Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*, transl. by Clara and Richard Winston, New York, A Harvest Book, Harcourt Brace and World, 1968, p.74.

The universe is composed of many actors but highly animated and dominated by man. This creature has extremely been affected by evolution which involves the gradual changes from simple to complex forms. According to the British naturalist, Charles Darwin and his doctrine of evolutionism, growth has occurred through a series of struggle for existence, variation, survival of the fittest and natural selection. However, the stages of progress didn't put aside the process of man's evolution from a *Dryopithecus*, to a *ramapithecus*, *Australopithecus*, *homo erectus*, *homo sapiens neanderthalensis*, and finally to *homo sapiens sapiens*. Throughout the process of growth and formation, moving from the ancient to the classical, post-classical, early-modern, modern to the contemporary periods of history, mankind has been plagued with many ills like hatred, envy, deceit, lies, and most especially violence by man on man. Today, no society is indifferent to the various forms of violence like terrorism, genocide, wars and other abuses, wherein man lives in a perpetual violence and who has been a problem to another man in the society.

Man is a political and social animal<sup>7</sup> as stipulated by Aristotle, who lives in a place called society. Society comes from the Latin word "*socius*" referring to the quality of associate, ally or companionship existing amongst humans leading to the building up of a culture. Building up a culture or society implies the establishment of groups of persons with a more or less flexible duration, at times stable and permanent.<sup>8</sup> Each society has its goals as they originate differently, and are of diverse forms like conjugal, commercial, and religious. Amongst these forms, the political society is the most important, unavoidable, apparent but more problematic. These forms of society fall under two major categories which are the micro societies and macro societies, which respectively embody the conjugal society and the political society. On the one hand, micro societies are naturally formed out of spontaneous social life or from a voluntary process amongst associates. This conjugal form of society includes a family, village, clan, tribe, ethnic, enterprise, associations, and political parties. On the other hand, the macro society is the political society, the large scale of the society, termed in Latin *polis* and *civitas*, which involves the approval of individuals to partake in the organization of the State because "*the beginning of political society depends upon the consent of individuals, to join into, and make one society*".<sup>9</sup> Hence, entering into politics is moving from the micro society to the macro society.

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<sup>7</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, Penguin, New York, 1980, p.38.

<sup>8</sup> Denis Maugenes, *Vivre Ensemble Malgré Tout... Initiation à la Société Politique*, Yaoundé, Presses de l'UCAC, Novembre 2012, pp. 11.

<sup>9</sup> John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, Rev. ed. P. Laslett, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.337.

Politics comes from the Greek word *'politikos'*, meaning 'of, for or relating to citizens'. As the word implies, it is derived from the Latin term "*polis*" denoting "city-state". As an adjective, it denotes the man Aristotle called *zoon politikon*, that is, a political animal; when used in a masculine form, it indicates the domain where the political activity unfolds; while in a feminine form, the most popular, it refers to the arts and science of the management of a society. Politics is the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live. It is an inevitable eater of human condition, and equally an act of governing public affairs *-res publica-*. Political questions are to be answered by all, and involves everyone, explaining why Arendt thinks that "*political questions are far too serious to be left to the politicians*"<sup>10</sup>. Thus, our theme of research is centered on this realm, specifically political philosophy, which is that branch of philosophy distinguished from political science on the grounds that political science is empirical and descriptive, explaining how a government works, while political philosophy is normative, establishing the norms or ideal standards that prescribe how governments ought to work.<sup>11</sup>

The relationship of men in a micro society and the management of public affairs hasn't been the best throughout history as violence has always chaired the union, whistle the game, and dictate directions. The multitude of moral codes in the world makes it difficult to give a precise definition of violence. Thus, there are many ways of defining violence depending on who is defining and for what purpose. Etymologically, violence comes from the Latin word "*vis*" which implies force, vigour, ferocity, viciousness. It is the use of force, power or similar attributes in any form to achieve a particular goal. From this definition, we can contemplate the concept of violence from two (2) senses; the simple sense and the general sense. Simply, violence could be apprehended as a disruption of stability, when a pre-existing or an established order is perturbed, while in a general sense, it is the use of force or power, be it physical or psychological in an exaggerated manner or not, to dominate, constraint, destroy or kill. This explains why the United Nations' World Health Organisation defines violence as "*the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community, that either result in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.*"<sup>12</sup> By this definition, we observe that our society has been captured by violence of all nature whereby, murder, suicide, rape, child abuse, women battery, and

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<sup>10</sup> Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*, p.74.

<sup>11</sup> Wiley Blackwell, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, p.536.

<sup>12</sup> World Report on Violence and Health: Abstract, World Health Organization, United Nations, 2002, p. 2.

many others reign every day. It is from such context and awareness of its consequences that in 1977, the French government created a committee in charge of reflecting on violence, criminality and delinquency wherein the conclusion of a report submitted in two volumes highly condemned violence to be a danger to mankind as it declared that « *La violence menace notre société : tantôt brutale, tantôt sournoise, elle risque d'être un ferment de désagrégation.* »<sup>13</sup> According to the world report on violence and health, globally over 1.6 million people lose their lives to violence each year. One of the dominant universal causes of the death of people aged between 15 to 44 years is violence, which accounts for 14% of deaths amongst males, and 7% amongst females. More people get injured and suffer from a series of physical, sexual, productive and mental health problems each time a person dies out of violence. This has equally got a negative effect on States who spend billions on health care and law enforcement.

It is from such facts on the rate of violence that we question the management of man by man. The management of humans in confined zones called nations, states, or nation-states, and the interrelatedness of men globally witnesses a cosmopolitan paradigm shift filled with a lot of uncertainties. Politics, which originally should be a means to secure the lives of men on earth and project divine principles of love, truth, peace and valorisation of life, has been a sphere of violence, lies and egoism. It gradually dissociates itself from humanistic foundations whereby politics no longer fascinates. Faced with the prevalence of violence and lies in politics, we are therefore entitled to wonder and reflect with Hannah Arendt on the essence of politics, human nature and condition. As such, we examine political power, violence and lies with her so as to narrow the gap between the governed and the rulers, and to curb the rate of ferocity in the world by emerging with new possible pillars for the culture of nonviolence as preached by Gandhi, Mandela and King Jr.

Thus, it is in this direction that our work is tilted, wherein we want to understand the why and how of violence in the society, especially in the political realm through the reading of Hannah Arendt in *Crisis of the Republic*. The aim of our study is to explain the thought of Hannah Arendt's political philosophy, that is, to bring out her analysis of violence and lies in politics, and its challenges in the society. As such, this dissertation poses the problem of the pertinence of Arendt's conception of power and violence. That is, consistency is the methodological virtue of every philosophical thesis and Arendt's conception is not an exception.

Arendt's conception of the relationship between power and violence can be apprehended at two levels. Theoretically, it lays the foundation for a philosophical reflection on concepts such

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<sup>13</sup> Alain Peyrefitte : *Réponse à la Violence*, T1, Presses Pocket, Paris, 1977, p. 221. "Violence threatens our society: sometimes brutal, sometimes sneaky, it risks being a ferment of disintegration." (my translation).

as power, lies, and violence. To talk of politics is to talk of the manner in which power is exercised quantitatively and qualitatively. Power for Arendt is the nexus of all political institutions. Power thus is the compass of political institutions. That is why Arendt affirms that “*all political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them*”<sup>14</sup>. Moreover, it implicitly explains how through the use of a lie, a government can lead citizens to seek a response through movements such as civil disobedience, and may push them to adopt violent behaviors. Practically, it matches with contemporary challenges as movements of violence and civil disobedience continue to sit at the apex of world information. In order to demonstrate her point of view, Arendt derives from the everyday reality of proven facts and examines them from the angle of philosophy. That is why she opines that; “*The Second World War was not followed by peace but by a cold war and the establishment of the military-industrial-labor complex*”<sup>15</sup> This implies that violence begets violence if we consider the sociology of violence in politics.

She explains the evils that are plaguing our society by an in-depth analysis of certain concepts whose use is easy but difficult to understand. Thus, it puts to the rigor of philosophical reflection the “ordinary” concepts of everyday life such as violence, power, lies, disobedience, etc. From Plato to Arendt right up to date, the preoccupation of every political society or State, has been that of stability. Violence has been a major ill in every society irrespective of its perspective, it is an existing phenomenon in all animals but frequent in the living together of men. However, Arendt arrived at a vital observation that there is a close link between politics, action, and lie. The powerless are most often stripped by the superpower, and that the scientific method is not workable in politics. More so, civil disobedience is independent of individual consciences, and that it is a group movement. Lastly, violence is different from power and it’s not an inherent characteristic of the human being. Thus, through this work, we submit a hermeneutic and critical appreciation of the Arendtian conception of violence by establishing the origin of violence in politics existing in our societies, showing both its strengths and weaknesses while regulating the living together of men in the society despite their differences, and suggesting possible pillars for the culture of nonviolence as expounded by great minds before and after Arendt.

It is worth nothing that Arendtian logic is both descriptive and prescriptive. The descriptive aspects comes in where she unveils or paints a picture of politics as practised today. Arendt

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<sup>14</sup> Arendt, *On Violence*, New York, A Harvest/HBJ Books, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970, p. 41.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

observes that political leaders today use lie and violence to exercise power. This has succeeded in most cases for the interest of the leaders at the detriment of the aspirations of the citizens. This is the picture of what is obtained in totalitarian democracy. However, this does not make her a political realist for she transcends observation to prescription. Arendt proposes values to be adopted so as to avoid chaos and violence, and her political normativity can be circumscribed within the framework of pacifism; where peace is an absolute value:

*Peace is an absolute, even though in recorded history periods of warfare have nearly always outlasted periods of peace. Power is in the same category; it is, as they say, 'an end in itself' [...] And since government is essentially organized and institutionalized power, the current question What is the end of government? does not make much sense either. The answer will be either question-begging-to enable men to live together-or dangerously utopian-to promote happiness or to realize a classless society or some other nonpolitical ideal, which if tried out in earnest cannot but end in some kind of tyranny.<sup>16</sup>*

From the above, Arendt positions herself between political realism and political idealism. Against political realism, she debunks the use of evil to attend political ends, and against political utopianism she is against the instrumental use of power. That is, power is an absolute value, an end itself and should not be conceived as a means to attend abstract or utopian ends.

Posing the problem of the pertinence of Arendt's thesis implies the evocation of the internal and external limitations. That is, we are going to question the internal consistency of Arendt's conception as well as confronting her with political realists and existentialist philosophers. Finally, we shall also question the philosophical interest or significance of her conception of violence and power in politics. This will take the global and the African orientations. The problem of the pertinence of Arendt's thesis requires the adoption of a historico-analytical method. Historical because we are going to explore the pre-Arendtian views of the relationship between violence and power. It is also analytical because we will examine the major articulations of Arendt's conception of the relationship between power and politics. If Arendt considers violence as action taken to vehemently coerce support from a group, lies as a disruption and caricature of politics in general, and both as that which can destroy politics without being able of any replacement<sup>17</sup>, can they be ultimately excluded from the political realm? How does violence manifest itself and how did we arrive at the point of violence in the society? Can we do without violence and lies in politics? If no, how could it be managed? These are the major and subordinate interrogations that will constitute the critical trajectory of our work.

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.51-52.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p.56.



The aforementioned historico-analytical method is reflected in the organisation of the work. In the first part titled; *Violence and Politics*, we will proceed historically by evoking the archaeology and trajectory of violence. The historical trajectory is epitomised by the examination of the pre-Arendtian conception of power and violence, while the psychological trajectory unveils Arendt's view of the origin of violence in the political prism. The first part ends analytically as it presents the framework of Arendt's political philosophy on the question of violence, power and lying in politics and its status in *Crisis of the Republic*. It shall be concluded with the criticisms she addresses to Fanon, Sartre and Black Powers.

The second part of this work is titled; *Problems of the Arendtian conception of violence in her political philosophy* wherein, we will first centre on the legitimacy of the usage of violence in politics, move onto presenting some critique on the political idealism of Arendt's conception of violence, and finally a critique of Arendt on counter-violence in the struggle for freedom wherein her misconception of philosophers like Sartre, Fanon and the black movements shall be exposed.

Lastly, the third part of this work is titled; *Arendtian conception of violence and politics: actualisation and perspective*. Our first concern here will be to acknowledge and expose on the contributions of Hannah Arendt in the progress of modern States. Emphases on a second note shall be on proposed solutions to the problem of violence which is that of establishing the pillars of the culture of nonviolence through Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Junior, and enlightened by Alain J. Richard. Finally, we shall be actualizing Arendt's political philosophy to the development of Africa, showing how violence could be governed as it is inevitable, echoing the moral, religious and political responsibilities in contemporary African States vis-a-vis violence and lies in governance, and emerging with the blending of Arendt's federal democracy with African consensual democracy for nonviolent governance in Africa in particular.

The significance of our research work on Arendt's conception of power and violence is dual; that is, theoretical and pragmatic. Theoretically, it permits us to engage into moral philosophy, which is the most practical branch of philosophy and specifically in the area of politics. Given that moral philosophy deals with what ought to be, as opposed to what is, which needs to be a regulator of political actions. This reflection gives us the axiological bases for a humanised political action. Practically, this research work provide outstanding principles and pillars to solve practical problems faced by mankind as a whole and Africa in particular in the domain of the organisation and the administration of the state. Thus, a reflection on violence, lies and power is fundamentally crucial for those who want to understand current political practices so as to project a better society and management of people.



**PART I:  
VIOLENCE AND POLITICS**

*“All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence.”<sup>18</sup>*

*“Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance..... Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it”<sup>19</sup>*

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p.35.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p.56.

## **PARTIAL INTRODUCTION**

Is violence, politics and power synonymous? Is there a link between violence and politics? Political violence or violence in politics? What are the different forms of the manifestation of violence? What accounts for the origin of violence? What is violence? How is violence manifested in humans? What does it mean to be human? These are the vital questions we shall be answering in this first part of our work which covers a wide range of disciplinary conceptions to make it unambiguous. It would be unmethodical to unfold a reflection on violence and its manifestations in humans, who constitute the society, without going through some conceptual elucidations on human origin and human nature. This will enable us draw a line between violence and politics, and understand through Hannah Arendt why it was for her, and should be for us a subject of long reflection. We shall equally attempt raising the types of violence that do exist, forms of violence in politics, and its origin in human existence. However, pinpointing the nuance that exist between political violence and violence in politics, and deducing a point of convergence and divergence between violence and politics won't be an exception.

## CHAPTER I: ARCHAEOLOGY AND TRAJECTORY OF VIOLENCE

No one concerned with history and politics can remain unaware of the enormous role violence has always played in human affairs. An examination and interpretation of the path to which violence occurs necessitates the analysis of the genealogy of humans. Being human is witnessing the total emergence of one's initial potentialities. Thus, an ontodunatologist, that is, a dynamic ontology, a being simultaneously active and always powerful. The essence of man is no other thing than his definition, which means man exists first before determining his worth, his stay and his tenacity in a particular vicinity. This formula which stands as the foundation of the Sartrean existentialism in his pronouncement that "*existence precedes essence*"<sup>20</sup>, is equally the affirmation of human freedom. If man has the same biological characteristics like other mammals but distinguishes himself from them through reason, then we can accept with Aristotle that "*man is a rational animal*"<sup>21</sup> and crown it with Nietzsche in his idea that man designates himself as the being who considers values, appreciates and evaluates, as the animal estimator par excellence, capable of establishing an order of perfection in a chaos. Accepting on a second note with Montaigne that "*l'homme est ondoyant et divers*"<sup>22</sup>, denoting man as vain, fickle, and unstable, is to say he is a puzzle, riddle, has a changeable state of mind, and one can only have an approximate and uncertain knowledge of him. However, this diversity and disorder surrounding man creates a tensed and unsecured environment which transforms the society into a jungle wherein one man becomes an enemy to another. Thus, Hobbes should be applauded for his brilliant declaration in reference to the state of nature that "*man is a wolf to man*"<sup>23</sup> emanating from the Latin proverb expressed as "*homo homini lupus est*" because of the presence of differences, urge for ownership and preservation of rights. As such, the violence and chaos perpetrated by man has been a disturbing issue in the unfoldment of historico-philosophical reflections. It is from this backdrop that this chapter attempts to present a philosophical and epistemological analysis of violence, from the origin and nature of man to the aetiology of violence, through its typology.

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<sup>20</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, Trans. Carol Macomber, Yale, Yale University Press, 2007, p.62.

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle, *Ethics*, trans. J. A. K. Thomson, London, Penguin, 1955, p.75 and p.88.

<sup>22</sup> Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*, Paris, Gallimard, 1973, p.43.

<sup>23</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*. CB MacPherson, ed. and intro. New York, Penguin, 1968, p.31.

## 1.1 - Human Origin and Human Nature

It would be unfair to delve into violence and its manifestations without examining the origin and nature of humans, following the different characteristics of man earlier raised. As such, our target in this subpart is to attempt an answer for the following questions: Are people violent by nature? Is there an inherently evil nature of man? What is human nature?

### 1.1.1 - Historical Reminiscence on the Origin and Nature of Mankind

Mankind has an ambiguous origin, which renders its nature complex. Human nature refers to the unique physiognomies which humans naturally possess. It could be apprehended as a cradle of norms of conduct and as obstacles to welfare wherein, the ambiguity of this nature runs differently from the ancient to the contemporary era involving doctrines of creationism and evolutionism.

#### 1) The Ancient Conception of Human Origin and Nature.

In the antiquity, the pre-Socratics ruptured from the mythical and dogmatic considerations of things by the poets, to cosmological speculations which sought for the essence and causes of things in the universe. This saw the emergence of the Sophists who shifted this pattern of thought to that of man and the society in which ethics, epistemology and politics were their point of focus. The pre-Socratics were ontologists, metaphysicians, and epistemologists as they engaged in the study of the nature of being, time, space, existence and causality, preached relativism of knowledge to a thinking subject as Protagoras said the measure of all things is man. However, Socrates rendered this debate more anthropocentric, different from that of the Sophists in terms of epistemology and ethics, especially in his famous pronouncements as presented in the works of Plato: *“knowledge is thus proved once more to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the origin of all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, or the greater pain to the less, except from ignorance”*<sup>24</sup> This practical analysis of human existence enriched Plato who established the difference between four cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperament, and justice, which are all fundamentally one but have different expressions of the rule of reason over all human activities.

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<sup>24</sup> Plato, *The Complete Works of Plato: Protagoras*, 1<sup>st</sup> edition, Compilation Mohamed Elwany, Trans. Benjamin Jowett, Benjamin Jowett's edition, 1871, p. 522.

In addition, according to Aristotle, all human actions are directed towards the attainment of a particular goal, a means to an end which is seen as a good, called happiness. It is the end which is sought for its own sake, and whatever a person seeks as an end or as a good, he seeks it as a means to happiness, defined as an “*activity of the soul in accordance with virtue*”<sup>25</sup>. Virtue for him is the result of a habit, and are either intellectual or moral in which moral virtues implies courage, temperance, generosity, justice etc. Thus, rationality is a vital quality of man which differentiate him from other animals because a virtuous action is a good action performed as a result of a habit by a being. This brought about his assertions that “*man is a rational animal*”, wherein we see the primacy of reason, and adopted by the Stoics. For them, human desires are insatiable and a trial of satisfaction is embarking unwisely on a road that lead nowhere but to frustration. According to them, man should therefore eradicate all his desires, emotions, and passions, overcome them and live only according to reason if he wants to be happy. Conversely to this, the Epicurean ethics also known as the *hedonistic* ethics, is based on pleasure as the standard of morality. Epicurus on his part apprehend pleasure as the act of judging an action to be right or wrong and onto which our decisions regarding what should be done and what should be avoided relies.

## **2) The Medieval Conception of Human Origin and Nature.**

During this period, the origin and nature of man was divinely inclined and all things were attributed to the supernatural entity called God. St. Thomas Aquinas was an embodiment of this as he followed the path of Aristotle on the highest good for man, and virtue as a mean between two extremes. The highest good for man according to Aristotle is the terrestrial contemplation of God by philosophers while for Aquinas is the mystical contemplation of God in heaven by anybody who has lived a good life here on earth, what he called the beatific vision. For him, man has an innate disposition to understand the fundamentals of life, and this capacity is called *synderesis*<sup>26</sup>. This is the natural tendency imparted on us by nature, infallible and present in all men, which came as a result of creationism.

To be human according to the creation story is to bear the image of God. This is the oldest and most popular conception accounting for the origin and nature of mankind as it asserts that “... *God created man to his own image...*”<sup>27</sup>. This metaphysical or theological standpoint was a divine

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<sup>25</sup> Aristotle, *Op. cit.*, p.75.

<sup>26</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, 1a, 2ae, 94, 4.

<sup>27</sup> The Holy Bible, *Genesis 1:27*, RSV, Bible Society Resources Ltd.

act wherein man received the gift of being like God and ruling over other creations. This material provided by the Bible presents two elements in human nature: the body and the breath of life, in which the living soul or person emerged from the symbiosis. Adam, who was the product of this obtained the qualities of God, which meant only three things: man is different from the beast, man is able to make decisions and rule, and man is free to establish aims and work for its accomplishment. Thus, “*created in the image of God*” is righteousness. However, the fallen nature of man ascended as a result of the abuse of man’s freedom of choice, choosing sin instead of righteousness, leading to total corruption of the human nature and universal sin as the teachings of both the Old and New Testaments stipulates: “*For behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sin did my mother conceive me*”<sup>28</sup>. This is because Adam was an embodiment of the totality of mankind, as he sinned, humanity as a whole sinned, became corrupt, crafty, egoistic, violent, and a replica of the vices of nature.

### **3) The Modern Conception of Human Origin and Nature.**

As of how the modernist apprehended the origin and nature of mankind, we come in contact with the conflict between the State of nature and the State of law. Man found himself in a lawless State, without any authority, morality, notion of right and wrong, justice and injustice. It was a State of perpetual conflict, uprisings, and insecurity amongst men because of desires, appetites and emotions. Being made of taste and needs, might became right as a result of lawlessness wherein men clashed, fought and quarreled with each other in the course of satisfying their appetites and take hold of a property till another stronger person seizes. This was the State of nature reflected upon by Hobbes and Spinoza who established the origin of the State of law wherein men realized that they needed the mutual help of one another to obtain satisfaction. So, it was in their own interest to voluntarily give up their natural rights in favor of an organized civil society based on a social contract. Like Hobbes, Spinoza maintains that man is naturally selfish and conditioned by nature to pursue only his interest. In short, Hobbes had declared that man had “*...no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and the worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of men was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.*”<sup>29</sup> This is a declaration that Rousseau will out rightly contradict by positing that war

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Psalm 51:5.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas Hobbes, op. cit., p.186.

and violence are the product of the society, man knew no evil, he was innocent. In short, “*man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains.*”<sup>30</sup> in a society that corrupts him.

Furthermore, the philosopher of private property, Locke, postulates a State of nature but differently in that, it was not a state of lawlessness but that of freedom and equality; everyone had the right to use his property at his will but with limits. Thus, due to the unsafe nature of their properties, the democratic and individual consent for civil society emerged:

*Men being, as has been said, by nature all-free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this state and subjected to the political power of another without consent. The only way whereby anyone can divest himself of his natural liberty and put on the bonds of civil society is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe and peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a great security against any that are not of it.*<sup>31</sup>

However, Hume proposed another version of the theory of the state of nature prior to the establishment of laws. He was more of an experimental psychologist than a philosopher whose interest was on how man *do* behave rather than how man *ought* to behave. Sentiments, natural feelings, natural tendencies and passions, are what moves a man and determines his choice of action not reason, for, “*reason is, and ought only be the slave of passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them (sic)*”<sup>32</sup>. Even though Kant will later on disapprove this claim after getting up from his ‘dogmatic slumber’, Hume went further declaring that man is a creature made up of not only sentiments, feelings and emotions, but sympathy because by nature, man’s sympathy permits him to share the feelings of others. Through sympathy, individuals rose above self-interest, man decided to examine his action towards others and realized that if everyone was allowed to use his freedom at his will, chaos was going to reign in the society. They therefore decided to frame laws that would limit their freedom and avoid disorder, and install the spirit of good conduct in the society.

Thus, from this historico-philosophical reminiscence on the origin of mankind and its nature, without any pretentious exhaustiveness, we come to understand that man is an embodiment of diverse elements such as reason, sentiments, feelings and emotions. Man was created in God’s image with righteousness and freedom of choice at his disposal. A creature of realisation, satisfaction, and ego-centricism but sympathises with his fellow man, having virtue as the result of their habits and all strive for happiness.

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<sup>30</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Social Contract or Principles of Political Rights*, G.D.H Cole translation, 1762, p.1.

<sup>31</sup> John Locke, *Two Treatise on Civil Government*, London :G. Routledge and sons, 1887, p.26.

<sup>32</sup> David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Oxford University Press, 1978. p.415.



### 1.1.2 - Human Nature and Evil

It is from this Historico-philosophical reminiscence on the origin of mankind and its nature, without any pretentious exhaustiveness, that we set the pace for an account of evil and violence. Evil can be apprehended as an unpleasant and a malevolent act, that which is intended to harm, producing sorrow, distress, injury or calamity. It has harmful qualities, not good, worthless, undesirable, morally bad and cruel. According to ethics and the philosophy of religion, evil is divided into moral evil and natural evil. On one hand, natural evil results from rare natural occurrences like earthquakes, diseases, famines, while on the other hand, moral evil is due to deliberate human actions. On the other hand, moral evil is the extreme form of moral wrongness, and causes much pains and sufferings<sup>33</sup>. If violence could be considered as a form of evil, then it is but logical that we elaborate on the concept of evil which is part of man be it a human act or natural endowment. In short, this subpart is bilateral in depicting the bond between man and evil. The first will be on some accounts on the origin of evil while the second will be a description to understand whether there exists an inherent evil nature of man.

#### 1) Conceptions on the Origin of Evil

Reflecting on the origin of evil, happens to be a heavy burden considering the fact that it is a subject matter which cuts across generations, and has always been at the start of time following the Biblical story of the Fallen Man in Genesis chapter 3 as prominently echoed by orthodox theologians. However, Socrates believed that nobody rationally chooses evil, and that evil is just the outcome of ignorance. To better assess this Socratic conception, and know about the origin of evil, we shall be evoking the ideas of great minds like Spinoza, Leibniz and Rousseau for lucidity.

Firstly, in defining good and evil, the Dutch Jewish Philosopher, Benedict Baruch Spinoza distinguished between two types of Beings; Real Beings and Rational Beings<sup>34</sup>. According to him, certain things fundamentally dwell in our mind and not in nature, which enables the distinctive apprehension of the relationship between things because they are products of our reflection. Thus, the human mind is at the apex of all existing phenomenon because it conceives, create and modifies that which is presented by nature. Nature presents the reality of the supernatural artist, His handicraft, consequently, the laws of nature are components of the real Beings while moral values

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<sup>33</sup> Wiley Blackwell, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Western philosophy*, p. 241.

<sup>34</sup> Baruch De Spinoza, *Court Traité sur Dieu, l'Homme et la Sante de son âme*, Appuhn transl., first part, Chap. 10, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1964, pp. 83-84.

constitute the rational Being. The rational Being embodies all that which is a product of reflection including nature itself because of relativism in their existence. Spinoza makes us understand that something is considered good as compared to another which has been judge as meaningless or useless. A man should be considered evil or bad if he has been compared with another having less utility or values, following the general idea we have got of things of this nature. For this philosopher then, evil is neither a thing nor an effect in nature, but an essence produced by rational Beings.

Secondly, following the publication of a book on the origin of evil in England<sup>35</sup>, the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz observed, exposed and judged the ideas of an English Bishop, William King<sup>36</sup> on evil, who divided evil into metaphysical, physical and moral evil, applauded by Leibniz. Metaphysical evil refers to the deficiencies of man and the world, physical evil exists in injured pains, while moral evil are all the imperfections perpetrated through sin. While analysing the ideas of King William, Leibniz in his fatalism arrived at his famous conclusion that the world as created by God is the best of all possible worlds and has a pre-established harmony wherein each individual substance is created to evolve according to its own determinate nature, but is nevertheless in complete harmony with other monads. Leibniz considered monads as soul-like, and each is a mirror in the universe because the world for him is a compound, ultimately comprising an infinity of indivisible and mutually isolated simple substances. This doesn't mean a world void of evil but where imperfections are attached to perfections as created by God so as to give man the freedom of choice, exercise a freewill of action and direction. Thus, evil for him originated out of freewillism and the corrosion of this harmony as monads in a compound.

Following the above rationalists in their reflection pattern, is the French political and social philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau whose reflection is closely linked to that of Leibniz in that God is not the origin of evil but the socio-cultural deviations brings about evil.

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<sup>35</sup> This refers to *The Origin of Evil*, a book published by William King in London in 1702, which tried to reconcile the existence of evil with the idea of a benevolent and omnipotent God.

<sup>36</sup> William King was the Bishop of Dublin from 1650-1729, and a disciple of John Locke.

## 2) The Inherent Evil Nature of Man

Steered by our stance on the origin of evil as earlier raised, enlightened by Socrates who believed that nobody chooses evil rationally; Benedict who thinks that evil is neither a thing nor an effect in nature, but an essence produced by rational Beings; and Leibniz who highlighted that we live in a world where evil is evident through the dualism of perfection and imperfection to permit the prevalence of freewill, we are at this juncture confronted with a dilemma. This dilemma requires some clarifications to better set the pace of man's link to violence. The idea of violence and human nature has drastically prevailed since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, our major question here is to determine whether evil is inherently man's nature. Are people by nature violent? In an attempt to provide answers to the above interrogation, we shall proceed analogically from famous historical situations like The Holocaust in German-occupied Europe, The Rwandan genocide in Rwanda, and The Anglophone Crisis or Ambazonian War in Cameroon. Though Thomas Hobbes declared that man's natural condition was that of violence and conflict, Jean-Jacques Rousseau contradicted in the 17<sup>th</sup> century when he argued that civilization, not nature, shaped the human attraction or preference of violence. Whatever be the case, both insinuates that men are involved either voluntarily or involuntarily as history puts it to our understanding.

Primarily, The Holocaust, also called the Shoah, was the Second World War (WWII) genocide of the European Jews between 1941 and 1945 across German-occupied Europe where Nazi Germany and collaborators methodically murdered about six (6) million Jews, covering about two-third of Europe's Jewish population. During this period, Adolf Hitler was busy making a claim on Stalingrad<sup>37</sup> with almost all his soldiers focused there. Who then carried out the genocide in Poland? According to Christopher Robert Browning, an American Historian, specialist of The Holocaust, the perpetrators were ordinary middle-aged men like firefighters, shop owners, local heroes and teachers, who were not members of the Nazi party, formed The Reserved Police Battalion 101 that carried out the atrocious killing and mass evacuation of Jews in some parts of Poland. Despite the offer made by Trapp, the leader of the Battalion, that any of the older men amongst them who didn't feel up to the task that lay before him to kindly step out, none did<sup>38</sup>. Life is a matter of choice, you choose to choose or you choose not to choose, in either case you make a choice. Though they were given the chance to keep their hands clean from the stain of innocent blood of women, children and elderly persons, they chose to stain the hands.

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<sup>37</sup> Volgograd, formerly known as Tsaritsyn and then Stalingrad, is a city in western Russia and the administrative capital of the Volgograd Oblast. It is located on the west bank of the Volga River.

<sup>38</sup> Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men*, New York, Harper Collins, 1993, p 2.

Furthermore, the Rwandan genocide in Africa, also called genocide against the Tutsi, was a mass slaughter of Tutsi, Twa and moderate Hutu tribes in Rwanda which took place between the 7<sup>th</sup> April and 15<sup>th</sup> July 1994 during the Rwandan Civil War. This was an anti-Tutsi racism which killed between 500.000 and 1.074.016 persons. Regardless of the numerous remote causes of the intertribal conflict between the Hutu's and the Tutsi's, the immediate cause which led to the civil war was the firing down of the airplane carrying the Rwandan President, Juvénal Habyarimana and the Hutu President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira as it prepared to land in Kigali. Though various accusations were reciprocally levied on Paul Kagame of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)<sup>39</sup> and Hutu extremists of the Rwandan Government, what matters here is that a man was behind the ordering and assassination while men were behind the slaughtering of Tutsi's and the sexual violence which occurred with about 250.000 to 500.000 women raped during the genocide.

Actually, the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon, also called the Ambazonian<sup>40</sup> War is a conflict in the former British Southern Cameroons region of Cameroon where Separatists in the Anglophone territories of Northwest Region and Southwest Region declared the independence of Ambazonia and began fighting against the government of Cameroon. This is due to long-lasting socio-economic and political discrimination perpetrated on the English-speaking Cameroonians of the Northwest and the Southwest regions since 1972. After several violent confrontations, the war drastically sprung on September 9<sup>th</sup>, 2017 and led to the dead of more than 3000 people as of February 2022<sup>41</sup>. Though still prevailing with uncertain death rates and statistics of both internally and externally displaced persons, accusing fingers about the severe violence has been pointed on both the government and the extremists for the casualties. In short, the violence, conflict, and war were planned, ordered and effected by Man, the rational animal not the irrational.

Thus, from the above-mentioned situations, we observe that though man is a political animal as declared by Aristotle, and a rational animal by both Aristotle and René Descartes, the problem of man in the society is man. The world is forced to take critical look in the mirror, put oneself into the terrifying hypothetical situation of what one would do in a dreadful condition when they have complete control of other's lives or when their rights are being violated. There is

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<sup>39</sup> The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF–*Front Patriotique Rwandais*, *FPR*) is the ruling political party in Rwanda transformed in December 1987 from the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU). Led by President Paul Kagame, the party has governed the country since its armed wing defeated government forces and ended the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

<sup>40</sup> The name “*Ambazonia*” is taken from Amba Bay (a bay in south west Cameroon) and *Ambozes*, the local name of the mouth of the Wouri River. This is where the English language was permanently established for the first time in Southern Cameroons, when missionary Alfred Saker founded a settlement of freed slaves by Amba Bay in 1858, which was later renamed Victoria, present-day Limbe.

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-cameroons-anglophone-crisis-crossroads>

something of an internal evil in us irrespective of whether we choose to embrace or suppress it. This explains why we concord with the view of Thomas Hobbes that *“the life of man in the State of nature is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”*<sup>42</sup>, crowning it with Sigmund Freud that all men are innately evil and aggression lies within a human as part of his nature. The two points proves that there is no animal crueller than *Homo sapiens*. Thus, from the above analysis backed by some philosophers, evil is inherent in man’s nature and people are naturally violent as violence is an evil aspect of man which generally has immediate negative effects, though to Hannah Arendt, violence is not an inherent characteristic of the human being because evil is not monstrous; it takes place under the guise of “normality”. According to her, the “banality of evil” is the idea that evil does not have the Satan-like, villainous appearance we might typically associate it with. Rather, evil is perpetuated when immoral principles become normalized over time by unthinking people, as she declares that *“...most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil”*<sup>43</sup>.

## 1.2 - Aetiology and Typology of Violence

We earlier defined evil as an unpleasant and a malicious act, which is intended to harm, producing sorrow, distress, injury or calamity. We understood that it could either be natural or moral, where natural evil results from rare natural occurrences like earthquakes, diseases, famines, while moral evil is due to deliberate human actions. One of these deliberate human actions which is unpleasant and nasty is violence, considered by Engels as the accelerator of economic development<sup>44</sup> and by Arendt to be that which *“can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it”*<sup>45</sup>. In the World Report on Violence and Health (WRVH), the definition of violence as *“the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person or against a group or community, that either result in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation.”*<sup>46</sup> clearly depicts a dichotomy between intended and unintended actions, presence of physical force, threat and actual power, not leaving out physical and psychological harm. Our aim in this subpart is to examine the origin of violence, types of violence, and the forms of violence in politics existing in human nature.

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<sup>42</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.186.

<sup>43</sup> Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, McCarthy, Mary (ed.), New York, Harcourt, Vol. II, 1978, p.13.

<sup>44</sup> Arendt, *Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics; Civil Disobedience; On Violence; Thoughts on Politics and Revolution*, New York, Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, 1972, p.111.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p.155.

<sup>46</sup> *World Report on Violence and Health*, *op cit*.

### 1.2.1 - Etiology or Aetiology of Violence

From the Greek words “*aitia*” and “*logia*” which respectively mean cause and study. Put together, it refers to “giving a reason for”. Etiology or aetiology refers to the study of the causes, origins or reasons behind the way that things are, the way they function or the causes themselves. Therefore, in this subpart we are concerned with the origin and causes of acts of violence so as to understand its physical or psychological manifestations in the society. According to Isabelle and Bruno Eliat, violence begins as soon as there is a non-respect on human dignity or the dignity of a man, which could be an ontological dignity or a cosmological dignity. As such, the origin of violence could be analysed from two (2) major thesis; the natural thesis and the cultural thesis.

#### 1) The Natural Thesis of the Origin of Violence

By natural thesis, we refer to the inherent evil nature of man as earlier raised wherein man is naturally violent. This relate to the fact that as violence is a vice and not a virtue, it is natural and innate in every human being reflected by human behaviour. This is best explained through the philosophies of Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Sigmund Freud. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli posits to our understanding that violence is the manifestation of the wicked and dark side of man, who is intrinsically and biologically violent.

In the same line of reflection, Hobbes highlighted that man originally has been in a state of nature with natural conditions coordinating his existence in which the “*natural condition of mankind*”<sup>47</sup> was one of violence and conflict. Man being in a state of nature, considered to be a state of war wherein life is “...*solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short*”<sup>48</sup> because individuals are in a constant “*war of all against all*”<sup>49</sup> accounts for the natural origin of violence. In short, he considered a state of nature to be a miserable state of war wherein none of our important human ends are reliably realizable though he proposes that all men by nature are equal in the faculties of mind and body.

Equally, the Austrian psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud argues that all men are innately evil and violence lies within the human as part of his nature. Thus, “*no one who, like me, conjures up the most evil of those half tamed demons that inhabit the human breast, and seeks to wrestle with*

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<sup>47</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.184.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p.186.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p.187.

them, can expect to come through the struggle unscathed.”<sup>50</sup> In *Malaise dans la Civilisation* he reiterates that violence is the manifestation of the drive or desire for death in man. This means that, when the spirit of dead (*Thanatos*) takes over the spirit of life (*bios*), man becomes violent naturally. This clearly explains why Freud declared that “*L’homme n’est point cet être débonnaire au cœur assoiffé d’amour (...) mais l’être au contraire qui doit porter au compte de ses données instinctives une bonne somme d’agressivité*”<sup>51</sup>.

## 2) The Cultural Thesis of the Origin of Violence

Here, contrary to the natural thesis, the cultural thesis of the origin of violence rather depicts the idea that man isn’t intrinsically and biologically violent but becomes violent as a result of certain existential aspects or products of socio-cultural realities he comes across. Proponents of this thesis hold that man didn’t aim to be bad but civilisation imposed that on him through cultural differences, advent of capitalism, social fraction, hyper-development of social media, drug and alcohol addiction. The 17<sup>th</sup> century French Philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, proponent of the state of law, for instance defends the natural goodness of man by highlighting that man is naturally good but is corrupt by the society<sup>52</sup>. According to him, civilization, not nature, shaped the human propensity for violence, that man has been deflowered by the happenings of a bad civilisation which he is simply a victim, and posits that this deplorable civilization is because of our bad morals<sup>53</sup>. This explains the prevailing of school violence in our society wherein students under the influence of drug and alcohol manifest extreme cases of individual or collective violence and loose pedagogic purpose needed for global change. According to Georges Dumézil, the fraction between the “we” and “they” leads to cultural division, tribalism, antagonism, genocide and other cultural related violence. As such, we deduce that violence is also caused by societal happenings.

In addition, with the proponents of this cultural thesis holding that violence is man’s heritage of the socio-cultural context he finds himself, one can’t neglect the fact that the advent of capitalism as elucidated by Marx and Engels which introduced private ownership of property accelerated social tensions with prevalent rate of envy, jealousy, greed, competition, backbiting, alongside other vices. Social fraction into classes created conflict between the poor and the rich due to social and economic pressure, injustice, frustration, and exploitation.

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<sup>50</sup> Sigmund Freud Quotes, [www.goodreads.com](http://www.goodreads.com), accessed on December 1, 2014.

<sup>51</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Le Malaise dans la culture* (1930), trad. de l’allemand par Ch. et J. Odier, Paris, PUF, 1981, pp.64-66.

<sup>52</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p.72.

Synthetically from the above thesis on the origin of violence, we can retain that our genes lead us to chaos or order, strives or stability, war or peace, violence or nonviolence depending on the particular social environment in which we live. Environmental pressures, opposition, and density in population, influence human progress which eventually inclines us to violence. Thus, cultural origins accounts more for the origin of violence than natural origins.

### **1.2.2 - Typology of Violence**

In this subpart, we are hereby preoccupied with the diverse manifestations of violence during our encounter with others as we coexist. In our daily activities, we encounter insults, fights, physical and verbal harassment, and many others. The expression of violence is of a double characteristic; physical violence which is the direct or indirect act of attacking the physical integrity of another on one hand, and on the other hand we have the psychological or moral manifestation of violence. The above dual characteristics produces manifestations like verbal violence, socio-economic violence, political violence, natural violence, spiritual violence, cyber violence, and self-violence. This will be elucidated via the triadic classification of the types of violence by the world report on violence and health (WRVH). As such, there are fundamentally three types of violence depending on who defines them and for what purpose, which are in turn subdivided into forms or systems.

#### **1) Self-directed Violence**

Self-directed violence refers to the act of performing violence independently by oneself on thyself without external control, which mostly leads to harm. According to The Centers for Disease Control (CDC), it is anything a person does intentionally that can cause injury to the self, including death. It is a wide concept which takes into consideration suicidal thoughts or action and forms of self-harm. Suicide which is highly used in self-directed violence, refers to a type of homicide which comes from Latin "*suicidium*" meaning to kill oneself. It is the voluntary taking away of one's life. Suicide is of various types like direct, indirect, voluntary, involuntary, individual and mass suicide. Thus, self-directed violence encompasses a good number of forms manifested by thoughts, actions or other forms of self-harm.

In a progressive or inductive manner, the first self-directed violence we can raise is non-fatal suicidal behavior which describes all acts of suicidal behavior that does not result in death. One of this is suicidal ideation which is clinically referred to as the contemplation of consciously ending one's own life. This form of violence is categorized as being more psychological than



physical as it is still at the contemplative stage. This is closely followed by attempted suicide which is a form of non-fatal suicide behavior defined as “*a potentially life-threatening self-injurious event or behavior with a nonfatal outcome*”<sup>54</sup>. It is when one tries to end his/her life by self-authority but doesn't die due to one reason or the other. Parasuicide, also called suicidal gesture, is another non-suicidal behavior considered to be a deceptive attempt at suicide but not aimed at death while self-harm is a deliberate injury to oneself, typically as a manifestation of a psychological or psychiatric disorder. In addition, there equally exist another category of non-fatal suicidal behavior called self-mutilation. Mutilation refers to the act of tearing off or removing parts of a human being, which is either therapeutic or customary. Thus, self-mutilation is the direct and thoughtful destruction or change of parts of the body without conscious suicidal intent<sup>55</sup>. Conversely to the above forms of non-fatal suicidal behaviors as a kind of self-directed violence is fatal suicidal behavior. This is a form of self-directed violence which is often used to refer to suicidal acts that result in death like hanging, pesticide poisoning, firearms, falling from a tall building. It is worthy of notice at this juncture that, attempted suicide, parasuicide, self-harm and mutilation are non-fatal suicide behavior which does not result in death while the fatal suicidal behaviors end in death. Consequently, both the non-fatal and fatal suicide behaviors are all forms of self-directed violence.

## **2) Interpersonal Violence**

This is the use of violence or dreaded behavior used to establish power and control over another person through fear and intimidation, often used interchangeably with domestic violence, and intimate partner violence. According to the department of injuries and violence prevention of the World Health Organization, interpersonal violence denotes acts of violence and intimidation happening between family members, intimate partners or individuals who might or might not know one another wherein the violence is not precisely planned to boost the objectives of any group or ideology.<sup>56</sup> This category is mostly caused by religious, judicial, economic and social disparity, and comprises of sexual violence, family violence, youth violence, gender-based violence, child maltreatment, abuse of elders, office violence, verbal violence and spiritual or religious violence.

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<sup>54</sup> Encyclopedia of Adolescence, [www.elsevier.com>books>brown](http://www.elsevier.com/books/brown), consulted on July 3 2017.

<sup>55</sup> According to the CDC, it is when there is past or present evidence that an individual wish to die, look for means to kill him/herself, and understands the probable consequences of his or her actions or potential actions.

<sup>56</sup> Waters H., Hyder A., Rajkotia Y., and others, *The economic dimensions of interpersonal violence*. Geneva: Department of Injuries and Violence Prevention, World Health Organization, 2004.

Primo, sexual violence is a type of interpersonal violence also known as sexual harassment, which refers to force manifested against someone for sexual exploitation who is unable to consent due to threats, authority, age or disability. It is a macroscopic act which involves voyeurism, rape, sexual pressure, and sexual harassment. Secundo, family violence on its part is a broad concept which encompasses all forms of violence existing amongst family members like child abuse, elder abuse, sibling violence, and intimate partner violence. Tertio, youth violence is another form of interpersonal violence which denotes, according to WHO, “*homicide and non-fatal attacks perpetrated by or against a person aged 10-29 years old*”<sup>57</sup> while quarto, we have gender-based violence, mostly used interchangeably with violence against women or men, is any act of physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering to women or men publicly or privately within the family, community or cultural sphere like female genital mutilation, deprivation of liberty or assaults. Quinto, spiritual or religious violence is another form of interpersonal violence which is a situation whereby an individual or a group be it dogmatist or extremists, decides to dominate or transform others from their spiritual convictions.

### 3) Collective Violence

When Arendt says “*the extreme form of power is All against One, the extreme form of violence is One against All*”<sup>58</sup>, and considered violence as being instrumental, she was perhaps referring to collective violence which has been defined by the World Report on Violence and Health (WRVH) as the “*instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group...against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives*”<sup>59</sup>. This is the highest form of violence which has drastically affected and transformed the world according to historical facts. This is because it includes all categories of violence manifested physically, sexually or psychologically, in a broader scope or better still, it covers the socio-economic and political sphere. This type of violence involves acts of violent social, economic and political conflict between or within States (war), violence enacted by States like genocide, torture, regular violations of human rights, organized violent crimes like gang warfare and terrorism. Thus, collective violence could be sub-grouped into structural

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<sup>57</sup> Mercy J. A., Butchart A., Farrington D., et al, *Youth violence*. In: Krug E., Dahlberg L. , Mercy J. and others, eds. World Report on Violence and Health, Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002, p.23-56.

<sup>58</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p. 141.

<sup>59</sup> *World Report on Violence and Health*, p.213-40.

violence (armed conflict, new wars, complex emergencies, terrorism and state violence) and socio-economic violence.

Firstly, socio-economic violence is a form of collective violence relating to any act or conduct which causes economic damage to an individual. It is a condition of governing a person's ability to achieve, use and possess economic resources. Economic violence to women and girls has been a contemporary glaring example wherein women and girls have limited access to education, employment, health, funds, and security, faced with property damage, discriminatory traditional laws on inheritance<sup>60</sup>, creating a gender-based economic disorder due to inequality. It is a typical scenario in Africa as whole where women have a secondary role to play, given the status of housewife or baby making machines and making them work in a family business without a salary. These deviations has led to several *feminist*<sup>61</sup> movements in the history of mankind since 1960s in the United States and other parts of the world where women's right or liberation movements are implanted in almost all countries as they sought equal rights, opportunities and greater personal freedom for women. As women are humans, it means they are entitled to all the human rights, fundamentally the right to live free from violence, slavery, and discrimination. The right to be educated, own property, vote, earn a fair and equal wage. A deviation of these leads to a socio-economic violence in every state as Arendt even stated that "*the defiance of established authority, religious and secular, social and political, as a world-wide phenomenon may well one day be accounted the outstanding event of the last decade.*"<sup>62</sup>

Secondly and prevalently is structural violence, expressed by political and cultural ferocity, which is violence existing as the aftermath of political deviations and modern armed conflicts. It is a form of collective violence which emanates from socio-political and economic unjust laws, leading to psychosomatic damages. During Socrates' interlocution with Thrasymachus in Book I of The Republic of Plato on the theme of justice, he clearly articulated that the role of the rulers is to work for the interest and security of the citizens and not for their personal interest. When this telos of politics is violated by the state who establishes unfair laws and systems which disempowers, downgrades and alienates the majority, structural violence by the people over the government will be inevitable. This was the *raison d'être* of Apartheid in South Africa based on racial discrimination as the blacks stood against the whites as a result of segregation. Thus,

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<sup>60</sup> "Trauma, Violence, & Abuse: Economic violence to Women and Girls," in *Sage Journals*, Art. First Published by Olufunmilayo Fawole, July 1, 2008.

<sup>61</sup> A feminist is an advocate of feminism, which is a political movement aimed at rectifying sexual inequalities through any of the four types: Radical, Marxist, Liberal, and Difference Feminism. It is believed that the feminist movement gained grounds in 1963, when Betty Friedan published her novel titled; *The Feminine Mystique*.

<sup>62</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.69.

structural violence is inevitably the outcome of modern armed conflicts, acting as another form of collective violence.

Armed conflicts generally depict war between two known states but recently, collective violence via armed conflict has been observed whereby non-state actors like indigenous and private armies rising against each other in a state or against the state in the form of terrorism. Being another form of collective violence, it is a brutish ideological movement aimed at obtaining a specific socio-economic and political aspiration from an established government through the use of terror, threats and related violence onto civilians or the state. The United Nations considers terrorism to be any act intended to cause death or bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants for the purpose of either intimidating a population or compelling a government<sup>63</sup>. As such, several terrorist groups which have mostly been Islamic like *Al-Qaeda*, *Al-Shabaab* in East Africa (Somalia and Kenya), *Boko Haram* in Cameroon, Nigeria, Tchad, *the Taliban* in Afghanistan and the *Al-Jamaat Nusrat* in West Africa have been deadly in 2021 in their violent quest for socio-economic and political aspirations. However, genocide, complex emergencies, new wars are other forms of collective violence which intends to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, or consist of a humanitarian crisis in a country leading to breakdown in authority and eventual internal or external conflicts requiring international intervention.

Mindful of the fact that the existence of man is guided by the principles of a macro society, political interest has always been at the apex of most forms of collective violence. As such, this is the epicenter of our reflection with Arendt wherein collective violence with all its categories or manifestation has been the engine of our societies and can't go unnoticed. This explains why Arendt declared that “*no one engaged in thought about history and politics can remain unaware of the enormous role violence has always played in human affairs...*”<sup>64</sup>.

### **1.3 - Manifestations and Forms of Violence in Politics**

Our epistemic preoccupation in this subpart is to evaluate the displays of violence in the political realm. Are we talking of *political violence* or *violence in politics*? On the one hand, political violence refers to the violence used by leaders to impose cruelty or abuse the people, which is the violence legitimised by Machiavelli. On the other hand, violence in politics refers to all forms of violence taking place in politics, which could emanate from either the leaders, the

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<sup>63</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism*, Fact Sheet N°. 32, p.14.

<sup>64</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.110.

people or caused by either party. Thus, for the purpose of not being biased, we are concerned with violence in politics and all its forms of manifestations. The manifestation of violence in politics can be considered as the assertion of political power in different forms. Public killings or tortures has for long served for the nourishment and confirmation of political power in middle ages, in colonial contexts or in modern times during so called ‘extraordinary’ times of necessity. However, violence in politics has been noticed to be manifested diversely through terrorism, new wars, political hold-ups, and most especially civil disobedience. In order to circumscribe our itinerary, focus shall be on civil disobedience as exhaustively discussed by Arendt in *Crisis of the Republic*.

The civil disobedience movement serves as the basis for Arendt’s analysis on violence as she analyzes civil disobedience in the light of philosophical ideas and tries to understand the reasons that lead individuals to engage in civil disobedience movements. She begins by reviewing the examples of civil disobedience used by theoreticians via the case study of *Socrates*<sup>65</sup> and *Thoreau*<sup>66</sup>. After that, Hannah Arendt sets out to characterize civil disobedience movements and ended by examining the relationship between civil disobedience and the law.

### **1.3.1 - Cases of “Civil Disobedience” in the Antiquity.**

In order to better analyze civil disobedience in the light of philosophical writings and works, Hannah Arendt examines two famous cases of civil disobedience. The first case relates to *the condemnation of Socrates* while the second illustrates *the relationship that Thoreau had with the laws*. These two forms of civil disobedience are different in their essence and in any case they do not fit with the idea that Hannah Arendt has of civil disobedience.

In the case of Socrates, Arendt reminds us that Socrates never questioned the laws, nor their essence. What he challenged was their interpretation of the laws. Socrates was not against the Athenian laws but rather against the judges. He didn’t want to violate the laws, which is why even though he totally disagreed with their interpretation, he accepted the verdict of the judges. The moral force that allowed him to undergo the condemnation at the risk of his life comes from a self-

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<sup>65</sup> Socrates was the greatest of all philosophers who emerged from Greece-Athens and is credited as the founder of Western philosophy and among the first moral philosophers of the ethical tradition of thought. His 4 main convictions are teachings were: *human wisdom begins with the recognition of one’s own ignorance; the unexamined life is not worth living; ethical virtue is the only thing that matters; a good person can never be harmed because whatever misfortune he may suffer; his virtue will remain intact.*

<sup>66</sup> Henry David Thoreau was a 19<sup>th</sup> century American philosopher, naturalist, essayist, and poet born on July 12, 1817 who had great interest on ethics, poetry, religion, politics, philosophy, history and biology. He was a leading transcendentalist and the author of “Resistance to Civil Government”, an argument for disobedience to an unjust state. In *Crisis of the Republic*, Arendt briefly explains that he was compelled to spend a night in jail because he refused to pay electoral taxes to a government that recognized slavery.

contract. In fact, Socrates wanted to stay true to himself, and in his thought, he praises self-fidelity. This is probably the reason why Plato argues that for Socrates “*thought is a silent dialogue between the person and the self*”<sup>67</sup>. In Thoreau’s case, it was the justice system that was being tested wherein Thoreau challenged the laws themselves because it didn’t suit him, and he wanted to show his disapproval. The comparison of Socrates and Thoreau is instructive. Primo, there is a big difference in the attitude they adopted towards the laws. Secundo, we notice that there is a similarity in their relationship to the laws. However, for both Socrates and Thoreau, disobedience is dictated by individual conscience.

For Hannah Arendt, this is precisely where the shoe pinches because civil disobedience cannot recognize individual consciences one by one. She demonstrates the difficulty that exists in wanting to deal with the problem of disobedience to the law at the level of individual morality. For her, “*the suggestions of conscience are apolitical and they always take on a subjective character*”<sup>68</sup>. This analysis allows Hannah Arendt to question all works on civil disobedience based solely on the attitudes of Socrates and Thoreau. According to her, wanting to apply these examples on the legal and political levels is to fall into the abyss of generalization and subjectivity. Generalization because conscience is individual, and subjectivity because ethics is personal and different from one individual to another. In the search for a relevant tool for analyzing civil disobedience, Hannah Arendt argues that disobedience is only civil and only meaningful when it is the work of a group.

### **1.3.2 - Characteristics of Civil Disobedience**

Civil disobedience movements have become mass movements and are found all over the world. An analysis of the history of the evolution of humanity could teach us that this generalization of civil disobedience is the harbinger of revolutions. At the same time, there is an increase in the number of crimes and misdemeanors committed in organized gangs or by isolated individuals. Based on alarming statistics, Hannah Arendt highlights the weakness of the judicial system. To better understand the civil disobedience movement, she analyzes the characteristic features of a movement of this nature.

Firstly, it is the work of a group that believes that “the normal mechanisms of evolution” of a society no longer work properly or that government policy is tainted with an anti-constitutional attitude. This is for example the case of the policy of the American government with regard to

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<sup>67</sup> Plato, *Theaetetus*, 189b10-190e4.

<sup>68</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.70.

Vietnam, or we can cite the example of the violation of fundamental freedoms. Secondly, civil disobedience seeks changes desired by society as a whole. The disobedience group believes that these changes are necessary. Finally, Hannah Arendt explains the distinctions to be made between civil disobedience and the criminal movement. While criminals violate the law in a clandestine manner, civil disobedience demands and proclaims its disobedience and above all does not seek to hide it. While criminals can use and abuse any form of violence, civil disobedience banishes violence in all its forms. It is this last feature that fundamentally distinguishes civil disobedience from revolution because the latter can be violent while the former can't as she quotes Carl Cohen by affirming that "*civil disobedience is not revolution...the civil disobedient accepts while the revolutionary rejects*"<sup>69</sup>.

By referring to Hannah Arendt and pushing the reasoning to the extreme, one could consider civil disobedience as a "social fact" in Durkheim's sagacity. Indeed, Hannah Arendt highlights the desire for change that exists in all societies. It also reminds us that change can only take place in stability, and the legal system is the main guarantor of this stability. It provides a framework within which change takes place. When the legal system no longer adequately ensures the stability necessary for the progressive change linked to the evolution of society, then we see the birth of a questioning of this legal system. As soon as this questioning is displayed and is the concerted work of a group, we witness the birth of a movement of civil disobedience which is evidently the most prevailing of violence in politics.

### **1.3.3 - Civil Disobedience and the Law: Ambiguous Relationships.**

At this juncture, Hannah Arendt poses the problem of the "compatibility" of civil disobedience with the law. To what extent can the civil disobedience movement be compatible with a given legal system?

For her, only the American legal system can allow civil disobedience to be integrated into her approach. Two main reasons are advanced to justify this assertion. The first relates to the philosophy of American law, in other words the "spirit" of American laws. The second reason which incidentally stems from the first, is related to the fact that the American legal system has a mechanism that can enable it to deal with civil disobedience. To explain the basis of the above assertions, the author begins by characterizing the spirit of American laws. In the United States, as in all societies, individuals act and react according to a "social contract". For Hannah Arendt, the

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p.77.

“social contract” that prevails in the United States is distinguished both from the “Rousseauist social contract” and from the “Leviathan” of Hobbes. In fact, the American “social contract” would be close to the “social contract” in the sense of Locke. It is a “horizontal conception” of the “social contract” characterized by the fact that individuals weave and maintain relationships based on consent with a strong bond of reciprocity. In this form of contract, individuals can act freely, and above all, they can express their disagreement. Thus for Hannah Arendt the consent which is the spirit of American laws is based on the notion of a contract comprising mutual obligations which first allowed the establishment of separate colonies and then their federal union. Under this view, civil disobedience movements in the United States can be explained by the defection of citizens. The latter withdrew their consent because they lost the trust they had placed in the legal system. The loss of trust results from the inability of the legal system to compel the government to adopt a policy in accordance with their wishes.

To better illustrate the importance of consent in the explanation of civil disobedience, Arendt recalls that blacks (who were very involved in disobedience movements) never gave their consent to participate in the “social contract” because for a long time, the American constitution simply denied their necessary legal consideration. Thus, civil disobedience is explained by the disrespect of citizens vis-à-vis the “social contract” because the legal system has not kept its commitments. However, Arendt holds that all human, social or political organizations are ultimately based on the capacity of each individual to make commitments and to keep them. In this case, the legal system has not fulfilled its commitments due to the rapidity of the transformations that have occurred in society. Beyond consent, the spirit of US laws is strongly characterized by “voluntary association”. It is, moreover, the force of “voluntary association” that can enable the American legal system to integrate and deal with civil disobedience.

For Arendt, it would be wise to consider the civil disobedience movement as a movement that comes under the voluntary association of citizens defending certain interests (such as pressure groups). As a result, the relationship between the movement and the legal system will go from “resistance” to a simple “disagreement”. According to Arendt, civil disobedience in contemporary society plays a vital role than we think, which brings about the problem of its compatibility with judicial systems in place. According to her, civil disobedience is manifested through the rejection of political authority, contestation of religious and laic authorities due to their irresponsibility. Thus according to Arendt, violence in politics must not always be reposted because it is that which raises the awareness of leaders on neglected aspects of the society or areas of growth and amendments.



## CHAPTER II: THE FRAMEWORK OF HANNAH ARENDT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The Framework of the Arendtian conception of political philosophy, specifically the prevailing nature of violence in the cosmos was characterized by the observed increase in acts of violence in major developed countries. She then inevitably embarked in an epistemic activity so as to understand and explain this societal phenomenon. To properly frame her analysis, she begins by evoking the relationships that exist between the major military powers, then tackles a critical rereading of the philosophical writings on violence, moves onto the phase of examining the relationship between violence and power, before ending with the nature and causes of violence. As such, this chapter is concerned with the background or context of Arendt's idea on violence and that which prompted her in the reflection on violence.

### 2.1 - The Influence of Arendt's Conception of Violence

#### 2.1.1 A Resilient Emerged Violence for Peace.

Hannah Arendt writes at the beginning of her book *On Violence* that her reflections on the topic were motivated by the violent events and debates of the twentieth century, which can be called "*as Lenin predicted, a century of wars and revolutions, hence a century of that violence which is currently believed to be their common denominator*"<sup>70</sup>. In the twentieth century, violence had reached to a dangerous level and to a scope in terms of its destructiveness, wider application and glorification. In relation to Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz's understanding of war as "*the continuation of politics by other means*"<sup>71</sup> or Engels's definition of violence as "*the accelerator of economic development*"<sup>72</sup>, she argues that this was inverted after the Second World War. The War was not followed by a peace, rather it gave way to the rise of 'Cold War', which in reality is a continuation of war through other means for socio-economic and political domination. Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a balance of terror. The great Western powers, barely emerging from the Second World War, embarked on a mad race for weapons. Consequently, according to Arendt, it is remarkable to note that the means used to preserve world peace are the very instruments of violence, and these means are more dangerous than all the ultra-

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<sup>70</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.105.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p.110.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p.111.

powerful weapons, which motivates the great powers to be suspicious of each other as they get more and more sophisticated and can destroy the planet in a very short time. This increase in power of the military and industrial complex in great developed countries, is partially explained by the presence of several advisers from the military ranks within governments, who introduce or propose no other means of peace and conflict resolution than their scientific and military methods. This greatly perturbed Arendt who witnessed the activities of Nazism and Stalinism in the management and organization of the society, and the consequences of humans in the world which is supposed to be more peaceful as governed by rational animals.

### **2.1.2 Critical Analysis of Violence.**

From a more theoretical approach, Hannah Arendt explains the position of several philosophers and intellectuals who have worked on the concept of violence. Many authors who claim their varying angles of belonging to the Marxist ideology praise violence as an instrument for resolving conflicts. This is how Jean-Paul Sartre, following the same reasoning pattern as Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*, openly advocates the use of violent means to overcome the system of domination put in place by the Western oppressors. Adopting an honest discontinuity with the position of Sartre, Fanon or Sorel, Hannah Arendt proposes a re-reading of Marx for proper understanding of his point of view and better enlightened on the concept of violence. For Hannah Arendt, violence is only present in Marx's work as an attachment and plays only a secondary role. It is in this order of ideas and following Marx's analysis that, though justifiable at times, she condemns all forms of violence because she tells us that "*if violence could settle social conflicts, revenge would become the miracle cure for most of our ills.*"<sup>73</sup>. Confronting theories of violence as a powerful means of emancipation for Third World countries, Arendt shows the diversity that exists between Nations and Third World countries, and the impossibility of approving an appropriate methodology in a set whose core characteristic varies. To our author, violence in politics must not always be reposted because it is that which raises the awareness of leaders on neglected aspects of the society or areas of growth and amendments. Thus, instead of reacting to violence violently, the reaction to this reaction will be no other thing than violence, leading to unending violence. This unending violence has been prevailing in the world leading to many casualties.

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<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p.122.

### 2.1.3 Violence and Power.

In the field of political theory, many authors have assimilated power and violence, fear of the danger of falling into an unfortunate confusion. Following this logic, we implicitly accept the idea of the political theorists from Left to Right that “*violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power*”<sup>74</sup>. For Hannah Arendt, this logic is wrong because it only considers the state and politics from the angle of domination and oppression. However, the state is not always an oppressive machine. It is therefore necessary to distinguish power from violence. To achieve this, Hannah Arendt draws a line between power and violence.

According to our author, “*power always needs to rely on the force of numbers while violence can do without it to a certain extent, since it can use instruments to impose itself*”<sup>75</sup>. The classic example of a violent system based on a small number can be seen through the tyrannical regimes which raged in some countries with the force of the sword without asking the population’s opinion. These schemes are generally supported by a small number of individuals. Their strength emanates from the sword and the passivity of the weak and spectating majority. However, regretting the lack of precision and confusion in the use of words such as “power”, “strength”, “force”, “authority” and “violence”, Arendt offers a definition of each of these words.

For Hannah Arendt, *power* is “*the ability of man to act and act in concert*”<sup>76</sup>, which exist as a group affair because someone being “in power” means an authorization to act in the name of others, while *strength* is the property of an object or a person being part of its nature. *Force* on its part is often mistakenly used in everyday discourse as a substitute of violence whereas it is the qualification of an energy that is released during physical or social movements. She however considers *authority* to be defined by its essential characteristic which would be that those whose obedience is required unconditionally recognize authority. Lastly, *violence* which is the core of our work is by nature instrumental, one might think that it does not have its own existence. It remains an instrument close to “power” and also it permits the increase use of “force”.<sup>77</sup> However, “violence” differs from “power” because power needs legitimacy but no justification whereas “*violence can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate*”<sup>78</sup>. For Machiavelli, power is held by individuals, Weber believed power lies in institutions, while for Arendt, power was maintained

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<sup>74</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.134.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p.142.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p.143.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p.151.

<sup>78</sup> *Idem.*

within groups. It should be noted that power and violence usually appear together despite the fact that they are distinct phenomena. So, Arendt argues that the relationship between power and violence is an antagonistic one: “*it is not enough to say that power and violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites*”<sup>79</sup>. This is despite the fact that power and violence are generally found in combination. She emphasises that even a totalitarian rule needs a power basis as it relies on secret police and a network of informants. Yet she points out the antagonism between violence and power with the argument that the absolute rule of one denotes the absence of the other; the two in their absolute forms cannot co-exist.

#### **2.1.4 The Nature and Causes of Violence.**

In trying to demonstrate that violence cannot be obtained from power, and that violence is not evil, Hannah Arendt proposes at the end of chapter two of *On Violence* that “*to understand violence for what it is, we shall have to examine its root and nature.*”<sup>80</sup> Scrutinizing on the nature and causes of violence, Arendt begins by outlining the methods that are used to understand the phenomenon of aggression in humans. The methods used are hired from the natural sciences, and human behavior is explained through a better understanding of animal behavior.

Concisely, scientific logic would suggest that if we can explain and understand the nature and causes of violence in animals, we could learn from it and apply it to humans. According to Hannah Arendt, this approach is simply based on a traditional scientific conception which would like man to be simply “*an animal endowed with reason*”<sup>81</sup>. This would certainly not provide insight into the nature and causes of violence in humans. In the natural sciences, the aggressiveness of animals is considered to be their instinct. Thus, following this logic, the violence that can prevail in the animal kingdom is normal and natural. For Hannah Arendt, to analyze violence in the light of the natural sciences is to wear distorting prisms which would only show us the instinctive and bestial side of the human being as an explanatory factor for all violent behavior.

Detaching herself from this “scientific” approach, Hannah Arendt takes a different standpoint. She begins by saying that in humans, anger is very close to violence. Anger breaks out when the individual believes that their rights have been robbed, they have been the victim of an injustice or they have been manipulated. This rage leads man to act with violence, which is to say

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<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p.155.

<sup>80</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>81</sup> This is the view defended by the continental rationalism of Descartes in *Meditations of first philosophy, Principles of Philosophy* and in *Discourse on Method*.

to perform acts without reasoning, without speaking, without thinking and without foreseeing the consequences. The injustice suffered is therefore an essential cause of violence. Thus, whatever the violence of a natural disaster, men are not indignant and their rage never turns into violence because nature even if it is sometimes unjust, cannot be the enemy of the man. Periodically, an earthquake, a tsunami, a storm, a torrential rain or any other natural cause can cause a large number of victims without causing a movement of violence on the part of men. However, sometimes it takes just one person killed by another person, for an entire city to degenerate into an infernal spiral of violence.

Hannah Arendt also questions us about the relationships between violence and the physiological characteristics of the individual. She explains that *race*, that is, the physiological characteristic, can be the object of exacerbated violence as soon as it is no longer distinguished from *racism*, that is, the ideology. This is how crowd movements can take a very violent approach, both verbal and physical, because there is total confusion between race and racism. What remains deplorable is that racism sometimes manages to use pseudo-scientific argumentation to make race its only object of violence. Also, in the current situation in the modern and contemporary periods, the reign of bureaucracy and the superpower of the big countries could explain the prevalence of violence. Bureaucracy corresponds to the reign of anonymity to a “tyranny without a tyrant”. Individuals become furious when they feel their rights are violated. As a result, they can resort to violence because they feel that they have no direct and visible interlocutor. In the case of the superpower of the large countries, the question of sizing arises as individuals have the impression of being crushed under the weight of power and dimensions. To counter this movement, they sometimes adopt violent behavior and claim their nationalism or their belonging to smaller communities, hence the proliferation of far-right movements of terrorism and civil disobedience. It should primordially be noted that when an ideology of the far-left advocates violence to change the world, another of the far right does the same to prevent this change. Thus, eruption of violence which sometimes get aggravated to a larger extent or out of control.

## 2.2 – The Asymmetry of Justification and Legitimacy of Violence in Arendt

From the above elucidation on the influence of Arendt's conception of violence, our concern at this juncture is to point out her recognition of a line of reasoning that runs through the threads of the defense of violence in the works of Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre. On one side, we shall be demonstrating Arendt's arguments when she rejects violence as a cruel or illogical phenomenon, while in an ironical concomitance on the other side, presents how she considers violence as a rational reaction in politics. This however acts sometimes as a very effective means for the occurrence of some changes, uttering inequalities, demanding for rights and acquiring justice in many societies in the historical landscape and pipeline.

### 2.2.1 From Societal Injustice to Rage

According to Arendt, violence may occasionally work as a 'therapeutic' procedure, which is predominantly significant when it comes from rage. Rage is a reaction, like a reflexive reply given to a situation of misery or a suffering to a problem that lies beyond the control of oneself. She declares that:

*"...no one reacts with rage to a disease beyond the powers of medicine or to an earthquake, or, for that matter, to social conditions which seem to be unchangeable. Only where there is reason to suspect that conditions could be changed and are not, does rage arise. Only when our sense of justice is offended do we react with rage."*<sup>82</sup>

For her, rage could possibly be irrational and obsessive at times, just like any other human distress, and asserts with William O'Brien that *"violence is sometimes needed for the voice of moderation to be heard"*<sup>83</sup>. Arendt maintains that *"to resort to violence in view of outrageous events or conditions is enormously tempting because of the immediacy and swiftness inherent in it"*<sup>84</sup>. This spontaneous response of violence is hereby underlined with reference to its source of origin, that is, feeling of injustice, its rise and itinerary. It should be immediate and must have an explicit objective. For Arendt, *"there are situations in which the very swiftness of a violent act may be the only appropriate remedy"*<sup>85</sup> both in private and public life.

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<sup>82</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.160.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p.176.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p.160.

<sup>85</sup> *Idem.*

*The point is not that this will permit us to let off steam, which indeed can be equally well done by pounding the table or by finding another substitute. The point is that under certain circumstances, violence, which is to act without argument or speech and without reckoning with consequences, is the only possibility of setting the scales of justice right again. In this sense, rage and violence that sometimes, not always, goes with it belong among the “natural” human emotions, and to cure man of them would mean nothing less than to dehumanize or emasculate him<sup>86</sup>.*

We therefore observe from the above illustration in the extract that Arendt doesn't seem to fear from violence as an explosion of rage as much as she fears from dehumanization. She proclaims that it is possible to create conditions such as concentration camps or use instruments such as torture, threat, imprisonment through which human beings turn into not animal-like but dehumanized creatures, epitomized by the conspicuous absence of rage and violence<sup>87</sup>. In other words, the use of reason at times is the driving force behind the hazardous unreasonable undertakings of humans in the world, such as the building of concentration camps or the invention and use of the atomic bombs or sophisticated weapons and chemicals on humans themselves.

### **2.2.2 Hypocrisy, Lies, Ruse for Violence in Politics**

Another appreciation of the rationality of violence by our author stems from the constant use of hypocrisy, lies, tricks relatively leading to fury and eventually ferocity in the political sphere. In *Crisis of the Republic*, Arendt began her first part with the analysis on the role of lying in politics linked to hypocrisy and fury. Thus, apart from the will to break free from the chains of the unjust conditions as seen on the paragraphs above, Arendt assesses hatred which is a sort of dislike for the bourgeois society in the works of thinkers like George Sorel, Vilfredo Pareto and Frantz Fanon. By comparing bourgeoisie with hypocrisy, they suggest violence to be a medium of revealing the 'true' nature of the system put in place, and which will “...*provoke action even at the risk of annihilation so that the truth may come out*”<sup>88</sup>. Arguing on hypocrisy, Arendt again emphasizes on the rationality of the use of violence and raises a quagmire that can be directed to the liberal denial of violence with the charge of irrationality by enunciating that:

*“... this violence again is not irrational. Since men live in a world of appearances, hence depend upon manifestation, hypocrisy's conceits - as distinguished from temporary ruses, followed by disclosure in due time - cannot be met with what is recognized as reasonable behavior. Words can be relied upon only so long as one is sure that their function is to reveal and not to*

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<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p.161.

<sup>87</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>88</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.163.

*conceal. It is the semblance of rationality, rather than the interests behind it that provokes rage. To respond with reason when reason is used as a trap is not “rational”; just as to use a gun in self-defense is not “irrational”*<sup>89</sup>.

Despite this declaration, she cautions against a possibility of when rage and violence turn irrational and this takes place “*only when [they] are directed against substitutes*”<sup>90</sup>. It should be noted at this juncture that Arendt actually makes an abnormal and controversial argument as compared to her philosophy, and doesn’t elaborate much on the meaning of this statement. She struggles with the reasoning that “*... it has become rather fashionable among white liberals to react against “black rage” with the cry, we are all guilty, and black militants have proved only too happy to accept this “confession” and to base on it some of their more fantastic demands*”<sup>91</sup>. She then moves to a discussion on collective guilt and innocence, and does not provide a clear explanation of her previous argument. One possible explanation might be that the motive of the violence in terms of rage lies in a past action, from which current actors cannot be held responsible. Thus, according to her, explaining violence with reference to the past cannot be justified as being appropriate, but deceit on citizens can bring out bestial behaviors.

### **2.2.3 Arendt’s Legitimacy of Violence in Politics as the Transcendence of Justificationism**

Irrespective of Hannah’s position on the negation of violence, she was self-contradictory in her analysis as she, at one point in time, saw reasons accounting for the use of violence in her justifications and distinction from legitimacy. During the exhibition of her disapproval of violence concentrating on rage, Arendt moves to a politico-critical examination of the phenomenon by stating the tactical use of violence in politics.

She posits that as a result of the strategic use of violence in politics, violence could become an instrument used to challenge or abolish an established political system deemed porous, and it possibly might even arrive its purposes by compelling the existing regime or the authority it stance

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<sup>89</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p.161

<sup>91</sup> In fact, Arendt’s many remarks on Africans and on black movement in the U.S. are controversial to the extent that some scholars call them ethnocentric (Shiraz Dossa, 1980) or antiprimitivist (Jimmy Casas Klausen, 2010). The most controversial text in this sense is the Reflections on Little Rock (1959); her arguments presented in *On Violence* that views the Black Power movement’s struggle as apolitical are also strange. Furthermore, Dossa in her reading of *Origins of Totalitarianism* names Arendt’s engagement as “ethnocentric”. See Shiraz Dossa 1980; “*Human Status and Politics: Hannah Arendt on the Holocaust*,” Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 13.2: 309-23; and Jimmy Casas Klausen labels this as antiprimitivism. See Jimmy Casas Klausen 2010. “*Hannah Arendt’s Antiprimitivism*,” Political Theory 38(3): 394-423. For further readings and debates on the issue see Anne Norton. 1995. “*Heart of Darkness: Africa and African Americans in the Writings of Hannah Arendt*”.



against, to reply to its pleas or demands. In fact, she underscored that “*violence does not promote causes, neither history nor revolution, neither progress nor reaction... but it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention*”<sup>92</sup>. Arendt didn’t end there, adduces by brilliantly and interestingly arguing that, “*to ask the impossible in order to obtain the possible is not always counterproductive. And indeed, violence, contrary to what its prophets try to tell us, is a much more effective weapon of reformers than of revolutionists*”<sup>93</sup>. She exemplifies this assertion by positing that some reforms in educational system were realized in the U.S and Europe due to the violence of student movements. This is the same scenario in most African countries wherein student movements either through strikes or riots have led to some university reforms or brought about ameliorations in the educational systems. Same goes to other spheres in the society wherein teachers, lawyers, doctors, taxi drivers have led violent movements for change in reforms to take place. This greatly explains Arendt’s proclamation that “*...no doubt ‘violence pays’...but the trouble is that it pays indiscriminately*”<sup>94</sup>. This simply insinuates that the use of violence is fruitful but it is not possible to be certain about the outcome of violence of the nature of the fruit as some might not even live to harvest the fruit, consume the fruit or if the fruit won’t be a poisonous one.

Thus, violence is rationally justifiable to the extent that it is effective in reaching its “*telos*” or end. Justification makes a certain act understandable and even excusable with references to the motives of an act and in terms of the established causality. An act is rationally justifiable when it is a human act and not the act of a human being. On the one hand like Emmanuel Kant in *The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* who judges morality from the intention of an act, and not the act itself, one can explain one’s intentions in acting a certain way and produce harm to be understandable by saying for instance; “I did not mean to hurt this or that person, it was simply an accident”. On the other hand, we can understand why someone hits another one when we see that s/he has been kicked or insulted in the first place. At this level, violence represents an immediate reflexive reaction, functioning as a force of self-defense, and consequently justified. For Arendt “*no one questions the use of violence in self-defense, because the danger is not only clear but also present, and the end justifying the means is immediate*”<sup>95</sup>. As such, the justification of violence is simply possible only when the duration of the process of reaching the end is short and even prompt. Violence loses its ground of justification when its intended end is postponed or

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<sup>92</sup> Arendt, *Op. cit.* p.176.

<sup>93</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.176-177.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p.151.

argued to be reached at a farther time. It is from this line of reflection that she makes a distinction between justification and legitimacy.

On the one hand, legitimacy primarily comes from a covenant whence the concerned agents might have some sort of an understanding of a coming action out of consensus. Within the framework of legitimacy, citizens of a particular political consideration would act within a trusted territory. On the other hand, justification is when the duration of the act extends and when it continues to have references to the future for the fulfillment of a promised end, such as the end of terror, introduction of democracy, or freedom, surfaces or paves way for uncertainty, ambiguity and manipulation, eventually leading to the loss of persuasive force. From such considerations, Arendt couldn't retain herself by precisising that, "*the very substance of violent action is ruled by the question of means and ends*"<sup>96</sup> and for this reason when applied to human activities, the end is always exposed to the danger of "*being overwhelmed by the means, which it both justifies and needs*"<sup>97</sup>. Therefore, there exist a perpetual danger where violence becomes a constitutive element of a vicious circle wherein Arendt didn't fail to maintain that the application of violent means undoubtedly leads to further violence. Whenever the end disappears altogether and whenever violence becomes an end in itself, violence turns into terror, the aimless and dysfunctional destruction and fright. Arendt notes that "*terror is not the same as violence; it is rather the form of government that comes into being when violence, having destroyed all power, does not abdicate but, on the contrary, remains in full control*"<sup>98</sup>. Therefore, violence that has lost its objective and become an end in itself turns out to be terror, hence, terrorism.

We hence realize at this juncture that terrorism emanates as a result of violence losing its purpose and becomes its own personal end. Arendt presents a comprehensive argument on the issue of terror and how it played a constitutive role in totalitarian regimes in *Origins of Totalitarianism* but her main argument with regards to totalitarian terror, as different from terror of tyranny and other forms of dictatorships is that after certain point it targets not only its 'enemies' but also its friends and supporter by being afraid of all power, even the power of its friends. "*The climax of terror is reached when the police state begins to devour its own children, when yesterday's executioner becomes today's victim*"<sup>99</sup>. Conclusively, violence suffers from unpredictability which is viewed as a vital limit on its justifiability, explaining Arendt's position despite her justification of violence that the results of violence can "*never be reliably predicted,*

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<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p.106.

<sup>97</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p.154.

<sup>99</sup> *Idem.*

*the means used to achieve political goals are more often than not of greater relevance to the future world than the intended goals*<sup>100</sup>. Hence legitimacy overrides justification in her conception.

### **2.3 - The Implementation of Arendtian Conception of Violence**

Hannah Arendt's conceptual elucidations have witnessed some of the contradictory limits. Irrespective of these, we can see Arendt's contribution in the definition of power as "*the human ability not just to act but to act in concert*"<sup>101</sup>, being usefully practiced or applied to some extent in the role of popular opinion in contemporary conflict. The latest widespread uprisings in West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, North Africa, South Africa and the Middle East are significant when thinking about the link between violence and power as well as the legitimization and instrumentalism of violence when governments fail to respond positively to the request of the citizens or its inability to counter terrorism for the stability of the state.

For instance, the military coup conducted on January 24<sup>th</sup> 2022 in Burkina Faso emerged as a result of the culmination of the population's growing discontent with the State's capacity to find adequate responses to counter terrorism from organizations affiliated to Al-Qaeda and Ansarul Islam groups. Today, Al-Shabaab continues to wage a violent campaign against the Somalia government, the African Union forces, and International targets in Somalia. In Mali, violent extremist groups have notably instrumentalised longstanding tensions over the access to land and natural resources, rigid social hierarchies and social division, grievances against local authorities perceived as being corrupted, and distant relationships with central states. This led to the deployment of about 15.000 UN peacekeepers under the MINUSMA mission, French Operation Barkhane, the Takuba force, and the EU training missions but all futile as no stability yet. Cameroon hasn't been an exception since October 2016 with the eruption of the Anglophone Crisis spearheaded by the Separatist Ambazonians against the central government due to socio-economic and political imbalance and injustice since 1961. In 2013, thinkers such as Çubukçu continue Arendtian thought in regards to the 2011 Libyan conflict, raising the questions whether *foreign military intervention has ever been a legitimate means to overthrow a repressive regime*.

Thus, these are problems which Arendt's definitions of violence fail to expatiate on, and while many problems arise from the abstract theoretical nature of her theory, we can only unconvincingly apply some of her ideas to contemporary conflict. The Arendtian assumptions

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<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p.106.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, p.143.

about the nature of violence, mainly that it erodes in legitimacy with unnecessary use is visible somewhat in international law regarding contemporary interventions. The Arendtian thought on the instrumental legitimacy of violence is surely reflected in international law with the existence of principles such as the Responsibility to Protect. Indeed, Arendt's commitment to violence in the short term holds some value on how to think about contemporary conflict. In recent years, foreign intervention in domestic conflict has certainly been perceived as being a successful legitimate intervention if violence is limited in scale and strength, and with some justification. Arendt's understanding of violence is not only visible in attitudes of international law, but also within Arendt's ideas on the origins of violence.

In short, the notion that violent means inevitably lead to violent ends, have some modern examples like the case of violence in Lebanon in 1982 and Syria, illustrates the spread of violence in Arendtian perspectives and terms. Again, Arendt's ideas of violence as historically recursive has some similarity to the concept of "blowback". The concept of 'blowback' captures this confusion, where foreign policy strategies that are intended to fight an enemy on one occasion later provide the grounds for violence directed back at the self in a way that is unintended and unforeseen. For example, blowback and continued violence has tarnished the U.S involvement in the Middle East for decades, and *"the possibilities of 'blowback' are visible everywhere"*<sup>102</sup>. However, the resort to oppression and violence by governments when without power, as Arendt postulates is certainly visible within contemporary conflict. Surprisingly, the roots and causes of civil conflict are arguably inadequately explained. When it comes to applying Arendtian attitudes towards technology to contemporary conflict, despite Arendt's assumptions that technology would lead inevitably to a state of terror, it is still far from inevitable. Arendt's assumption that *"the development of robot soldiers, which would eliminate the human factor completely and, conceivably, permit one man with a pushbutton at his disposal to destroy whomever he pleases could change this fundamental ascendancy of power over violence"*<sup>103</sup> cannot occur given the absolute nature of Arendt's concepts. While there are some scholars who suggest drone warfare has allowed an unprecedented level of state violence Arendt's conception of a complete state of terror (one without popular support) cannot exist because of Arendt's flawed conception of power. While Arendt is willing to concede that *"No government exclusively based upon the means of*

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<sup>102</sup> Leo Panitch, "September 11 and the American empire: Interventions", *International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, Vol. 5, N°2, 2003, p.233.

<sup>103</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.149.

*violence has ever existed*”<sup>104</sup>, it is arguably equally true of a state of power given the distinct definitions used.

Conclusively, we had as main objective in this chapter the presentation of Arendt’s understanding of the phenomenon of violence based on her assessment of the increased use of techniques and the rise of a discourse of violence in politics. We observed that she has particular criticisms directed at the traditional understanding of politics as a relation of rule and monopoly. Freedom is understood as liberty, and in that sense it denotes the condition of being free from any type of instruction and legislation. Power, on the other hand, is equated with the effective capability of controlling another person. Within this conceptual framework, Arendt argues that, violence cannot be judged from its development in politics because it becomes nothing but other than an extreme form of power. The equation of power with violence is a severe confusion she wants to correct. In this critique, we have seen Arendt attacks the notion of sovereignty as well since it represents the embodiment of all misconceptions within political realm: a political subjectivity, free from all constraints and successfully ruling over others. She has pointed out possible causes for the rise of violence in human relations or in history. Perception of injustice is one of the reasons of such emergencies. Circumstances that offend people’s notions of justice or conditions that prevent argumentation or speech may lead to violent outbursts and these outbursts may have a therapeutic and restorative function. The strategic usage of violence within politics is again an understandable phenomenon for Arendt because in many instances violence can be an effective means in reaching the ends. It is swift, dramatic and effective. In terms of its impacts, violence has some resemblances with action as well: It operates as an unpredictable, at times expressive and disruptive force in human realm. Yet, violence needs implements, functions within the framework of instrumental rationality, destructive and is generally a silencing force. The circle of violence is difficult to break and as long as the use of violence is prolonged, its justification becomes impossible. Arendt’s distinction between justification and legitimacy becomes an important criterion. Accordingly, justification implies understanding of the causal dynamics and the emergence of a certain event. Legitimacy, however, is a binding and bonding phenomenon and is related to power, people’s will of getting and acting together. Thus, this presentation on Arendt’s framework on violence paves way for us to examine her critique of violence in politics.

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<sup>104</sup> *Idem.*

## CHAPTER III: ARENDT'S CRITIQUE OF THE PROPONENTS OF REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

In *Crisis of the Republic*, Hannah Arendt proceeds to a critical analysis of political violence, relying particularly on the positions of philosophers and intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon, and the Leftists like the Black Powers and the Black Panthers. She mainly accuses them of hypostasizing violence. Indeed, it appears that many of these authors advocate violence as an instrument for solving political problems as we can respectively deduce from their ideologies.

### 3.1 – Analysis made to Jean-Paul Sartre

#### 3.1.1 The View of Sartre on Revolutionary Violence.

Jean-Paul Sartre's connection with Arendt is observed in her article *On Violence*, which stems from his exaltation of revolutionary violence in his famous preface to *The Wretched of the Earth*, wherein he openly advocates the use of violent means to overcome the system of domination and exploitation put in place by the Western oppressors during the period of colonialism. This preface, exclusively addressed to European colonialism and particularly to French colonizers, is inscribed in the context of the Algerian war from 1954 to 1962. In this preface, he denounces with infectious dynamism the colonial policy made of violence, hypocrisy, duplicity and lies. For Sartre, the colonial policy “*was nothing but an ideology of lies, a perfect justification for pillage; its honeyed words, its affectation of sensibility were only alibis for our aggressions*”.<sup>105</sup> Colonial violence was accompanied by the systematic denial and closing of indigenous cultures, abusive exploitation, organized starvation and massacres.

Faced with this cruelty, Sartre thinks that the time has come for the colonized to fight in order to recover their freedom and their dignity. For him, the colonized have “*a single duty, a single objective: to drive out colonialism by all means*”.<sup>106</sup> This is why, he notes that with the movement of decolonization, Europe is running to its loss, it is dying “*yes (...) Europe is in great danger of dying*”.<sup>107</sup> It lost its power and prestige, and with the process of decolonization, “*the native populations reveal their true nature*”.<sup>108</sup> With decolonization, hope is reincarnated for the

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<sup>105</sup> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, prefaced by Jean-Paul Sartre, New York, Grove Press, 1963, p.25.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p.233.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p.26.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, p.209.

“sub-humans”, they become aware of the strength they represent, free themselves through the fight against the settler. The balance of power has reversed, decolonization is underway, and nothing can shake it. Addressing his European brothers, Sartre affirms in this sense that:

*“Our Machiavellianism has little hold on this very awakened world which has tracked down our lies one after the other. The settler has only one recourse: force, when he has any left; the native has only one choice: servitude or sovereignty. What does it matter to him, whether you read his work or not? it is to these brothers that he denounces our old malice, on which we have no spare”*.<sup>109</sup>

He posits from this standpoint that with the irreversible process of armed liberation movements, the situation is reversed for the settler who yesterday was the master, the one who acted. From now on, it is the opposite, the colonized reveals himself, becomes an actor, and makes history. The colonized becomes a free man again by regaining his dignity through violence. This explains why Sartre recalls that this violence of the colonized is their fury against the colonizers for their perpetual injustice. The dialectic has been reversed as the master suffers from the violence of the slave, who acts without affection. As such, Sartre postulates that *“involution starts; the native recreates himself, and we, settlers and Europeans, ultras and liberals, we break up”*.<sup>110</sup> It is in his exaltation of the violence of the colonizer on the colonist that he affirms that it is time to move away from *“Sorel’s fascist utterances”*<sup>111</sup>, to find with Fanon, *“the first since Engels to bring back to light the midwife of history”*<sup>112</sup>. According to Sartre, Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth*, explains to his brothers and dismantles for them the mechanism of European colonization, and maintains that the real national and revolutionary pool is in the hands of the rural masses.

Sartre considers violence as a power-generating enterprise, the engine of history and progress, and splits the parties in conflict into antagonistic categories. The European settler becomes the enemy to be absolutely destroyed if the colonized want to forever be free from their coaching. In such a situation, there is a total exclusion of any form of negotiation, violence becomes the only means of communication. As the colonial power is violent, refuses any negotiation and doesn’t accept its weakness but rather multiplies strategies to overcome the relentless logic of decolonization, decolonization therefore presents itself as an irreversible process through violence. In short, for there to be negotiation, it must be based on the recognition of the other to be self-determining, and the existence of equality between the parties. Europe is

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<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p.28.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*, p.14 and Arendt, *Op. cit.*, p.114.

<sup>112</sup> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p.14.

hypocritical as they declare Liberty, Equality and Fraternity between men and peoples without practicing it. This is why, to be on an equal footing with others, the dominated and exploited peoples must hold onto violence as the only alternative instrument of liberation through appropriate strategies to overthrow the colonial system.

As a conclusion on Sartre's thesis, we realize in his radical proposal of a break between Africa and Europe that he advocates for the unity of the Third World which discovers and speaks to itself through the revolutionary slogan borrowed from Marxism: "*Natives of all underdeveloped countries unite!*"<sup>113</sup>. By uniting, the Third World becomes a real force, capable of imposing its points of view and gaining respect. The realization of this unity obeys a single condition: the armed struggle. The Third World has only this choice, violence, which is the only means of liberation and emancipation. This is why, for Sartre, violence begets, gives birth, educates. Violence makes history, it allows the oppressed to discover and reorganize themselves, it is salutary and therapeutic. It is for this reason that Sartre asserts that: "*Will we recover? Yes. For violence, like Achilles' lance, can heal the wounds that it has inflicted.*"<sup>114</sup>

### **3.1.2 Arendt's Critique of the Sartrean Conception of Violence.**

In Hannah Arendt's thesis *On Violence*, she criticizes what she calls Sartre's "new faith" of violence, and argues that his call to the oppressed peoples to turn to a violent struggle to achieve freedom from their colonizers is an idea that was unidentified in the history of revolutions. She adduces that Sartre's glorification of violence is totally opposed to the Hegelian and Marxian tradition, and to any humanistic leftist, which eventually led to her stand that Sartre should be included among "the new militants" or "the new preachers of violence" of the New Left. To support her views, Arendt criticizes extracts in Sartre's *Critique of Dialectical Reason* and in his preface to Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*.

Hannah Arendt disagreed with Sartre's position on violence despite his brilliant revolutionary ideas on the liberation of the dominated through violence. Firstly, she describes his preface as provocative, and speaks of "*the great influence*"<sup>115</sup> that it brought in the 1960s, and many activists found refuge there, like the Black Power, the Black Panthers and student protest movements against the Vietnam War. According to Arendt;

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<sup>113</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.123.

<sup>114</sup> Frantz Fanon, *Op. cit.*, p.30.

<sup>115</sup> Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, p.148.



*“Sartre, who in his preface to Fanon’s ‘The Wretched of the Earth’ goes much further in his glorification of violence than Sorel in his famous ‘Reflections on Violence’-farther than Fanon himself, whose argument he wishes to bring to its conclusion...”*<sup>116</sup>

Secondly, she criticizes Sartre of not having understood Marx and for the unification of Marxism with existentialism. For the class struggle advocated by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Party Manifesto*, Sartre substituted the struggle of the colonized which resulted in the death or disappearance of the colonist as she highlights that: *“To shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone ... there remain a dead man and a free man, says Sartre in his preface. This is a sentence that Marx could never have written.”*<sup>117</sup> Hannah Arendt thinks that in his preface to *The Wretched of the Earth*, Sartre contradicts Marxism on the theme of violence. While pointing out on Marx’s thesis, she posits that this intellectual warns the bourgeoisie on the rise and sermon of violence, and most especially on individual or direct violence as stated by Sartre, who however, praises the use of dagger by saying in the absence of other weapons, the patience of a knife will suffice. She asserts in this regard that:

*“This shows to what extent Sartre is unaware of his basic disagreement with Marx on the question of violence, especially when he states that “this irresistible violence... is man recreating himself,” that it is through “mad fury” that “the wretched of the earth” can “become men”.*<sup>118</sup>

According to Hannah Arendt, violence is only present in Marx’s work as an attachment or temporal act, and only plays a secondary role in a vast effort to understand and transform the society. According to Marx and Engels, if the proletariat, in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, necessarily constitutes itself as a class, if it sets itself up by a revolution as the dominant class and, as the dominant class, destroys by violence the old system of production, the conditions of class antagonism, it destroys classes in general and, by the same token, its own domination as a class.

Thus for Arendt, Marx was perfectly aware of the role of violence in history, but this role seemed secondary to him; the old society is led to its ruin not by violence, but by its internal contradictions. It is in line with Marx’s thesis that she banishes all forms of violence and declares that if violence could settle societal conflicts, revenge would become the miracle cure in most of our hands. She strives to demonstrate that violence is a fundamentally anti-political notion on which nothing solid can be based. According to her, violence is far from being a powerful means

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<sup>116</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.114.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, p.115.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p.114.

of emancipation of the Third World countries as Sartre asserts. Violence does not give birth, it does not educate, because the power of violence is mammoth, blind. Therefore, “*violence can be justifiable, but not legitimate*”<sup>119</sup> because it is just instrumental in nature.

## **3.2 - Analysis Made to Franz Fanon**

### **3.2.1 The Fanonian Hypothesis on Revolutionary Violence.**

Frantz Omar (Ibrahim) Fanon was a French West Indian psychiatrist and political philosopher who lived from 1925 to 1964. He used his clinical research and experience of being a black man in a racist world to analyze the effects of racism and imperialism on individuals and communities. The starting point of the thought of Fanon is on the one hand, the historical destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which mark the end of the Second World War; and on the other hand, the disaster caused by colonization. His epistemic exposure is found in his famous work; *The Wretched of the Earth* where he renders his text a tool for reflection on colonialism and the emancipation of developing countries. Being an anti-colonialist, Fanon wants to, as Sartre declares, “*dismantles the tactics of colonialism*”, then make a brutal and total break with the unjust colonial system. He therefore, as Jean-Paul Sartre did, unreservedly condemns European colonization and proposed mechanisms to get out of such conditions.

According to Fanon, colonization is a unique phenomenon, radically different from all the other conquests and oppressions that have taken place in the history of humanity. It absolutely represents evil, and “*it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other person all attributes of humanity,*”<sup>120</sup>. He presents himself as one of the intellectuals who posed the problem of violence in the revolutionary process with the greatest breadth. A reader of Marx, Fanon makes an underlying analysis of colonized societies and their historical process of liberation. This is a Marxist conception that he has personally worked on and adapted to his cause, replacing the proletariat with the colonized. This explains why decolonization appears to him as a break with colonization which is based on lies, systematic looting and the total destruction of peoples and their cultures. Thus, in the face of such a cruel and cynical system, Fanon maintains that “*decolonization is quite simply the replacing of a certain ‘species’ of men by another ‘species’ of men. Without any period of transition, there is a total, complete, and absolute substitution.*”<sup>121</sup>.

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<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p.151.

<sup>120</sup> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p.250.

<sup>121</sup> Frantz Fanon, *Op. cit.*, p.35.

Colonization is always a violent phenomenon, which is why it can only be accomplished by violent means and armed struggle. More precisely according to Fanon, this violence represents the institution that the colonized masses have that their liberation must be done, and can only be done, by force. He added that colonized men, these modern-day slaves, are impatient, they know that only this madness can save them from colonial oppression. Thus, the destruction of the colonial system gives the possibility of rebuilding human relations and eventually creates “new men” with and in a new society.

It should be noted that when Fanon published *The Wretched of the Earth*, colonial violence was unleashed with the Algerian war. He contemplates that if colonization divided man, decolonization reconstructs him by uniting him. “*the colonial context, as we have said, is characterized by the dichotomy that it inflicts on the world. Decolonization unifies this world by taking away its heterogeneity by a radical decision, by unifying it on the basis of the nation, sometimes of the race.*”<sup>122</sup> As a result of this, Fanon sees violence as the only and supreme means for the liberation of oppressed man. This justification of violence as a royal mediation is based on the claim that it transforms the psyche of the oppressed man. In this line, violence “*allows both the misguided and the outcasts of the group to come back, to find their place, to reintegrate. (...). The colonized man frees himself in and through violence. This praxis illuminates the agent because it indicates to him the means and the end.*”<sup>123</sup> The colonized engage in the struggle with passion, especially if this struggle is armed, and accompanied by a saving, liberating and regenerative power. To him, violence purifies and represents “*absolute praxis*”<sup>124</sup> as a trampled people finds in it a means of regaining their dignity. According to Fanon, violence appears as a force that detoxifies in the sense that “*it rids the colonized of his inferiority complex, of these contemplative and desperate attitudes. She makes him fearless, rehabilitates him in his own eyes.*”<sup>125</sup>

Violence sensitizes the masses, accelerates their organization and their education, it transforms the hearts of those who risked their lives rather than suffer servitude or further exploitation. The colonized made a turning point out of awareness when he “*...discovers that his life, his breathing, the beating of his heart are the same as those of the colonist. He discovers that a colonist’s skin is worth no more than a native’s skin. That is to say that this discovery introduces an essential reminder in the world.*”<sup>126</sup>, that everyone is equal and no one has the right to dominate

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<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p.32.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p.26.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, p.59.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p.70.

<sup>126</sup> *Frantz Fanon, Op. cit.*, p.32.

and exploit the other. Out of this, Fanon makes violence the exclusive vehicle of awareness when “*the decolonized discover reality and transform it in the movement of their praxis, in the exercise of their violence, in their project of liberation*”<sup>127</sup>. Thus, the only solution to this imperial attitude towards the colonized according to Fanon is that “*the colonized man frees himself in and through violence*”<sup>128</sup>. It is in this angle that Fanon conveys the objection that anyone who rises up against “the violence” of the oppressed against the oppressor is a hypocrite, who favors the violence of his camp. As a result, Fanon denounces the language of non-violence which is a colonial invention to overcome the action of the colonized against the colonizer, and equally a new form of deception or ruse of the colonizer to subdue the colonized psychologically. Non-violence advocates equality, an agreement for common salvation, which is undoubtedly impossible in view of the prevailing reality. Rather, it installs a situation of compromise, which is a new form of humiliation and a reinforcement of colonialism. Fanon condemns such a humiliating attitude and ponders that the colonized can accept a compromise with colonialism but never a compression.

Consequently, according to Fanon, violence is the midwife of progress in the tribunal of history. This violence is that of the colonized on the colonizer, described by him as the absolute form of praxis that makes history possible. To him, “*colonialism is not a thinking machine, is not a body endowed with reason. It is violence in the state of nature and can only bow to greater violence.*”<sup>129</sup> It can then only yield to greater violence which is in fact a return to the sender, a response from the colonized to the colonist. Thus, for Fanon, violent decolonization leads to the prospect of a new world, it radically deconstructs the colonial and slavery past. This boldness of human regeneration is linked to the rupture with Europe and its humanism which is nothing but lies, hypocrisy and caricature of facts. If at the beginning of *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon proclaims a clean slate, he invites the underdeveloped peoples in the afterword not to imitate the delirium of a Europe which has never stopped talking about man while massacring. Fanon invites us not to be obsessed with the desire to imitate or catch up with Europe, but condemns such an attitude which he finds senseless. Fanon concludes his thesis by telling the exploited and the marginalized that “*...for Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must get a new look, develop new thinking, try to create a new man*”<sup>130</sup>. Thus, this is a call for the Third World to invent itself and of starting a new history.

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<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p.55.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, p.60.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, p.43.

<sup>130</sup> Frantz Fanon, *Op. cit.*, p.237.

### 3.2.2 Arendt's Critique of the Fanonian Conception of Violence.

In line with similar reactions towards Sartre, though Hannah Arendt thinks that Fanon is closer to reality than most of his admirers, she doesn't share his conception of violence as she observes a misinterpretation of his thought by those who claim it. Arendt reproaches Fanon for confusing his theory with that of Marxism. Sartre's thought helps us to better understand that of Fanon, and of those who were inspired by him because Fanon himself was inspired by the Sartrean existentialism. She considered Fanon to be more reserved than his admirers about the effects of violence, and believes that only the first chapter of her work *On Violence*, has widely been read. In addition, she says Fanon knows well that this pure and total brutality inevitably leads to the defeat of the movement after a few weeks if not immediately combated. It is in line with such reasoning that Arendt describes the assertions of the leaders of the Black Panther and the Black power as "...emphatic and irresponsible"<sup>131</sup> and more precisely because the new militants, according to her, appeal to a rhetoric which is directly inspired by Fanon, their theoretical argumentation usually includes only a confused mixture of the rest of Marxism. She recommends a dissolution of any misunderstanding through a rereading of Marx's thought on violence and effect a total cessation from such a conception which glorifies revolutionary violence as the ultimate solution in politics.

Fanon situates violence at the collective level by considering the populated laborer as the medium of revolution. He marked that during a revolutionary action, as well as during a military operation, "*individualism is the first value to disappear*"<sup>132</sup>. Arendt ponders that this group spirit worshipped by Fanon is similar to the "...well-known phenomenon of battlefield brotherhood, where acts of devotion and self-sacrifice are often daily occurrences"<sup>133</sup>. At this juncture according to Arendt, Fanon asks the activist for the irrevocable act, the one that seals the commitment that leads to the gift of his life. Such a solution founds the prejudice according to which death seems to play a political role, an egalitarian factor in the sense that "*for the colonized, life can only arise from the decomposing corpse of the colonist*"<sup>134</sup>, and to Fanon, killing a colonizer is not only a duty but a politico-ethnic responsibility. According to Arendt, such a conception represents the antipodes of all political reflection, and extreme and paradoxical figure of politics. Following the Arendtian view of the condemnation of violence, this Fanonian

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<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, p.122.

<sup>132</sup> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, cited by Arendt in *Crisis of the Republic*, p.164.

<sup>133</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>134</sup> Frantz Fanon, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

conception of popular violence is debatable as it can be at the origin of the legitimization and justification of Kamikaze or terrorist actions, marked by suicides operations in which thousands of innocent people are slaughtered. Such a conception is anti-political, and Arendt recalls that never has a political institution been based on the recognition of equality in the face of death or on the realization in practice of violence<sup>135</sup>. The extreme form of the popularization of such a practice is no other thing than extremism and terrorism or blind violence reaching its climax. According to Arendt the consequences of such acts are deadly for the preservation of the “common world”.

Therefore, Arendt in her criticism of Fanon, thinks that violence is not politically productive, and cannot be opposed to violence because it can generate any fury. For her, there is no just war or just violence as preached by Fanon, because violence is instrumental in nature and unable to support causes, to lead the march of history, to promote revolution, to defend the progress or reaction. This is because Fanon’s position on popular insurrection is based on the spontaneity of the masses, but once the process has begun it is difficult to stop or control it. Such collective action leads to the disorganization of society, a return to the state of nature where man is compared to beast. As Arendt points out, it is a question of relying on biological and not political terminology as Fanon and other apologists for violence have been doing. Thus for Arendt contrary to Fanon, violence is destructive and cannot be legitimate, it can only engender another injustice.

### **3.3 - Critique to the Black Powers and Black Panthers**

The Black Panther Party was an African American revolutionary party for self-defence founded in 1966 in Oakland, California by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale. This was a Marxist-Leninist black power political organisation with main ideology to patrol African American neighbourhoods and protect residents from acts of police brutality. This group emerged during the Black Power era but were not a Black Power group as such because the ideology of the Black Powers was to emphasize on racial pride, economic empowerment, and the creation of political and cultural institutions. Hannah Arendt considers both the Black Powers and the Black Panthers as “*negro students ... regarded and organized themselves as an interest group, the representatives of the black community*”<sup>136</sup>. Indeed, according to her, they favor direct action, in other words armed struggle or rebellion as a means of political pressure, explaining why in her critique of lies and political violence in Crisis of the Republic, she also attacks the above new leftists in American.

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<sup>135</sup> Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, p.120.

According to Hannah Arendt, they were considered as activities and activists devoted to the glorification of violence as she enunciated in her words that “... *violence with them was not a matter of theory and rhetoric.*”<sup>137</sup> but an effective instrument of pressure and social demand. Arendt strives to show that violence is a fundamentally pre-political and anti-political notion, on which nothing solid or lasting can be constructed. Simple reason why she favors dialogue, discussion and consensus as a political solution to violence and thinks that the identification of political action with violent action can be fatal because from it, in the current circumstances, nothing else can result except that political action has now become meaningless. Likewise, faced with theories advocating violence as being a powerful means of the emancipation of Third World countries, Hannah Arendt shows the diversity that exists between these different nations and countries, and by the same time the impossibility of adopting a relevance in a set whose main characteristic is heterogeneity. For her, the Third World does not exist and the affirmation of its unity by Sartre, Fanon and the Third World advocates is a lie. It is therefore a “vast error of judgment” to affirm that the Third World is a reality, one and indivisible, as the latter maintain.

According to Arendt, the Third World as defined by their advocates is not an objective reality, but just an ideology, an illusion or better still a false belief. For her, this qualifier is only a “pseudo concept” that does not cover anything, therefore, it is meaningless. The Third World preachers by affirming the unity of the world on the political, economic, cultural and historical level, have shown partiality and subjectivity in their demonstrations. Their conclusions have nothing to do with the factual truth, they are swapped and without any real basis because they are cut off from objective reality. She actually underscores their ignorance and negligence about innumerable characteristics which they do not have in common, and the fact that what they have in common results simply from a difference with another part of the world.

This criticism of the Third World is also addressed to the New Leftist. This whole movement which proclaims the unity of the Third World, this through the new slogan of the era of decolonization inspired by Marxism. This new slogan, inspired by Sartre’s preface, is as follows: “*natives of all underdeveloped countries, unite!*”<sup>138</sup> Also, Hannah Arendt thinks that this slogan of the new left is more aberrant and clumsy than the old model that it copies: “*Proletarians of all countries, unite! which itself is now, after all, totally discredited*”<sup>139</sup>.

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<sup>137</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, p.123.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p.124.

## **PARTIAL CONCLUSION**

Our preoccupation in this first part has been to examine through the help of Hannah Arendt if violence, politics and power are synonymous, and if there is a link between violence and politics. In an attempt to provide answers to these worries, we proceeded via a deductive reasoning of apprehending what it means to be human, the origin of violence in humans, their manifestation, and different forms in a macro society. It would have been unmethodical to have unfolded a reflection on violence and its manifestations in humans, who constitute the society, without going through some conceptual elucidations on human origin and human nature. This enabled us draw a line between violence and politics, and understood through Hannah Arendt why it was for her, and should be for us a subject of long reflection. We equally raised the types of violence that do exist, forms of violence in politics, and its origin in human existence. As such, the above were classified into the archaeology and trajectory of violence before raising the framework of Arendt's political philosophy comprising of her influence and application, and finally the author's criticism on political lies and violence. This therefore paves way for the examination of the problems related to the Arendtian conception of political philosophy, which constitute the subject of discussion in our second part.





**PART II:**  
**PROBLEMS OF THE ARENDTIAN CONCEPTION OF VIOLENCE IN HER  
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY**

*“All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence.”<sup>140</sup>*

*“...violence can be justifiable, but not legitimate.”<sup>141</sup>*

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<sup>140</sup> Arendt, *On Violence*, New York, A Harvest/HBJ Books, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970, p.35.

<sup>141</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.151.

## PARTIAL INTRODUCTION

In our previous part, focus was on the conceptual elucidation of power, strength, force and violence, before analyzing violence via its origin, nature, characteristics and manifestation in politics. This permitted us to understand via the framework of Arendt's political philosophy that violence, different from power though close to strength, is instrumental in nature, and cannot create power but can always destroy it. She stood against the use of violence in any form especially for freedom and held against Fanon that violence is politically not productive but was however confused and controversial in her analysis as she justifies violence and declares that "*violence can be justifiable, but not legitimate*"<sup>142</sup> because it is just instrumental in nature. This therefore paves way for the examination of the problems related to the Arendtian conception of political philosophy, constituting the focus in our second part. In short, it comprises firstly on expatiating on the surface of political realism the legitimacy of the use of violence in achieving targeted goals before on a second note getting essentially critical on the Arendtian unrealistic hypothesis. Thirdly, we shall carry a criticism on her counter-violence in the struggle for freedom. However, our guiding questions are: can it actually be asserted that Hannah Arendt hypothesis on violence be tenable? Can violence and related actions be avoided in the modern and contemporary societies? How plausible and possible could the thesis of Arendt on violence be realistic?

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<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p.151.

## CHAPTER IV: THE REALISM OF VIOLENCE IN POLITICS

Violence is linked to social conflicts prevailing in our society, whose acceptability is associated to changes out of social sensitivity. Since the decline of the great revolutionary tides, its degree of acceptance has decreased. However, in recent years, certain groups or social movements have been trying to legitimize it. By legitimacy we refer to acceptability, legality or validity of an act. As such, talking about the legitimacy of the usage of violence in politics, we are thinking about instances of the permissibility and correctness of the use of violence in politics as praxis. The realism of politics on grounds differs from the idealism conceived and preached by many intellectuals from antiquity to the contemporary period. Hannah Arendt being a proponent against the use of violence in politics was ironical or self-contradictory in her justifiability of this same violence which indirectly depicts some legitimacy on her part. This then expresses the inevitability of violence in praxis to handle some pertinent issues about the organization of the state. Thus, this chapter is aimed at expounding on political realism through which violence could be seen as inevitable, politics perceived as transformed violence, and finally apprehending homicide which is a form of violence as the center of gravity of politics conceived from historico-philosophical events in the world.

### 4.1 - The Philosophical Justification of the Heuristic use of Lies and Violence in Politics.

The practicality or pragmatism of politics since the organizational coexistence of men hasn't been a bed of roses as violence has persistently remain unavoidable. Violence appears to be the generator or engine of political sphere as no political organization has ever been void of the claws of violence in any form. The analysis of the conditions and causes of violence, alongside the ways to overcome and reduce conflict and aggression within and between socio-political communities is a central concern in political philosophy and theory. On one part, some political philosophers like Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Max Weber<sup>143</sup> views the relation between violence and politics as essential and unavoidable as opposed by the contract theories from John Locke to John Rawls. Political philosophy witnessed a twist during the modern period with the shift from the ancient and medieval period with Machiavelli and Hobbes. A new order

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<sup>143</sup> Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Peter Bondanella (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005 -1532-); Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1985 -1651-); Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).

based on experience and observation of political facts installs itself at the center of the ideal and preached system of Plato and Aquinas. While recording a rupture with the idealist and religious tradition, they expounded that politics as the art of commanding and ruling has to gain its support from its pillar which is the human nature. Thus, for the good of the city and citizens, the prince or the leviathan must rule with an iron hand so as to oblige men to respect the laws. This can only be possible through its fuel which is no other than lies and violence, inevitable in politics.

In reality, politics is incompatible with the truth and there exist the difficulty of conceiving the political space without domination, invisibility and concealment. This reality is clearly expressed in Sembene's words that « *l'honnêtetés est un délit de nos jours* »<sup>144</sup>. We can still reduce the high rate of lies and the different forms of violence, but not completely eliminate them. This initiative is part of the dream of some philosophers from which Hannah Arendt belongs. She could be accused of being an idealist as her positions seems to hide the political fact wherein her conception often does not take into account the conjuncture and the context in which events take place. From the Arendtian conception of power, we retain the coincidence of political action and moral idealism. If politics is reduced to a set of techniques necessary to access and maintain power, then the Arendtian conception can be considered misplaced and ineffective. Indeed, the task of politics is not the moral reformation of humanity, which is to say, that of making the citizen good and virtuous. Such judgment could lead us to the dictatorship of virtue which corresponds to political moralism and not realism. The struggle for power is therefore at the heart of political life. This is why politics cannot be a matter of morality, because political action obeys a higher necessity, which is that of the salvation of the city. Politics, which has always been guided by action is an activity which in its exercise and practice must dissociate itself at times from morality. It is for this reason that Freund thinks that acting politically is not the same as acting morally and vice versa<sup>145</sup>.

Political action is based on efficiency, and necessitates a condition of success by all cost. Politics is a matter of sovereignty, domination and constraint, contrary to morality which is a matter of discipline. Morality cannot be drawn from experience, because its object is the ideal, not the real, that is, what ought to be, and not what is. Any politician who places his whole action on moral values like good faith and honesty is likely bound to fail and exposed to numerous condemnation. It is therefore necessary to resort to maneuvering and manipulative techniques as a means to achieve one's ends. The end justifies the means, and the effectiveness of an end depends

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<sup>144</sup> Sembene Ousmane, *Le Mandat*, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1966, p.189.

<sup>145</sup> Julien Freund, *Qu'est que la politique?* Paris, Sirey, 1965, pp.5-6.

on its means. We can therefore say that it wasn't necessary to wait for Machiavelli, the precursor of modern political thought, to observe that the exercise of power and the conduct of the State require facts and foreign means to commonly accepted moral rules. Politics must be exercised taking into account concrete realities, which necessarily puts morality in the background. This explains why Machiavelli advises that "*...it is necessary for the prince to know how to practice well both the beast and the man. (...) which means nothing else, to have thus for governor a half animal and a half man, except that a prince must know how to use one or the other nature, and that the one without the other nature, is not lasting*"<sup>146</sup>. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli separates individual morality from political morality. According to him, individual morality is personal and is linked to beliefs and convictions, while political morality is the responsibility vis-à-vis the social body whose stability the prince must ensure. Thus, he reduces the art of governing to a culture of lies and deception.

In *The Republic*, though a lover of truth, we can invite Plato as a forerunner of modern political experience who grants the right to lie to the leader of the city. This right corresponds to what he calls "*pious lies*" or "*noble lies*". According to Plato, lying is useful to men as a form of medicine but whose use must be exclusively reserved for the head of the city and therefore the layman must not touch it. The use of lies is thus forbidden to social classes lower than those of magistrates or philosopher kings, namely craftsmen and watchdogs. He presents lying as the prerogative of the leaders of the city or the magistrates to deceive, in the interest of the city, enemies or citizens. To any other person, lying is forbidden, and we will affirm that the individual who lies to the leaders commits a fault of nature. It is good for the legislator to lie for the well-being of the City because lying plays a necessary role to the State which is that of preservation and order. For Plato, lying is politically condemned when it divides and it is politically acceptable when it unites and stabilizes the City as he declares that "*... the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in dealing with enemies - that would be an instance; or again, when those whom we call our friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm, then it is useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive*"<sup>147</sup>.

A reflection about politics while excluding lies and violence leads to an abusive, childlike vision, and to an error of evaluation. Believing that there can be politics without lying and violence seems illusory because political life as it is practiced always supposes a high rate of lying in

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<sup>146</sup> Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p.107.

<sup>147</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, Benjamin Jowett Translated version, Feedbooks, published in 380AD, <http://www.feedbooks.com>, p.261.

varying degrees as well as violence. Lying in politics is a necessity and utility as it is extraordinarily powerful and considered as the pivot of the political game. Therefore, there is no politics without lies, lies and violence have been proven to be one and indivisible as they serve as the pillar of politics, permits its subsistence, and necessary for social balance. Though Arendt's thesis holds that lies give birth to violence, lying does not always lead to instrumental violence, instability or arbitrariness. Lying and violence can be the source of cohesion and balance of the social body. For example, the use of 'the reason of State' according to Machiavelli in *The Prince* depicting the survival of the state by any means is sometimes of great importance in the event of a serious crisis or war, it is a question of preserving and safeguarding the socio-political order by all means. In short, can't we lie for the good of the people? Isn't lying more effective than the truth? One can therefore lie in the interest of a group, a doctrine or for the well-being of all. We are sometimes obliged for public interest to use violence or not to say everything or to say as little as possible because we could create disorder or chaos if we say the truth or nonviolence can lead to severe chaos. Do not we often say that all truth is not good to say? As a matter of principle, it is important to hide what should be, to be careful and vigilant when making public statements. In fact, the duty of the State obliges one to maneuver, to use finesse, to trap the adversary, making the political space not to be a place of transparency or purity but of appearance. This is what Sartre clearly puts in his words:

*As you value your purity, my little boy! As you are afraid to get your hands dirty. Well, stay pure! Who will this benefit and why are you coming among us? purity is an idea of Fakir and monk. (...) I have dirty hands. Up to the elbows. I plunged them into shit and blood. And then after? Do you imagine that we can govern innocently?*<sup>148</sup>

For the preservation of a human life, lying and violence are legitimate as its end is to preserve a precious value. Such a lie or violence is not reprehensible but at the service of a moral intention, which renders it useful and necessary. It is necessary to know how to sacrifice principles when the essential ends are at stake. In the political field this thesis retains all its patience. Therefore, it is unrealistic to pretend that we can govern without lies and violence. Violence and lies are not pre-political or apolitical facts as Hannah Arendt points out because they have an essential socio-political function wherein they cannot be totally deconstructed as both are rooted in history according to the Marxists. Violence is not only instrumental or destructive, it can be constructive, saving and beneficial. This is undoubtedly what Fanon maintains while affirming that the paying

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<sup>148</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Les Mains Sales*, Paris, Gallimard, collection, « Folio », 1971, p.198.

nature of violence, makes it an indispensable instrument in the service of revolutionary action, because a trampled people finds in violence a means of reconquering their dignity. Revolutionary violence has been proven to be the midwife of history as the violence of the resistant, of the oppressed or of the slave who, in the mist of oppression and servitude, has no alternative but the recourse to violence to free themselves from cruelty was the only way out. In the context of the decolonization of Third World countries, violence had all these rights, in the sense that it appeared as the only means of liberation and emancipation according to Fanon and Sartre. Violence in such a context was necessary and therefore just. The nationalist and independence movements in the Third World have managed, through the use of violence, to promote the emergence of a new order, or at least to make international opinion aware of a regional problem. Such violence retains all its legitimacy and is justifiable. Indeed, freedom is not given, it is conquered and only snatched at the end of a struggle.

When Hannah Arendt affirms that violence is instrumental, and therefore incapable of creating power, she destroys the true organizational sense of the state or of politics which only works with ideological apparatuses, weapons of balance and social repression. Political domination makes it possible not to separate political violence from social power, but obliges us to establish a close connection between the two, a connection which cannot differentiate them. The political order without repression establishes according to Hobbes a “state of nature” reduced to the war of each against each. The state is in principle the institutionalized form of political power as it substitutes rule for arbitrariness and has the monopoly of legitimate violence and is responsible for ensuring the well-being of citizens and guaranteeing the safety of individuals. Thus, believing in a public space of justice, sincerity and transparency, where violence, lies, camouflage and corruption will be banished forever is not possible in the governing of men. Such a conception is only a form of manipulation carefully managed by politicians. By claiming to condemn and be annoyed at violence and lying, Hannah Arendt, despite her good faith, practices self-lying, and thereby reinforces the rate of political lying.

## **4.2- The Historicity of the Instrumental Use of Violence in Politics**

### **4.2.1 Hitler's Holocaust as Genocide of the European Jews.**

The Holocaust, also called the Shoah, was the World War II genocide of the European Jews between 1941 and 1945 across German-occupied Europe where Nazi Germany and collaborators methodically murdered about six (6) million Jews, covering about two-third of Europe's Jewish population. The Shoah in Hebrew means "calamity" or "destruction" to describe the genocide and oppression of European Jews, even though contestation arose that it could equally be a calamity on non-Jews like the Rwandan case. The main problematic here is: what were the structural and social conditions that led to this crime? The causes of the holocaust were of several historical factors like antisemitism, the rise of nationalism, world economic depression, the aftermath of World War I, the failure of democracy in Germany, and cosmopolitan laxity to host Jewish refugees. The Nazi ideology was based on a set of racial principles and classified society through purity of blood, establishing a hierarchy wherein the top was the "purest," and all others were gradually poisoned through years of race mixing. Applying this hierarchical structure, Jews were the least, placed on the bottom, and considered the enemy of Germany. The Nazis created ideas based on theories of antisemitism, including religious and economic forms of discrimination. They connected these historical ideas with contemporary concerns, accusing the Jewish people for German and European societal problems as well as the defeat of Germany in First World War (WWI). When Adolf Hitler ascended power as German Chancellor in 1933 after serving in the army during WWI, the Nazi party headed by Hitler saw the loss as humiliating following the events at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and considered the Jews to be scapegoat of this disgrace. They instantly began passing anti-Jewish laws with the aim of chasing the Jews out of Germany, which was simply the fundamental objective. But emigration was not an easy task as Jews were asked to give up their homes, livelihoods, and businesses, charged exorbitant fees, and had few places of escape open to them. As a result of this difficulty, Nazi policy shifted to direct violence against Jews and their property. A fundamental moment for this change took place on the nights of November 9 and 10, 1938, when Nazis and their supporters took to the streets of Germany and Austria, burning and ransacking Jewish shops, homes, and synagogues. The war ended on May 8, 1945 but the repercussion of the homicide continues to affect the contemporary society as the violence perpetrated by the Nazis and collaborators have been repeated through acts of mass violence and other genocides throughout the world. Thus, we notice here that homicide is the



center of gravity in politics for expressing anger and disappointment, and the acquisition and preservation of power, sovereignty and domination of the minority.

#### **4.2.2 Coups d'état and Genocide in Africa for Political and Cultural Goals.**

On the first note, Africa has been a continent of the bedrock of Coups d'état as many Presidents came to power and departed through this prevailing political violence. The first ever coups d'état that occurred in French and British colonies of Africa, which led to the achievement of independence in the 1950s and 1960s, was the Togolese military coup on 13 January 1963. This was as a result of foreign intervention into domestic politics as seen from France and Ghana of Nkrumah who had expansionist philosophy hidden behind the unity of Africa, rejected by Sylvanus Olympio, the first President of Togo. This led to the joint attack of Emmanuel Bodjolle and Etienne Eyadema, which triggered the killing of Olympio, and a new government formed. Secondly, Idi Amin Dada seized power after overthrowing Obote on 25<sup>th</sup> January 1971 through a military coup in Uganda. The dictator carried mass killings for 8 years in Uganda to maintain power thanks to the military. However, this terror didn't continue as the cannibal witnessed the repulsive incursion of the Tanzanian Armed Forces supported by the Ugandan exiles in 1978 while Amin's troops were assisted by Libyan soldiers. Kampala was captured on the 11<sup>th</sup> April 1979 and Amin fled with his remaining troops to Libya. Thirdly, Nigeria has recorded five (5) successful military coups d'état between 1966 and 1999 and four (4) failed attempts with recent one in 2014 at the Enugu Government House. With the aim to restore the State of Biafra, Barrister Benjamin Onwuka who is the leader of the Biafra Zionist Federation militant group took control of the state house for about 4 hours and erected their flag at the entrance of the house on March 8, 2014. Recently in 2021, the Murder of the Chadian President Idriss Deby Itno for Political aspiration can't be neglected. Idris Deby Itno was a graduate of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's Revolutionary Center in Libya. He took power by leading a coup d'état on President Hissène Habré in December 1990 and survived various rebellions and coup attempts against his own rule. During his three decades in office, Chad experienced democratic backsliding and widespread corruption, including cronyism<sup>149</sup>, embezzlement and a deeply entrenched patronage system. Consequently in 2016, the

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<sup>149</sup> Cronyism is the practice of partiality in awarding jobs and other advantages to friends or trusted colleagues, especially in politics and between politicians and supportive organizations. For instance, this includes appointing "cronies" to positions of authority, regardless of their qualifications; this is in contrast to a meritocracy, in which appointments are made purely on qualification.

Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)<sup>150</sup> was established with the goal of overthrowing Déby's government. In April 2021, FACT initiated the Northern Chad offensive, Déby was injured on April 19 while commanding troops on the frontline fighting the militants, and kicked the bucket on April 20, 2021.

On another note, genocide has been the centre of gravity of politics not only in the West, but in Africa due to cultural, religious, economic, and political reasons. Some of the genocide cases in Africa are the 1993 ethnic violence in Burundi, the 8 years Uganda genocide due to religious disparity by a dictator, the October 1996 Democratic Republic of Congo war, the 1967 Biafra war in Nigeria, the 2003 ethnic Darfuri killing in Western Sudan known as the 1<sup>st</sup> genocide of the 21<sup>st</sup> century and most especially the 1994 Rwanda genocide<sup>151</sup>. For instance, the Rwandan genocide in Africa, also called genocide against the Tutsi, was a mass slaughter of Tutsi, Twa and moderate Hutu tribes in Rwanda which took place between the 7<sup>th</sup> April and 15<sup>th</sup> July 1994 during the Rwandan Civil War. This was an anti-Tutsi racism which killed between 500.000 and 1.074.016 persons. Regardless of the numerous remote causes of the intertribal conflict between the Hutu's and the Tutsi's and the colonial factor like Belgian rule which denied political power and education to the Hutu as they named the Tutsi superior, the immediate cause which led to the civil war was the firing down of the airplane carrying the Rwandan President, Juvénal Habyarimana and the Hutu President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira as it prepared to land in Kigali. Various accusations were reciprocally levied on Paul Kagame of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)<sup>152</sup> and Hutu extremists of the Rwandan Government.

Thus from the above instances, we notice that the dark continent has really been dark in political records as extermination or massacre and several revolutions to ascend to power or overthrow a dictator can't go untold. This illustrates that due to bad governance, religious and cultural disparity, violence through genocide has been the center of gravity of politics in Africa for over 59 years, testifying the instrumental use of violence in Africa's politics.

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<sup>150</sup> The Front for Change and Concord in Chad (French: Front pour l'alternance et la concorde au Tchad), is a political and military organization created by SG Mahamat Mahdi Ali in March 2016 in Tanua, in the north of Chad, with the goal of overthrowing the government of Chad. Ali declared his preparation for military operations against President Idriss Déby, and killed him in April 2021 while he was commanding troops on the frontline fighting the militants.

<sup>151</sup> Stapleton, J. Timothy, *A History of Genocide in Africa*, Volume 1, London, Praeger, April 2017, p.3.

<sup>152</sup> The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF–*Front Patriotique Rwandais*, *FPR*) is the ruling political party in Rwanda transformed in December 1987 from the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU). Led by President Paul Kagame, the party has governed the country since its armed wing defeated government forces and ended the Rwandan genocide in 1994.

### **4.2.3 The Repression of Political Opponents to Preserve Power: The Case of the UPC in Cameroon.**

World politics has been characterized by rivalries wherein Machiavellian doctrines of conquering and preserving power by all costs has been of utmost vivacity in the West, Africa and Cameroon in particular. Cameroon like other countries in the world has been a ground of violence in politics through extermination of opponents by established regimes. Our case study to justify this thesis is the death sentences or executions of UPC sympathizers and supporters, most especially that of Bishop Albert Ndongmo of Nkongsamba.

On April 10<sup>th</sup> 1948, the first real indigenous political party in French Cameroon was formed under the name Union des Population du Cameroun (UPC) at Bassa quarter in Douala by Leonard Bouly. Dr. Roland Felix Moumie became its president, Abel Kingue as 1<sup>st</sup> vice president, Ernest Ouandie as 2<sup>nd</sup> vice president, and Reuben Um Nyobe who was hospitalized in Sackbayeme at the time of its formation became its secretary General, accompanied by many strong members like Mayi Matip, Mathias Djoumessi, etc. The main aim of the creation of UPC was for immediate independence and reunification due to several reasons. Amongst the numerous socio-economic and political reasons for the creation of UPC, the immediate were; the 100% increase on daily taxes paid for renting markets stalls in the Yaoundé Central Market which caused the market women to join the unemployed in the strike against the French colonial administration, pay increase and better working conditions demanded by the USCC trade union, discontentment over the division of the natives into two distinct classes by the French called the citoyen and the sujets, Um Nyobe's constant visit to the UNO General Assembly and denouncing the activities of the French colonial policies, the French colonial authority's harassment of UPC militants created room for violence leading to the 1955 revolt<sup>153</sup>. The uprising of the UPC and the continuous violence contributed to the instability which in turn caused the fall of Andre Marie Mbida's government in 1958 and his temporal exile to Guinea. This led to the coming of Amadou Ahidjo to power with the intention of neutralizing UPC. He first succeeded to kill Um Nyobe through the French forces on patrol on 13<sup>th</sup> September 1958<sup>154</sup>, caused one of the pillars of UPC Mayi Matip Theodore to cross carpet under the promise of a Ministerial post. As a result, a centralized federal system of government was instituted in 1969 to enjoy considerable powers to deal with the UPCists.

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<sup>153</sup> Victor Julius Ngoh, *Unravelling the History of Cameroon Reunification, 1959-1961*, London, Eden Xtra pub., October 2011, p.74.

<sup>154</sup> Verkijika G. Fanson, *Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges, V.2*, London, Macmillan Edu., 1989, p.113.

Also, the sentencing of Bishop Albert Ndongmo of Nkongsamba was a continuation of his Machiavellian drive. Ahidjo discovered that it was difficult to check the UPC militarily, he then engaged the services of Bishop Ndongmo to reach an agreement with the UPC leadership. The Bishop accepted on conditions that the arrested leaders' lives would be spared and that they would be rehabilitated without further hostility. Ahidjo refused his proposals because he didn't want to spare their lives, so they were dragged to court, tried, and on January 1<sup>st</sup> 1971, in spite of appeals from Pope Paul VI and the French Communist and Socialist parties, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Vice President of UPC, Ernest Ouandie was executed. As a result of Bishop Ndongmo's stand on Ouandie's arrest and execution, Ahidjo's regime intentionally misjudged him as a supporter of the UPC party. He was accused, arrested and triad of plotting to overthrow Ahidjo's government alongside with Celestine Takala (death sentence), Celestine Lingo (released), Christophe Tienchue (released), and Wambo Le Courant (executed)<sup>155</sup>. Despite the lack of sufficient evidence, the military court found him guilty and sentenced him to death. This changed to a life imprisonment after Ahidjo's pardon when appeals for clemency came from many areas, and was called to the Vatican where he lived till his death. It was however evident that Ndongmo was sentenced to death not because he plotted to kill Ahidjo but because the bishop wanted to contest the 1970 presidential elections against Ahidjo.

The Machiavellian nature of Ahidjo was at its peak as he created a secret service police placed under Jean Forchive with the aim to spy and fish out opponents of his regime. To further maintain peace and security for his interest, Ahidjo set up maximum detention camps at Tignere, Yokadouma, Yoko, Mantoum, Tchollire and Kondengui. Thus, the assassination of UPC political leaders, the death sentence of Bishop Albert Ndongmo, execution of many other political antagonists, existence of few private newspapers, jailing of recalcitrant newspaper editors, banning of newspapers and private radio station by late President Amadou Ahidjo for political aspiration is a glaring example of violence and homicide as the center of gravity of politics.

### **4.3 - The Legitimacy of Socio-Political Violence**

Violence as previously elaborated is closely connected to socio-political conflicts prevailing in every society because there is no society without violence which however takes different manifestations and paradigm depending on their roots and sphere. It progresses according to the opinions and demonstrations it stimulates from each individual or group who carry a point

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<sup>155</sup> Verkijika G. Falso, *Cameroon History for Secondary Schools and Colleges*, V.2, pp.158-156.

of view varying within time and space. The very place violence occupies in a society, and the significance attached to it course can experience essential variations. As such, violence is naturally objective and subjective, which makes any dogmatic definition difficult to apprehend its essence. We can visualize from the instances in our previous thought on homicide above, some of the modalities, number of aggression, abuses, violations, murders, rape, and many others which goes in the way of a universal pretense approach because it is seemingly realistic. However, the question is who defines these modalities, chooses them, recognizes them as being relevant, and how the statistics are produced to enter into the galaxy of qualm and derision. Though violence has been condemned by Arendt, Gandhi, King Junior, Mandela and many other great thinkers, the United Nation (UN) and non-governmental organizations (NGO), a certain legitimacy of socio-political violence paradoxically runs throughout history as seen above, especially in our contemporary period, while the state symmetrically loses part of its legitimate control to use force. A further historico-factual approach, but now, of the most recent cases of socio-political violence in Cameroon, Africa and the world at large will enable us understand the elasticity within time and space of the legitimacy of violence in politics from one generation to another.

Collective violence via rebellion of different forms from which legitimacy has been granted to some prevails in all the continents. The expansion of religious extremism at the heart of political violence has been the nightmare of most African and Western countries who embarked on several repressive acts. For instance, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Islamic uprising in Algeria from 1991 to 2001, the terrorism of Al Qaeda then Daesh, and the Boko Haram insurgencies, decreased after the 2015 attacks. The asymmetric war with Boko Haram pushed the concerned African countries like Cameroon, Chad, and Nigeria to repost the terrorist group to safeguard their territories against such insurgency. On the night of 14 to 15 April 2014, 276 mostly Christian female students aged from 16 to 18 were kidnapped by the Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram from the Government Girls Secondary School at the town of Chibok in Borno State-Nigeria. This was the most evident and alarming child aggression which legitimized the use of violent reactions from the world as several head of states and individuals condemned this act despite the UN declaration to protect children and girls. It is worthy of recall that following the effects of the Lebanon war in 1982 wherein several Palestinian and Lebanese children were victims of Israel's acts of aggression, the UN dedicated 4<sup>th</sup> June of each year as the International Day of Innocent Children Victims of Aggression. This simply means children should be spared from any form of conflicts to which they are obviously not perpetrators or actors voluntarily, but this isn't respected most especially by radical Islamism. The most profound analyzes of the push of radical Islam and

jihadism shows that these violence attests a metamorphosis as faith provides the moral and emotional means of passing through their struggle.

In the West, we observed the outcome of the Charlie Hebdo January 7, 2015 terrorist attack by the Algerian French brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi in France which led to the death of 17 people including 11 journalists, and 4 days after, pushed World leaders like Benjamin Netanyahu (Israeli Prime Minister), Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (Malian President), Francois Hollande (French President), Angela Merkel (German Chancellor), Donald Tusk (European Council President) Mahmoud Abbas (Palestinian Authority President) accompanied by many officials to march in tribute of those killed. But students refused to participate in the minute of silence requested in the schools nationwide for the reasons that they believed the attacks were staged by government officials for political reasons and to caricature the Muslims. Thus, they stood against lies in politics and needed explanation from the authorities. As such, the legitimacy of terrorist barbarism finds here a space, modest, but real most especially in Africa and Europe.

In addition, violence has found increased legitimacy mainly under the effect of repression, for example with the movement of yellow vests in France which began on 17 November 2018 for economic justice and later for institutional political reforms, which was not the case with the temptation of violence that is observed in certain more or less libertarian movements, Anti-capitalists, or defending a precise cause. This movement was not violent in itself, but his demonstrations were punctuated by violence with which it had a complex relationship. Whether it is ultra-right activists, and more numerous, ultra-Left-Blocs-yellow vests wanting to do battle or becoming infected on the spot, because of the repression, not to mention a few burglars, the yellow vests have benefited from media coverage and an impact that would never have reached such a level without violence. Thus, the notion has imposed itself as violence pays, and perhaps the same violence can pay accepting with Arendt that “...no doubt ‘violence pays’...but the trouble is that it pays indiscriminately”<sup>156</sup>, but ironically contradicting her declaration that “violence can be justifiable, but not legitimate”<sup>157</sup> because it is just instrumental in nature. Admittedly, the emergency economic proclamations announced by President Macron, and therefore the tangible results obtained by the movement date from December 2018, while violence occupied the stage for long weeks afterwards. Nevertheless, the opinion and the media have never continued to take an interest as they did in the yellow vests without the violence that has permanently punctuated their mobilization. Jean-Paul Sartre, already author in 1961 of a sulphurous preface to the last book

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<sup>156</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, pp. 176-177.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p.151.

of Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, invited the French “Maoists” of the early 1970s to revolt without excluding violence. In 1977 again, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and again Jean-Paul Sartre, opposed the exile of Klaus Croissant, a German lawyer compromised in the terrorism of the Red Army Faction, and in 1979, Foucault took sides with the Iranian Revolution. In fact, a certain legitimacy of violence then lived its last fires.

Synthetically, on a symmetrical note, the police repression has regularly been perceived in other situations to be excessive, provoking strong criticism, questioning its methods and tools, and suddenly, the legitimate control of the use of the force they embody has been fed up. Thus, the violence from below finds a certain legitimacy while that of the state is weakening. Concomitantly to the above, violence is paradoxically criticized on many other records, since what links it to radical Islam disqualifies its essence, except as seen in some areas that violence against women and children faces a battle, and that very active campaigns denouncing police violence are possibly associated with racism. It should be clearly highlighted that even if the ideological references of violence were often international, the framework of legitimacy was essentially given by the nation state as projects of political violence were generally tense towards the taking of state power, and no government will like to yield to the pressure of a movement aimed to seize its power.

At this juncture, it is therefore important to admit the opposing crescendos of the present situation whereby we are today caught in a dilemma between two reasonings prevailing in contrary directions; one which revalues social and political violence, and another which makes it a taboo so as to preserve its assets. Consequently, a dichotomy is witnessed at this crisis as these two judgments cannot be placed on the same scale. Concretely, the second reasoning translates a powerful movement of a society which particularly requires rights and protections for the most vulnerable or weakest in the society, and which highlights that demands do not need violence to be heard. Conversely, the first finds its source not indeed in the sagacity that the actors want to promote, not really in their self-expectations, as in the crisis of legitimacy which affects power in Cameroon, Africa and the world at large. Therefore, it is important to hold that the type of violence which redeems legitimacy is not that of armed groups or that which tilts towards the capture of state power. Rather, it is the expression of an anger or a hatred which attests the insufficiencies of democracy and the authoritarian nature of those who pilot the political aircraft.

## CHAPTER V: THE PROBLEM OF THE LOGICAL PERTINENCE OF ARENDT'S ANALYSIS OF VIOLENCE AND POWER.

Hannah Arendt's hypothesis on violence rejecting its legitimacy when she declares that "*violence can be justifiable, but not legitimate*"<sup>158</sup> depicts her political idealism. From our epistemic voyage on the legitimacy of violence in politics, this chapter is focused on questioning the supposing idealism and paradoxes of Arendt and shed more light on her political fantasy, though with mixed feelings, by inviting the pragmatic conceptions of Muhannad Ayyash, Christopher Finlay, Jürgen Habermas, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Max Weber. These realistic thinkers from the medieval to the modern and now contemporary periods on the societal organisation and management of men views the relation between violence and politics as essential and unavoidable, disapproving with that of our author. Thus, this chapter posits what we can bravely and stipulatively call here the Arendtian paradox and Arendtian fearological illusion.

### 5.1 – The Theoretical Inconsistency of Arendt's Conception of Violence in Politics

Hannah Arendt has been brilliant and highly innovative in her conceptual analysis and praxis of violence, power, and politics. However, from the legitimacy of the use of violence illustrated in the previous chapter, we realise that Arendt's supposing idealism dichotomizes practical realism. Most of the disapproval with Arendt arises from the definitions which she uses in arguing violence. Arendt's definition of violence as distinct, her clarification that "*Power and violence are opposites*"<sup>159</sup>, and the claim that the roots of violence arise only from historical violence, is unsupportive in understanding the justifications for conflict. According to Muhannad Ayyash, violence and power are arguably better considered interconnected concepts and not distinct from each other as he declared that "*...violence and politics are not two separate entities; rather, they form a continuum in which relations of domination and power are established, but also continuously resisted, modified, inverted, and negotiated*"<sup>160</sup>. Arendt's distinction between power and violence raises certain problems both theoretically and in applying her definitions to contemporary conflict. Her interpretation of conflict is one which avoids a state-centric approach as it remains reliant too much on systematic considerations, and constructing her own structure of

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<sup>158</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.151.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p.56.

<sup>160</sup> Muhannad Ayyash, "The paradox of political violence" in *European Journal of Social Theory* Vol. 16, 2013, p. 354.



international conflict by integrating some concepts such as culture and ideational factors in the understanding of these conflict. Arendt approaches much from the right direction – considering the psychological reaction of those with power in reacting to or instigating violent conflict. However, statements such as “...*impotence breeds violence, and psychologically this is quite true. Politically, loss of power tempts men to substitute violence for power*” while incorporating some psychological justification, limits itself to the problematically applicable Arendtian system. This explains why Ayyash writes that, “*Violence cannot be captured within conceptual frameworks such as Arendt’s and Fanon’s, wherein violence must only play a specific role within a rigidly bordered theoretical region*”<sup>161</sup>. Thus, Arendt focuses her critique on the instrumentality of violence by distinguishing violence from power and politics which rejects the political realism of Niccolo Machiavelli in *The Prince* who expressed the real essence and effective use of the above concepts famously in his idea of Statesmanship and war that acquiring a state and maintaining it, requires evil means. This instrumentality, she argues, is in principle inimical to political action and thus any attempt to use violence as a political means should be criticized and resisted without qualification. As such, this is an Arendtian paradox.

Furthermore, and worse of all, Arendt’s rejection of violence as being illegitimate nails her down to the pole of illusion. Her dismissal of violence as illegitimate in all dimensions and paradigm, and yet justifiable in cases such as revolution is paradoxical. Actually, in contemporary conflict outside abstract theory, violence and politics are often harder to distinguish. The problem of her theory is often perceived to lie in the limits of her normative assertions for a politics purified of violence. A distinction between politics or power, and violence is, in many conflicts, often impossible to distinguish. Thus, Habermas was correct criticising Arendt’s link of strategic action both with force or violence and with instrumental action<sup>162</sup>. The reduction of violence and power into abstract and distinct concepts does not form a solid theoretical basis on which to understand conflict and force, explaining why according to Simon Swift it is “*both unrealistic and hasty in its effort to reduce all strategy to force*”<sup>163</sup>. Arendt’s understanding of power as fundamentally a result of discourse is difficult to maintain as separate from the real act of violence. Thus, her claim that Violence “*can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate*”<sup>164</sup> is paradoxical and unrealistic within the prism of contemporary politics.

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<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p.352.

<sup>162</sup> Jürgen Habermas, and McCarthy, “Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power” in *Social Research*, Vol.44, N° 1, 1977, p.18.

<sup>163</sup> Simon Swift, “Hannah Arendt, violence and vitality”, in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol. 16, 2013, p.28.

<sup>164</sup> Arendt, *Op. cit.*, p.151.

In the same line of reflection, we see in Arendt a sort of political hypocrisy and voluntary hesitancy not to accept that violence could be perpetual in politics. Though advocating for nonviolence, it doesn't reject the fact that it has fed and still feeds the tribunal of political history. Again, there are issues with the nature of violence being "instrumental" when elaborating the origin of conflict which Arendt escapes. This explains why Christopher Finlay holds that for Arendt there is a certain "*reluctance to regard violence as something which can occur within politics*" and that her instrumental violence relies on how "*the permissibility of violence relates to its origins as distinct from its ends*"<sup>165</sup>. However, Arendt's clarification that for violence, "*its justification loses in plausibility the farther its intended end recedes into the future*"<sup>166</sup>, leads to the situation where with an eye on historical experience even instrumental justifications are to be doubtfully viewed as the justice of violence has nothing to do with its origins. Violence cannot be considered primarily a result of historic origins, and the definitions pronounced cannot account for unseen conflict as it arises. According to Finlay at this juncture, if the "*physiologically necessary consequence of violent oppression and exploitation is counter-violence by colonial subjects, then the justice of that violence could be seen as the result of legitimate origins*"<sup>167</sup>. Therefore, from Arendt's thesis, we observe that there is, to some extent paradoxical support for revolutionary violence and condemnation of that of established governments.

## **5.2 – Fearolotical Reality and Legislature as the Potential Sources of Violence**

The characteristics of Thomas Hobbes' state of nature were solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, short, no preservation, war, threatening, danger, insecurity, death, homicide, violence, all these generating fear amongst men in their management and organisation, which is politics. Thus, the politics of fear which is herein stipulative as "*Fearolotical*"<sup>168</sup>. This type of state directly opposes the state of sovereignty which is government, institution, power, court, law, justice, prison, punishment, command, authority, order, preservation, and force. Thus, according to Hobbes' fearolotical philosophy, man lives in a condition of perpetual fear out of constant violence of diverse forms due to neglected rights and desires. Hobbes should be applauded for his brilliant declaration that "*man is a wolf to man*"<sup>169</sup> stemming from the Latin aphorism expressed as "*homo*

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<sup>165</sup> Christopher J. Finlay, "Hannah Arendt's Critique of Violence" in *Thesis Eleven* Vol. 97, 2009, pp. 28-30

<sup>166</sup> Arendt, *Op. cit.*, p.151.

<sup>167</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.97.

<sup>168</sup> This is a neologism emanating from Hobbes and Desh, which depicts Fear + Political = *Fearolotical*. The simple logic behind this word is that *fear precedes politics*.

<sup>169</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p.81.

*homini lupus est*” because of the presence of differences, urge for ownership and preservation of rights. In the same line of reflection, this depicts a political vision based on fear found in the analysis of fear developed by Subba who held that “*Man feels restless, tortured, suppressed, and suffocated because of known and unknown fears and searches for an outlet and emancipation.*”<sup>170</sup>. From antiquity till date, societies have constantly been animated by this fear, and any analysis that integrates Arendt’s conceptual distinction of power and violence, rejecting its legitimacy and or justifiability, is therefore disposed to reproducing a political theory that neglects state violence in the service of White rule, yet charges those who resist it with breaching the peace.

The German Jewish Philosopher Walter Benjamin, friend to Arendt, in his *Critique of Violence* described parliaments as deteriorating because they had forgotten that they represent a law-making violence and that it was a revolutionary force that brought them into existence. In a manner troubled by the destroying violence, he claimed that the parliaments “*cannot achieve decrees worthy of this violence, but cultivate in compromise a supposedly nonviolent manner of dealing with political affairs*”<sup>171</sup>. However, Benjamin did not intend for his critique of the “supposedly nonviolent manner” of law to contribute to the establishment of a more suitable parliament. His intention was rather to comprehend a kind of non-instrumental violence that could undo law and eventually the state, and his messianic word for this unique option is “divine violence.” Negating Arendt’s declaration that “*the very substance of violent action is ruled by the question of means and ends*”<sup>172</sup>, Benjamin focuses on the relation of violence to law and justice which involved a shift from the question of ends, towards the radical question of whether violence could ever be a suitable means. As a radical critique, it was directed at the principle of violence itself notwithstanding the ends it serves. His venture was therefore not to describe the normative constraints of violence within a legal order as Hannah did, but to address the question of whether violence, as a principle, was ever justified. His conclusion was that it could not be justified because both the postulating of law and its enforcement are malevolent. According to Benjamin, the legal order itself must be surpassed and this could only be done through the “pure means” of divine violence.

Influenced by the *fearolotical* philosophy of Hobbes, the revolutionary moment of 1919, and Georges Sorel’s *Reflections on Violence* written in 1908, what Walter Benjamin believed he could qualify as non-instrumental violence is no other than the labour strike. This is because strikes

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<sup>170</sup> Desh Subba, *Philosophy of Fearism: Life is Conducted, Directed and Controlled by the Fear*, Xlibris, United State 2014, p.11.

<sup>171</sup> Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence”, in *Selected Writings*, Volume 1, Harvard UP, 1996, p.244.

<sup>172</sup> Arendt, *Op. cit.*, p.106.

are often used for what Benjamin describes as a means of extortion, that is to achieve some goal concerning pay, benefits, or working conditions. In these most common cases the strike takes on an instrumental or “political” form. However, when a strike becomes revolutionary, it exceeds instrumentality and become a “pure means.” Benjamin claims that the task of this general or revolutionary strike is the demolition of state power, not the establishment of law. According to Benjamin, this exceptional non-instrumental kind of violence had the potentials to negate legal violence altogether and thus make justice possible. Conversely, Arendt categorically argues that nonviolent action is the *vita activa* of the political sphere, whereas work and labor, as instrumental and violent, characterize the social and private spheres respectively. It is power, as an “end in itself,” that takes the epicentre in the political sphere, with violence excluded to the extent that Arendt does not consider the instrumentality of state action and legal violence. As such, Arendt is following Kant, not only in the aforementioned method of critique as policing boundaries, but in what she takes to be Kant’s understanding of political action as well. This led to her declaration in *Human Condition* that “Kant did not mean to formulate or conceptualize the tenets of the utilitarianism of his time, but on the contrary wanted first of all to relegate the means-end category to its proper place and prevent its use in the field of political action”<sup>173</sup>.

According to Arendt, power relates to our ability to act in concert. It is therefore located not within the individual, but in the relations among individuals or in a group, and when the group scatters, so too does this power. In *The Human Condition*, she refers to the space in which this acting and speaking in concert is made possible as the space of appearance. To her, “in acting and speaking ... men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world”<sup>174</sup>. This form of publicity allows us to make ourselves known to each other as individuals and thus to obtain social recognition. Arendt held that the power generated within this *polis* is the power of the people necessary for government. This is because to her, this power is inherent in the very existence of political communities, and needs no justification. Unlike violence which is essentially instrumental, power is an end in itself<sup>175</sup>. According to Arendt, the government and the rule of law are materializations of this nonviolent power of the people, so when “the living power of the people ceases to uphold them”, state institutions “petrify and decay”<sup>176</sup>.

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<sup>173</sup> Arendt, *Human Condition*, p.156.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, p.179.

<sup>175</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.151.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p.140.

Contradicting Arendt, Benjamin made the opposite point in his *Critique of Violence*, arguing that parliaments relied on the violence, rather than power, which brought them into being and that maintained them. Undeniably, Benjamin give out a warning against the mistaken belief that existing political affairs are actually dealt with in a “nonviolent manner”. For him, all law-making and all law-preserving action, as well as all productions and enforcements of legal contracts, preserve the “latent presence” of violence or explicitly exercise it. The solution to violence was not therefore a better government or more just law as Benjamin states that “*desirable and gratifying a flourishing parliament might be by comparison, a discussion of means of political agreement that are in principle nonviolent cannot be concerned with parliamentarianism*”. Thus according to Benjamin, Arendt failed to understand that “*what a parliament achieves in vital affairs can be only those legal decrees that in their origin and outcome are attended by violence*”. As such the divine violence or violence of law of Benjamin to handle the veracity of *fearolotical* philosophical of Hobbes and to present a kind of non-instrumental violence that could undo law and eventually assist the state of sovereignty to cultivate in compromise a supposedly nonviolent manner of dealing with political affairs.

### **5.3 – The Actuality of Weber’s Defence of State’s Monopoly of Legitimate Violence**

According to Weber, contrary to the conception of politics posited by Arendt which is seemingly moralistic, the task of politics is not the moral reformation of humanity, which is to say, that of making the citizen good and virtuous. Such judgment could lead us to the dictatorship of virtue which corresponds to political moralism. This is what Max Weber calls “ethics of conviction” as opposed to “ethics of responsibility”, which is the conformity of action driven by a pre-constructed ideal. The state is the institutionalized form of political power as it substitutes rule for chance, has the monopoly of legitimate violence and is responsible for ensuring the well-being of citizens and guaranteeing the safety of individuals. To speak of a “monopoly of legitimate violence” with Weber means that, like Benjamin previously seen, the violence of the State is governed by the laws: force is exercised “with a certain regularity and a certain uniformity with the known rules”, in order to achieve the establishment of a peaceful concord between individuals. Weber, argued to define politics narrowly, as the acquisition, distribution and exercise of state power legitimizes the use of violence as the defining characteristic of the state.

Max Weber assessed the peculiarity of modern state in its successful claim over the monopoly of legal enactments and the legitimate use of force. The conception of violence in political science mostly refers to this definition and evaluates violence as the employment of force,

which falls outside the legal framework established and protected by the modern state. While to Weber the ‘use of force’ by the state was presented as legitimate with reference to rationality, Arendt argues to consider violence, opposed to the ‘use of force’, as irrational is to make it a minimal phenomenon hence impossible to understand and reflect upon. She asserts that violence is rational and by doing so, problematizes the claim of rationality and its close relationship with modernity. She also rejects any form of moralism in politics: the search for a natural inclination in human beings in the form of good or evil is a futile effort for her; nor it is possible to defend a universal human ethic, which could provide shelter in times of crisis. Further, making the issue more complex, she recognizes violence as part of human life. There are instances of violence in certain human activities; according to her conceptual triad of human condition, labor and work impose violence. She asserts that the rejection of violence must be done with political arguments, which denotes a phenomenological approach adopted and presented in her works. The problems one assesses in ‘politics’ today, for her, is due to the distortions that happened in the meaning of human existence, political life and political notions such as freedom or equality.

In *On Violence*, she notes that there is an implicit agreement among political theorists from Left to Right which views violence as the most flagrant manifestation of power. Quoting C. Wright Mills, “*All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence,*” and Weber who defines the state as the “*rule of men over men, based on the means of legitimate, i.e. allegedly legitimate, violence*”<sup>177</sup>. Arendt argues that the pact is very weird since almost all theorists equate political power with “*the organization of violence*” which confirms “*Marx’s estimate of the state as an instrument of suppression in the hands of the ruling class*”. We then invite the historian, Martin Jay and his benefits of deceit closely linked to pre and post violence in politics undermined by Arendt. In Jay’s work; *The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics*, explains Hitler’s ideas from *Mein Kampf* that “big lies” at times are less likely to be detected than “small lies”, and presents an interesting discussion of the views of Machiavelli, Derrida and Habermas depicting that lying and violence comprises the violation of the promise to say a truth and the betrayal of trust. We then accept with Jay that there are two general opposing views about the morality of lying and violence: the deontologists or rigorous absolutists who denounce lying in itself as an inherent evil to be evaded by all means on one hand, and on the other hand the consequentialists or contextualists who are concerned with the practical impact of lying, whether good or bad<sup>178</sup>.

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<sup>177</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.134.

<sup>178</sup> Martin Jay, *The Virtues of Mendacity: Lying in Politics*, Virginia, University of Virginia Press, 2012, p.48.

It is in this practicality that the political sphere of lies finds refuge to preserve the sovereignty of the state as raised by Machiavelli, Hobbes and Weber. Martin Jay examines lies in politics which mostly leads to violence from Plato and St. Augustine to Arendt and Leo Strauss to demonstrate that each philosopher's position on lying corresponds to a particular conception of the political realm, which decisively shapes attitude towards political mendacity and violence. He then uses this insight to discover a variety of contexts and questions about lying and violence in politics, and concludes by proposing that lying and violence in politics may not be too bad. That political hypocrisy and violence may be the best substitute to the violence justified by those who claim to know the truth. Thus, conflicts due to divergent truth and interest accounts largely for the legitimacy of violence in politics, which leads to Arendt's paradoxical ideological limits over her supposing support for revolutionary violence and attack of that of established governments.

## CHAPTER VI: CRITICISM ON ARENDT'S COUNTER-VIOLENCE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

As a philosopher against violence, though she tried to justify instances of its use, Hannah Arendt maintained that violence begets violence and is only instrumental and declares that the practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world. Having analyzed on one hand the thesis on violence of some great minds on revolutionary movements like Sartre, Fanon, and movements of the black powers and black Panthers, and on the other hand Arendt's criticism to their hypothesis in chapter 3 of this dissertation, can we possibly identify any weakness of Arendt's part or consider her critique to be unjustified? Is her thesis on counter-violence in the struggle for freedom by the oppressed, exploited or dominated tenable?

### 6.1 – Re-Actualising Sartre from Arendt's Criticism

Even though Arendt criticizes Sartre's political realism, the former seems to be the solution to individuals and collectivities that are victims of servitude and dictatorship today. To Sartre, *"Man is nothing other than his own project. He exists only to the extent that he realizes himself, therefore he is nothing more than the sum of his actions, nothing more than his life."*<sup>179</sup> Contextually and as a reminiscence, Sartre's preface, though aggressive, inflammable or provocative, is established in a specific environment, that of the struggle for liberation and emancipation of colonies. Every society and individual yearn for freedom because being free is good, but the Western dominating power does not want to grant any rights to those who deserved them or those they consider the underdogs. They create all kinds of barriers to prevent them from gaining international sovereignty. The Western dominating powers are in fact the embodiment of violence and barbarism. Thus for Jean Paul Sartre, the reaction of the colonized is legitimate and therefore justified. It is not condemnable, on the contrary it is to be encouraged and supported. Faced with explorers who refuse any dialogue and who respond with violence, it becomes urgent for the colonized to free themselves and manage political life differently. It is clear that the violence of the oppressed on the oppressor is not instrumental, it rather allows or permits the restoration of a balance of power, which places the colonizers and the colonized on an equal

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<sup>179</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, Transl. Carol Macomber, Yale University Press / New Haven & London, 2007, p.37.



footing. The colonized who have become free can in order to realize themselves and affirm themselves as beings in their own right and not apart. Their liberation is a process; it is a conquest that takes place through armed struggle. Thus, using the slogan of the international communist and revolutionary, Sartre advocates for the unity of the Third World, which is indisputably what Kwame Nkrumah supported and defended with all his wishes. In *Africa must Unite*, Nkrumah uses the same slogan, to reiterate that the union of all the colonized people of the world, particularly that of the African descent is primordial. He thinks that the true unification of Africa can only be achieved through armed struggle, which is the only effective means of resistance and liberation against neocolonialism, considered to be the last stage of imperialism. As a visionary, he perceived despite the accession to Independence of the former colonies, the danger of a re-colonization of Africa is inevitable, in a veiled and subtle form, but more bloody and violent than the previous one. To this end, he wrote a remarkable and revolutionary work entitled; *Neocolonialism*, the last stage of imperialism, equally found in *Conscientism*.

Consequently, we deduce that Arendt's evaluation of Sartre's philosophy is somehow wrong. We need to clearly outline that her appraisal depends mostly on his preface to *The Wretched of the Earth*, and only on two quotations she made on Sartre; "*Irrepressible violence ... is man recreating himself, that it is through "mad fury" that 'the wretched of the earth' can 'become men'*"<sup>180</sup>, and "*...to shoot down a European is to kill two birds with one stone . . . there remain a dead man and a free man.*"<sup>181</sup> Anyone who judiciously reads Sartre's preface will notice that she chooses only those quotes which could suggest that Sartre glorifies violence. Likewise, she deduced these quotes from their socio-political contextual realities. For example; Sartre clearly declares that his preface is a call for the Europeans, mainly to the liberals among them, to read Fanon's book, and to take a courageous stand in relation to the truth that it reveals: the violent struggle of the Algerians is the consequence of the continuous violence practiced by French colonialism. It is a struggle against the French policy of oppression, economic privation, and of socio-cultural and political destruction of the Algerian people. Sartre, as a citizen of the oppressive state, chose to say Yes to the violent struggle of the oppressed, and No to the French violence. It should then be retained that Arendt's presentation and interpretation of what Sartre is saying is grossly mistaken. Indeed, her entire presentation is fallacious because the passage is a summary of Sartre's lengthy discussion of scarcity, and its many influences. In this passage, Sartre primarily

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<sup>180</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.114.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, p.115.

describes a dialectic of violence that occurs in a world of scarcity. His description has moral implications, but its aim is not to justify violence as Arendt argues.

Thus, violence is a human action which, under the sway of Manichaeism and in the context of scarcity, is aimed to destroy a specific evil. Often, such a destroying is counter-violence, it is an act performed against the evil that prevails, against an initial violence practiced by another. Despite the fact that most people, including Arendt, judge the violence of the oppressed as the initial violence, the truth is the opposite. The initial violence is always that of the oppressor wherein with the establishment of an oppressive system, violence has already begun. Counter-violence, Sartre emphasizes, is often the only way open for the oppressed to struggle against the broken reciprocity, and also against the terrible oppression and exploitation, accompanied by passivity, alienation and alterity, that were imposed on them from without. In this situation the contra-person must sometimes kill and torture. The oppressed, in order to live, must adopt the violent means, like killing and torturing, that were initially practiced against them by the oppressor, the other, the enemy. What the oppressed hate in the enemy or the oppressor is human being as human being; what they try to kill is the human freedom of the oppressor. Killing is the oppressed 'non-human' way to prevent their adversaries from annihilating them in their body. Sartre concludes that counter-violence is sometimes the only true way of the oppressed to realize themselves as human beings, to regain their freedom, and their humanity. This, Arendt didn't understand and missed the contextual reality of Sartre's invitation to the oppressors.

## 6.2 – Revalorising Fanon from Arendt's Idealist Tribunal

Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth* posits that "*the exploited man sees that his liberation implies the use of all means, and that of force first and foremost*"<sup>182</sup>. Fanon is a reader of Marx, and if he claims Marxism, it is to go beyond it. His thought is original, and for him the "bandits" as Arendt underlines in her work constitute the people. The people are the rural mass long ignored and overexploited by the colonial power. It is precisely in this capacity that Fanon maintains that he particularly constitutes the spearhead of the revolution, because of his position and the immense force he represents against colonialism. Fanon affirms to this effect that "*only the violence exercised by the people, the violence organized and enlightened by the leadership allows the masses to decipher social reality, gives them the key to it*"<sup>183</sup>.

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<sup>182</sup> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, p.61.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, p.164.

In a similar direction like Sartre, after the presentation of Arendt's criticism to Fanon, we can reproach Hannah Arendt for having partially grasped the content of Fanon's thought, and the fact of not having understood the relevance and topicality of the Fanonian conception of revolutionary violence. Indeed, if Fanon exalts violence, it is for a good cause, that of the liberation of colonized people under the yoke of colonialism. The portrait he paints of the colonized person being a sub-human and a modern time slave is real. The action of the colonized against the colonizer is a normal process in every aspect of life which none will like to be under. A man who is aware of his condition, can't peacefully have a solution, and then decides to violently demand for his recognition. The colonized in Fanon is similar to Hegel's slave in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. If in Hegel, there is reciprocity between the master and the colonial slave, he is for him a simple object, something which has no value, nor dignity and which is not entitled to any respect. From this description, we understand the lesson that Fanon gives to these modern time slaves, and why he invites them to oppose violence to violence, and with greater violence if necessary.

Being a psychiatrist, Fanon demonstrates in *The Wretched of the Earth* that the aftermath of colonial violence on the colonized which can only obtain a possible cure by resorting to violence. The colonial heritage of inferiority, submission, exploitation, will only be uprooted by armed struggle and liberating violence not by begging because the invaders didn't seek the consent of the exploited, a point Arendt fails to understand. Violence is a moral act that rehabilitates the colonized in his own eyes as it detoxifies it infected society. The slave in turn produces violence as a royal pardon and makes history for himself. This violence is productive, because it presides over the overthrow of the colonial world and promotes the advent of a new world, an anti-colonial world in which a new man with a new status and new condition can emerge. In other words, a conscious, free and responsible man.

Arendt misapprehended Fanon as we clearly highlighted that in *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon warns against the feeling of hatred, revenge or racism alongside their effects but doesn't advocate for them. For him, the oppressed does not fight for revenge, but to snatch his rejected dignity and to regain his violated freedom. For him, racism can in no way be the basis of a liberation struggle and no nationalist leader can therefore include hatred in his program. If it was a feeling of the first hours of the liberation struggle, it cannot continue to feed it, because the leader realizes, day after day that racism, hatred, resentment, which are legitimate desire for revenge, cannot fuel a war of liberation, and hence "...hatred cannot constitute a program"<sup>184</sup>. We can

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<sup>184</sup> Frantz Fanon, *Op. cit.*, p.100.

therefore see that Fanon did not remain solely in the dimension of the armed struggle. If he exalts the spontaneity of the rural masses, he subsequently recognizes that this can be manipulated either by the colonist or by the colonial bourgeoisie made up of assimilated Africans. In Fanon's work, he devotes the second chapter to the analysis of this question relating to the spontaneity of the overexcited masses during the revolutionary insurrection. This explains why he acknowledges the need to channel this spontaneity through education of the masses. Therefore, for Fanon, the liberation struggle is national, revolutionary and social, and cannot be blamed for legitimizing kamikaze or terrorist actions.

Arendt can equally be criticized for not understanding that Fanon prepared post-colonialism, or for having wanted to fly over the colonial reality and foresee the past European slavery. It is in this direction that the tradition of philosophical Conscientism of William E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Towa and many others teaches us that the struggle for liberation is a process by which a people purifies and affirms its identity. The society the Westerners wants to establish is that of lie and deceit, because its purpose is the reign of individualism and exploitative egoism that characterizes the new liberal world. As such, according to late Marcien Towa, it is a matter of denouncing the complicity between the ideologies of differences and the obvious contemporary global system of domination and oppression. Towa reminds that oppression is the psychosomatic suffocation of the exploited masses. Thus, Towa against Arendt in support of the Fanonian perspective of liberation declares that:

*« L'impérialisme occidentale est un fait. La lutte révolutionnaire de ses victimes contre sa violence oppressive est également un fait historique majeur, (...). La nécessité de la violence révolutionnaire a été démontrée, en ce qui concerne les peuples noirs, par Césaire, par Fanon, par Malcon X et par ses héros des luttes de libération nationale (Cabral, Mchel, etc). C'est aujourd'hui évidente »<sup>185</sup>.*

Marcien Towa in his writings invites us to follow the example of *Prometheus*<sup>186</sup> who stole fire from the Greek gods, a symbol of power. In return, we must follow the same route with Europe, because liberation consists in domesticating science and technology, secret, principle of its power. It is in the wake of Fanon that Towa emphasizes that our freedom which is the affirmation of our

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<sup>185</sup> Marcien Towa, *Idée d'une philosophie negro-africaine*, Yaoundé, Clé, coll. « Points de vue », 1998, p.65.

<sup>186</sup> Following the Greek mythology, Zeus the god of gods hid fire from the mortals but Prometheus who first of all tricked Zeus in accepting the bones and fat of sacrifice instead of the meat, stole the fire and returned to the earth. So, this was when mankind discovered fire. Zeus being furious, ordered that Prometheus be chained to a rock as a punishment for stealing his lightning bolt.

humanity in today's world, passes through the identification and mastery of the principle of European Power. This is because if we do not become powerful like Europe, we will never be able to seriously shake off the yoke of European imperialism. This leads us to adopt a positive attitude, an attitude of openness towards European civilization precisely to free ourselves from European civilization<sup>187</sup>. Thus, Fanon help to shed light on Arendt's deliberate or implicit neglect of significant economic, psychological, religious, and racial factors in her articulation of the primacy of the political organigram.

### 6.3 – Arendt's Critique of Black Freedom Fighters: Humanism or Racism?

Our contention here is that Arendt's idealist critique of the Black Panther revolution was partial. Qualifying the black panthers as racist and violence is one-sided and somewhat suspect of racist intentions. This is because the Black Panther revolution was a revolution for the liberation of the blacks. That is why Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr express the objectives and manifesto of the Black Panther revolution in the following terms:

*The Panthers graphically introduced the public to a new vision of black politics. Like the leaders of the earlier Civil Rights Movement, the Panthers continued to focus on black liberation. Yet, rather than appeal for a fair share of the American pie, the Panthers portrayed the black community as a colony within America and the police as an "army of occupation" from which blacks sought liberation. In their view, the racist power structure was the common enemy of all those engaged in freedom struggles.*<sup>188</sup>

Moreover, Arendt's criticism is that directed to the activities and ideology of the activist of the new leftists called Black Powers and the Black Panthers in Crisis of the Republic. She accuses the activists of the new leftists of being activists engaged in the glorification of violence on the one hand, and on the other of being a racist movement. Which is not the case. Black power was a political movement that campaigns for a strong awareness of blacks and their identity in America, it has represented both the culmination of a crusade in support of civil rights and a reaction against racism, of which blacks were mostly victims in the 1960s. The black panthers, still called the "black panther", is also a revolutionary movement of blacks which originally was a vigilante, who formed militias in the ghettos and encouraged people to use their constitutional right to arm themselves. The movement recommended the use of armed rebellion, "if necessary", to

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<sup>187</sup> Marcien Towa, *Essai sur la problématique philosophique dans l'Afrique actuelle*, Yaoundé, coll. « points de vue » Clé, 1971, p.57.

<sup>188</sup> Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr., *Black against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party*, London, University of California Press, p.61.


achieve its objectives. Their activism could go so far as to defy the law. They also mark their opposition to the war in Vietnam and affirm their solidarity with the Vietnamese. If they resort to armed struggle, it is to defend themselves, because America is racist and there is a law that advocates segregation between whites and men of different color. This law has proven to be unfair and cynical. Indeed, these movements are organized on the contrary to promote the total and complete liberation of blacks and all the oppressed. Isn't such an action laudable? Their struggle is not a racial struggle but a class struggle between the proletarian working class which brings together the masses, and the tiny minority which is the ruling class, which uses racism as a means to divide the people. For them, it is within the working class, the lumpen proletariat, its unemployed and it's downgraded, that the insurrection finds its spearhead. This is why one of the main founders of the Black Panthers in the person of Bobby Seale specifies the objective of the black panthers which is the summary of their plan of action in these terms:

*“We do not fight racism with racism. We fight racism through solidarity. We do not fight exploitative capitalism with black capitalism. We fight capitalism with socialism. We do not fight imperialism with proletarian internationalism. These principles are essential in the party. They are concrete, human and necessary. They should be adopted by the masses”.*

It should be noted that these various movements were fought by the American government and the intelligence services, which considered them to be bandits. According to their statements, their various actions were undermining public order. The Counter Intelligence Program whose purpose was to investigate and disrupt dissident political organizations and revolutionary groups in the United States from 1956 to 1971, and The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which was the main federal service of judicial police and internal intelligence, succeeded in interrupting their activities, by infiltrations, public propaganda against their social political program, and by division among the members. They were victims of endless chases, shootings and targeted assassinations.

## PARTIAL CONCLUSION

Conclusively, the epistemic strive in this second part of our dissertation has been to present the impediments or limits of the Arendtian conception of violence in her political philosophy. Trying to expose her weakness on political philosophy, we presented the practicality of political sphere which depicts that; lies and violence are fuels in politics, and homicide is the centre of gravity in politics with Hitler's Holocaust on the Jews, Coups d'état in Africa, and the extermination of political opponents in Cameroon as case-studies. As a result of these instances accounting for the legitimacy of the use of violence in politics, we embarked on criticising Arendt to be politically unrealistic as violence is justifiable and legitimate depending on the surrounding circumstances contrary to our author's view that it can be justifiable but not legitimate. More light came with ideas and theories of monumental political figures like Machiavelli's aim of politics and power, Hobbe's *fearolotical* philosophy, and Weber's rationality of State violence. We just could not end without evaluating Arendt's idea about counter-violence in the struggle for freedom taking into consideration the reality of liberation movements in the world. This exposed us to the ideas of Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon and the Black Panthers, conversely to the reproaches levied to them by Hannah. Through her reproaches, we then underscored and deduced Arendt's thoughts on violence which paved a route for her nonviolence inclination, and eventually leading us to the possible pillars of the culture of nonviolence as point of focus in our next part, serving as the third and last of this dissertation.



**PART III:**  
**ARENDTIAN CONCEPTION OF VIOLENCE AND POLITICS:  
ACTUALISATION AND PERSPECTIVES**

*“The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world.”<sup>189</sup>*

*“You must remember that the influence of all great teachers of mankind has outlived their lives. In the teachings of each prophet like Mohammed, Buddha or Jesus, there was a permanent portion and there was another which was suited to the needs and requirements of the times. . . . You can see that the influence of these men has sustained us after they have passed away.”*

**Gandhi, in an interview with Nirmal Kumar Bose, Hindustan Times, 17 October 1935**

*“Our most powerful nonviolent weapon is . . . also our most demanding, that is organization.”*

**Martin Luther King Jr.**

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<sup>189</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.177.



## PARTIAL INTRODUCTION

Our preceding part has been to examine the problems related to the Arendtian conception of political philosophy. Despite her controversial judgment about violence on the rail of her epistemic voyage that “*violence can be justified but not legitimate*”<sup>190</sup>, she still remain firm to her conviction that it is politically unproductive. Her conclusive negation of violence and lies in politics makes us perceive her as one cut-off from political realism, and existential realities. This comprised of the analysis on the legitimacy of violence in politics, criticism of her political idealism, and her counter-violence in the struggle for freedom. Irrespective of this position embodied with limits, we can’t give a blind eye to her political contributions and drive for nonviolence. As such, this third and final part aims at first under chapter seven (7), raise the possible contributions of Hannah Arendt to the progress of modern States. We shall notice that Arendt’s ideas helped to understand that modernity, characterized by totalitarianism and the loss of the world, is a period of bureaucratic administration and a manipulation of public opinion. It is an era whereby totalitarian forms of government like Nazism and Stalinism emerged out of the institutionalization of terror and violence which entered the contemporary period. As a result of this, noting that Arendt is indirectly an advocate of nonviolence, we shall then attempt establishing possible pillars of the culture of nonviolence in chapter eight (8). This first and foremost entails expounding on the reasons of nonviolence through Noam Chomsky before illustrating successful historical cases of nonviolent action in the world, then conclude with the pillars needed in the world for the culture of nonviolence through the light of Alain J. Richard. We shall then end with chapter nine (9) consisting of actualizing the political thoughts of Arendt on violence to the development of Africa via ethics and politics of good governance to curb violence, management of violent political situations, and contemporary moral, religious and political responsibilities for nonviolent African States. Thus, our guiding questions are: did Arendt contribute to the growth of modern politics?

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<sup>190</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.151.

## **CHAPTER VII: ARENDT'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROGRESS OF MODERN STATES**

Hannah Arendt is progressively being acknowledged as one of the most significant political philosophers of the twentieth century. She gained fame for her historical study of totalitarianism, notoriety for her analysis of Adolf Eichmann's trial, and philosophical recognition for her political studies of action, and her critique of the Western tradition of political thought from Plato to Marx. Consequently, she is probably the first woman to join the catalogue of great philosophers in the world. Her ideas have cut across time and space, and transcend from one generation to another in a variety of conceptual frameworks and theoretical understanding; not only on our subject matter of violence and politics, but equally on human condition, revolution, governance, law, love and responsibility. This made her to be pluri-dimensional and venerated across frontiers for her brilliant contribution to the progress of the world through her restructured but scattered and neglected ideas. One reason for this neglect is that her contributions to modern States are sprinkled across a broad array of her different works. This chapter aims at harnessing her dispersed thoughts on the growth of world politics for a better national, international and cosmopolitan stability. It equally attempts to encourage a restoration of this disregard by providing a guide to her critique of sovereignty and her influences for the federal principle. Thus, what was Arendt's contribution on Federalism and governance? Did she make a post-violence reconciliation call? Was Hannah Arendt a preacher of nonviolence?

## 7.1 – The Primacy of Arendt’s Federalism over Other Forms of Governance

Hannah Arendt developed an acute defense of Federalism as a substitute to the prevailing model of state sovereignty leading to many separatist groups in the world at large and Africa in Particular. Arendt’s methodology poses a vital trial to the realist dismissal of world federalism as a paradigm of the delusion they attributed to their idealist antagonists. The literature on the history of federalist ideas has long neglected her contributions despite her persistent reputation as one of post-World War II’s premier political theorists. However, to properly understand this drive, it is necessary for us to first examine the different forms of government which will enable us understand why the Arendtian choice or veneration fell on Federalism, and why modern and contemporary States need federalism for a more peaceful society.

### 7.1.1 - The Taxonomy of Various Forms of Government in Political Philosophy

In Book VII of the *Republic*, Plato classifies forms of government into Aristocracy, Timocracy, Oligarchy, Democracy, and Tyranny<sup>191</sup>. Aristotle on the other hand, uses the quantitative and the qualitative elements to classify forms of government into the positive and the perverse. After a scrutiny of forms of government, he asserts that;

*In our first inquiry into constitutions we analyzed them as follows: the right constitutions, three in number - kingship, Aristocracy, and polity - and the deviations from these, likewise three in number - tyranny from kingship, Oligarchy from aristocracy, democracy from polity.*<sup>192</sup>

In the modern context, a government is the State and its administration, viewed as the ruling political power, and equally the management or control of a system. The power owned by a government is applied in relation to the structure and the source of its obtainability. This posits that the two fundamental forms in which a government manifest its power are through power structure and power source. The forms of government by power structure are the overall organization or configuration of a State applied by a ruling entity which is guided by its laws as the macro. It is under the power structure that the forms of government by power source are exercised and regulated. This therefore necessitates a brief conceptual clarification of these separate governmental entities for the proper understanding of Arendt’s roots of federalism and her international thought.

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<sup>191</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, Trans. By Raymond Larson, Illinois, Harlan Davidson, Inc, 1979, pp. 203-205.

<sup>192</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics*, Transl. by T. A. Sinclair, Revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders, London, Penguins Classics, p.239.

On the one hand as of what concern the forms of government by power source, there exist a multitude practiced by many nations worldwide from antiquity to the contemporary period according to their convergence realities. Totalitarianism was a term formed by the Italian Giovanni Amendola, and the German Carl Schmitt to mean a system of government in which the people have virtually no authority and the state has absolute control. This is synonymous to dictatorship, which is that type of government exercising autocratic rule. Autocracy (“*auto*” – self, and “*cracy*” – rule) is a form of government by power source wherein unlimited power is held by a single individual. It is supreme power and absolute monarchy. Monarchy, from Latin “*monarchia*” (*mono* – only, and “*cratia*” – power) is a government in which sovereignty is embodied within a single person, today usually considered as hereditary head of state, while authoritarianism is where the governing body has absolute or almost absolute control, maintained by force and little attention given to public opinion. Moreover, there prevail another form of government called Plutocracy whereby the state is ruled by those who are wealthy in the society, synonymous to argentocracy or Tycoonocracy. Here, the rich (few) are the ones having the right to govern or the opportunity to rule the state, and is closely linked to Oligarchy, from Latin “*Oligarchia*” (“*olig*” – few, and “*archia*” – rule). Another form of government is Timocracy which comes from Medieval Latin “*timocratia*” formed from “*timo*” meaning honour or valuation, and “*cratia*”. According to Plato, it is a form of government in which ambition for honor, power and military glory motivates the rulers, while to Aristotle it is a government in which civic honor or political power increases with the amount of property one owns. Last but not the least, and most popular is Democracy venerated by the former American President Abraham Lincoln as “*the government of the people, for the people and by the people*”. Etymologically it comes from the Latin term “*democratia*” (“*demo*” – people or society, and “*cratia*”) referring to a government under the direct or representative rule of the people of its jurisdiction, where the people rule themselves.

On the other hand, we have the forms of government by power structure which entails Federation, Confederation and Unitary State. Primo, in a unitary form of government, all the power rests in a central government. The country may be divided into states or other sub-units, but they have no power of their own. For example, England depends on its Parliament, a legislative body, to create and enforce the laws in the country. The leader of the nation, the Prime Minister, is a member of the Parliament and does not have any more power than its members. As such, a unitary government is like one big chair, with all of the government’s power sitting in one place. We have the existence of unitary republics, and unitary monarchies which all makes up a total of 170 unitary states in the world. Secundo, the confederal form of government is an association of independent

states. The central government gets its authority from the independent states, and the power rests in each individual state, whose representatives meet to address the needs of the group. America tried a confederal system before writing an entirely new constitution. This type of plan didn't work for the US because the states did not give the central government enough power to do its job. A confederation of states is like a bunch of different chairs grouped together. They hold power independently but work collectively, some of which are Canada, Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, Switzerland, European Union, Russia and Belarus. Tirtio, A federal form of government splits power between independent states and a central government. The power rests in both places, and each gets its authority from a governing document, like the U.S. Constitution. Independent branches inside the central government may also share power. The states and central government must work together and balance each other out, like a set of chairs around the table.

### **7.1.2 - Arendt's Defense of Federalism as Basis for Pacifism and Cosmopolitanism.**

From the above, Hannah Arendt did a blending of federalism and democracy, which we can call the democratic federal government or a federal democracy. According to Arendt in her political philosophy found in *Crisis of the Republic* and other works, the federal system is an effective approach of organizing different sources of power while avoiding sovereign politics. To her, federalism is a political exercise of the citizen to the public space wherein the only way to fight the likely tyranny of democratic power is through the multiplication and separation of powers. In fact, Arendt recognizes that "*the separation or the balance of powers*"<sup>193</sup> is federalism's function. Talking about separation of powers directs us to the form of government by power source called democracy, comprising of three (3) distinct organs; *the legislative, executive and judiciary*, which to her is the sphere of nonviolence but limited. As such, Arendt invites modern States not to practice the totalitarian democracy as proposed in the world today leading to many crisis and proliferated by many thinkers like Matthieu Baumier, but a refined and holistic democracy in a new era called a democratic federal government or a federal democracy. This Federal system of government which entails the distribution and disaggregation of powers is the only way not to be trapped in the vicious circle of democratic tyranny. This leads to the understanding that those who oppose the whims and caprices of authoritarian Presidents, leaders or systems are turning to federalism and the rights of the State. This is glaring and has been animating the political sphere in Africa wherein most delve into separation. According to the Unrepresented Nations and

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<sup>193</sup> Arendt, *On Revolution*, Penguin Books, London, 1990, p.245.

People's Organization (UNPO), the continent has a record of 21 *unrecognized States*<sup>194</sup>, both old and current, with autonomous claims.

Through Arendt, we therefore posit two explicit privileges to the escalating scholarship on her international federalism as a contribution to modern states. Firstly, her international ideas call for balancing the domestic necessity for human prominence and blossoming, and the international mandate for regulation and cooperation. Secondly, her reflections on council-based federalism offer a nuanced position that views the dual elements of equality in politics (*intra-state* and *inter-state equality*) as neither conflicting nor reconciliatory but rather as ideal types along a continuum. So, through the unique form of federalism emphasizing the need to balance two loads of free politics with a clear recognition of its instability, Arendt's thinking enhances much-needed understanding to worldwide homily. Grounded in her critique of sovereignty, violence, and domination, several works have successfully applied her free politics internationally. Arendt approves of neither the sovereign state system nor the world state. On one hand, she is really worried by state sovereignty and its effect on warfare. Knowing the decolonization struggles of the 1960s, Arendt expresses her anxiety about the development that "*national independence, namely, freedom from foreign rule, and the sovereignty of the state, namely, the claim to unchecked and unlimited power in foreign affairs, are identified.*" On the other hand, Arendt worries that institutionalizing the dream of cosmopolitan oneness could lead to world oppression. To Arendt, "[*the*] world government ... could easily become the most frightful tyranny conceivable, since from its global police force there would be no escape—until it finally fell apart."<sup>195</sup>

As such, Hannah Arendt's reflection on federalism is based on the hypothesis about action as one of the happenings in life, and the public space as a place for the exercise of social and political relations between the citizens of a community. In order to understand the concept of the term under discussion, our analysis on Arendt's "federalism" were used as a theoretical foundation.

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<sup>194</sup> Federal Republic of Ambazonia (*Cameroon: 1984 to date*), Republic of Logone (*Central African Republic: 2015 to date*), Republic of Somaliland (*Somalia: 1991 to date*), Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (*Morocco: 1976 to date*), Republic of Martyazo (*Burundi-Rwanda: 1972*), Azawad (*Touareg Rebels: 2012*), Bir Tawil (*Outside Antarctica, claimed no nation: 2011, 2014, 2017*), Rif Republic (*Morocco: 1921-1926*), Republic of Biafra (*Nigeria: 1967-1970*), Republic of Benin (*Nigeria, established by the Biafra soldiers and died same day under the attack of the Nigerian army: 19 September 1967*), Republic of Cabinda (*Angola: 1975-1976 but still operate a government in exile after resurrection in 2006*), The Republic of Rhodesia (*1965-1979 which later became Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe*), Republic of Transkei (*South Africa -S.A.: 1976-1994*), Republic of Ciskei (*S.A.: 1981-1994*), Republic of Bophuthatswana (*S.A.: 1977-1994*), Republic of Venda (*S.A.: 1979-1994*), Republic of Anjouan (*Comoros: 1997-2002, 2007-2008*), South Kasai (*Congo: 1960-1962*), State of Katanga (*Congo: 1960-1963*), Republic of Jubaland (*Somalia: 1998-1999*), Emirate of Cyrenaica (*Libya :1949-1951 leading to the formation of the Libyan Kingdom*), available on [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unrepresented\\_Nations\\_and\\_Peoples\\_Organization](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unrepresented_Nations_and_Peoples_Organization), consulted on the June 20<sup>th</sup> 2022 at 6 pm.

<sup>195</sup> Arendt, *On Revolution*, Penguin Books, p.230.

The main outcome attained relates to the understanding that the meaning of the term depicts a state of belonging and responsibility for the decision-making acts of a community, since federalism constitutes the act to establish an order and validity of common prerogatives between politics and law. Thus, a democratic federal government or a federal democracy is the public place conducive for politics in our modern states as Arendt invites the universe for cosmopolitanism and nonviolence.

## **7.2 – The Necessity for Inclusive Post-Violence Reconciliation.**

The contemporary society is animated by the ravages of modernity, spiced by a variety of inter-state or intra-state conflicts with farfetched consequences on contemporary emergence. Violence which has fuel the cosmopolitan socio-economic and political voyage plagued with many diseases, needs to be sieved from modernity. According to Hannah Arendt, modernity is characterized by the damage of the world, that is, the constraint or abolition of the public domain of action and speech in favour of the private domain of contemplation and hunt of economic interests. Modernity is the age of mass society, the rise of the social out of a previous distinction between the public and the private, the era of bureaucratic administration and unidentified labour, rather than politics and action, and the era of elite domination and the manipulation of public opinion. It is the period when totalitarian forms of government, such as Nazism and Stalinism, arose due to the institutionalization of terror and violence, a period where history as a “natural process” replaced history as a fabric of actions and events, where uniformity and conformity replaced plurality and freedom, and where isolation and loneliness wrinkled human solidarity and all forms of living together. Modernity is the period where the past no longer carries any faith of evaluation, where individuals, having lost their traditional standards and values, must search for new grounds of human community in the contemporary period. In this contemporary period, the ravages of violence and terror needs to be bypassed by inclusive reconciliation processes for effective growth of states, where everyone has a place and belongs with no distinction. This is Arendt’s vision of modernity transmitted into the contemporary period in need of reconciliation after the ravages of totalitarian paradigm for the future of the future.

However, Arendt’s negative assessment of modernity was designed by her knowledge of totalitarianism in the twentieth century, which can help us to address certain problems relating to governance in the present-day. Arendt claimed in her works on politics, especially in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, that the occurrence of authoritarianism, dictatorship or tyranny has destroyed

the stability of Western history, and has rendered meaningless most of our moral and political considerations. The rupture in our habit has become unchangeable after the disastrous happenings of the twentieth century and the success of oppressive activities in the East and West. In the form of Stalinism and Nazism, totalitarianism has shattered the recognised classifications of political thought and the accepted canons of moral judgment, and has in this manner destroyed the stability of our history. Faced with the disastrous happenings of the Holocaust, we can no longer go back to out-dated concepts and values, so as to explain the extraordinary by means of examples, or to understand the monstrous by means of the familiar. The burden of our time must be faced without the aid of tradition, or as Arendt once put it, “without a bannister”. Our inherited concepts and criteria for judgment have been dissolved under the impact of modern political events, and the task now is to re-establish the meaning of the past outside the framework of any tradition, since none have retained their original validity and reconcile. It is the past, then, and not tradition, that Arendt attempts to preserve from the rupture in modern time-consciousness. Only by re-appropriating the past by means of what Arendt called “*the deadly impact of new thoughts*”<sup>196</sup> can we hope to restore meaning to the present and throw some light on the contemporary situation.

Over the past decades, the United Nations, the international community and individual nations have struggled to find the right responses to the devastating legacies of conflict. Ending violence is a major challenge of our time. The significant reduction in violent conflict witnessed since the end of the Cold War is now at risk. We therefore need to get better at ending violence and sustaining peace. In this endeavor, reconciliation is an essential retrospective and proactive tool. Reconciliation is a process, an aspiration and an outcome which means different things to different people because individuals and communities are affected by violence and peace in different ways. It is the restoration of friendly relations. It addresses the causes and consequences of conflict *and* prevents its recurrence. Given that half of post-war countries lapse back into conflict in the first decade after the end of fighting, the preventative dimension of reconciliation is of utmost importance. We therefore need to strengthen our peace building techniques and approaches. Today, reconciliation is an element in almost all peace agreements, though with limited understanding of what actually works in advancing reconciliation. Even supposed reconciliation success stories are now facing new challenges and increasing levels of violence whereas it is expected to transform relationships, contribute to the establishment of a social contract between the state and the people, and address economic inequality and structural

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<sup>196</sup> Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*, p.199.



faultiness. Global participation is the strength of reconciliation because it is a long-term and holistic process as everyone must be committed for it to succeed. If it is not promoted with sincere intentions or if complicated realities are reduced to sensational headlines, the process is doomed to fail.

Consequently, from the above, we brilliantly retain like most militants of peace and stability that after a period of conflict, crisis or violence, contemporary states need to adopt genuine attitudes of reconciliation which necessitates inclusive democratic federal participation as Arendt suggests, without any preconceived mentality of the ruling class. Therefore, the nature of these conflicts means that solutions must be based on reconciliation efforts which address the deep-rooted causes of conflict within a society. The term ‘reconciliation’ is often associated simply with the end of violence. In practice, formally ending a conflict is just the beginning of a long and complex process of rebuilding relationships damaged by violent conflict, not only between groups in society but also between people and their institutions; uncovering the truth, fighting impunity, banishing corruption, and building a well-functioning state and democratic methods. At this juncture, we can posit three stages for post-violence reconciliation to effectively prevail; replacing fear by non-violent coexistence, building confidence and trust, and developing empathy. This coexistence, trust and empathy for reconciliation are develop between individuals who are connected as victims, beneficiaries and perpetrators. If peace is considered as moving beyond the end of violence and toward transformed relationships of trust, then the momentum of public desire for peace needs to be transformed into a strong and sustained commitment to policies and initiatives that will nurture a true ‘reconciled society’. Like Arendt, Mandela said, *“in the end, reconciliation is a spiritual process, which requires more than just a legal framework. It has to happen in the hearts and minds of people”*<sup>197</sup>.

Thus, for the existence of an inclusive post-violence reconciliation to succeed, the local populations most affected by the violence need to be put at the center of reconciliation efforts. They must be engaged from the very beginning, from the design to the implementation, and the assessment stage. Reconciliation efforts should not focus only on rebuilding damaged relationships between individuals and groups, but also reinforce the relationship between state and society. However, every post-violence situation has some unique characteristics with no particular formula for success. The key is to make sure that those who develop reconciliation processes know the critical questions they should ask themselves.

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<sup>197</sup> Nelson Mandela’s Speech Address to the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, 18 September 1994.

### 7.3 – Arendt’s Contribution to Nonviolence and Civil Society Activism

The evolvment of societies from violent conflicts face many trials as they target political stability and socio-economic development. Above all, these societies have to deal with the legacy of the past: widespread human rights violations, continuing communal or ethnic tensions, the collapse of the justice system, the failure of the security services and the erosion of state legitimacy. Countries have sought to manage that legacy with the support of the international community using various approaches such as truth-seeking, reconciliation initiatives and transitional justice mechanisms. These approaches have become part of the standard framework of peace agreements and processes, all meant for nonviolence. This depicts the importance and urgent need for nonviolent practices in the world as a means to solve socio-economic and political conflicts. Fire can’t be quenched by fire, violence can’t be eradicated by violence, and revenge can’t solve our diverse conflicts as it has been proven since time immemorial. This explains why our author, Hannah Arendt stood against the use of violence to solve problems emanating from violence as she declared that *“if violence could settle social conflicts, revenge would become the miracle cure for most of our ills.”*<sup>198</sup>

As a philosopher of nonviolence, she directly and indirectly communicates to world leaders and victims of violence her perception of peace, stability and nonviolence alongside its outcome following her experiences from the Holocaust, World Wars and liberation struggles. Nonviolence is a more effective technique for political change than violence, and that it actually forces the opposition to change. Political leaders and actors involved in the nonviolence process needs to first homogenize the ethical conceptions of nonviolence while addressing the disputes that arise from conceptualizing nonviolence in a universalistic moral framework, which fails to integrate power, and in a purely instrumentalist framework, which fails to distinguish violence from nonviolence. In Arendt’s political theory we realize that nonviolence is a form of communicative power that grows outside of constitutionally democratic frameworks. It is ethical because it involves the effective and rational exercise of agency, through discourse alternating with action. Nonviolence makes private and public autonomy possible for movement of participants in contexts of irresolvable conflict because it is powerful and can disrupt or replace existing institutions and legislation. It is therefore worthy to retain that nonviolence requires solidarity and a co-generative relationship between disruptive and communicative power. This is because disruptive acts prevail between the movement and its opposition, while communicative action is within the movement

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<sup>198</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, op cit., p.122.

itself. In order to produce the disruptive aptitude that is recognized as nonviolent power by the civil resistance works, participants within a movement must take a communicative standpoint toward each other, develop a public sphere, and must contribute in developing shared political understandings. The voluntary and collective nature of nonviolent disruptive acts, like strikes, entails the formation of public will. Solidarity at this level thus depicts that disruptive acts creates communicative action and are used to protect or expand the space for communicative action against attempts at suppression. This was the case with Mandela for example which dichotomizes the ideas of Arendt and relate to a universal call of violence and nonviolence.

One of the most solicitous and subtle reflections on the strategic and moral difficulties of violence has been that of Nelson Mandela during his trial hearing at the Supreme Court in Pretoria in 1964 wherein Mandela argued for a limited campaign of violence in response to the violence of the South African State. Mandela didn't deny that he planned sabotage but the planning wasn't in a spirit of irresponsibility, nor because he had any love of violence. He planned it out of a calm and moderate assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of the blacks by the whites. As one of the founders of the *Umkhonto we Sizwe*<sup>199</sup> movement which he admitted, and played a prominent role in its affairs until his arrest in August 1962, he had to first explain what Umkhonto set out to achieve; what methods it prescribed for the achievement of these objects, and why these methods were chosen, and how he became involved in the activities of this organisation. Mandela rejected the allegations that Umkhonto was responsible for a number of acts which clearly fell outside the policy of the organisation. He briefly went to the roots and policy of the organisation to demonstrate that the acts could not have been authorised by Umkhonto. According to Mandela, the creation of the organisation was based on two fundamental reasons. Firstly, they believed that as a result of Government policy, violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless responsible leadership was given to guide and control the feelings of the black race, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce a passion of bitterness and hostility between the various races of South Africa which is not produced even by war. Secondly, they felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African people to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy. All lawful approaches of expressing opposition to this principle had

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<sup>199</sup> Umkhonto we Sizwe, abbreviated MK means "Spear of the Nation" founded by Nelson Mandela on December 16 1961 in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre. It was the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), and was created as a response to the political, social and economic oppression against blacks by the South African Apartheid regime, thus, against the South African government. It carried out numerous bombings of military, industrial, civilian and infrastructural sites. Notable among these is the January 8 1982 attack on the Koeberg nuclear power plant in Cape Town. Umkhonto we Sizwe was officially disbanded on August 1 1990.

been closed by legislation, and they were placed in a position in which they had either to accept a permanent state of inferiority or to resist the government. Thus, they chose to resist the government and its law. This choice was still in a way which avoided any resort to violence; when this form was legislated against, and then the government resorted to a show of force to crush opposition to its policies, only then did they decide to answer violence with violence. However, Mandela reiterated that the violence which they chose to adopt was not terrorism, justified by his declaration during his court trial that:

*“...it is a fact that for a long time the people had been talking of violence - of the day when they would fight the white man and win back their country - and we, the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless always prevailed upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods. When some of us discussed this in May and June of 1961, it could not be denied that our policy to achieve a non-racial state by non-violence had achieved nothing, and that our followers were beginning to lose confidence in this policy and were developing disturbing ideas of terrorism.”<sup>200</sup>*

After an extensive and restless assessment of the South African situation, the activist of Umkhonto came to the conclusion in June 1961 that as violence was unescapable in the country, it would be idealistic and not pragmatic for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the government met peaceful demands with force or violent reactions. This wasn't an easy conclusion to arrive at but only erupted when all other peaceful means had failed, and the decision was made to embark on violent forms of political struggle through the formation of *Umkhonto we Sizwe*. Thus, they did so not because they desired such a path, but exclusively because the government had left them with no other choice as it was clearly written that *“The time comes in the life of any nation when there remain only two choices - submit or fight. That time has now come to South Africa. We shall not submit and we have no choice but to hit back by all means in our power in defence of our people, our future, and our freedom.”<sup>201</sup>*

The apprehension of Mandela's multifaceted limited turn to sabotage as opposed to terrorism in his words, is to assist in the reflection of Arendt's essay *On Violence*, as she writes that it is instrumental at root. As Mandela did, Arendt as well understood that violence can be a useful and important means in struggles for justice, and is a means to an end which sometimes can yield positive and even moderate results. This explains her assertion that *“Sometimes ‘violence is the only way of ensuring a hearing for moderation.”<sup>202</sup>* Violence can, and often does, make

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<sup>200</sup> Nelson Mandela's Speech during his trial before the South African Supreme Court in Pretoria in 1964.

<sup>201</sup> In the *Manifesto of Umkhonto* published on 16 December 1961.

<sup>202</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.176.

injustice visible to a public that has been blinded because it can “*serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention,*”<sup>203</sup> and it can serve the cause of reform and also of justice. We must earnestly consider Arendt and Mandela’s arguments as violence is a means to an end, can work, it pays, and can yield results. However, it should fundamentally be retain that Arendt like Mandela is not an advocate for violence as she says in her own words that “*...no doubt ‘violence pays’ ...but the trouble is that it pays indiscriminately*”<sup>204</sup>. The use of violence therefore becomes dangerous at this level because the danger in using violence as a means is that when applied to human affairs, violence as a means has a tendency to overpower whatever good ends it aims. Too often, violence will lead those in power to respond with pretended reforms designed to end violence. They will seek the path of least resistance, establishing reforms that are often erroneous. As such, violence has a tendency to promote more violence in response just because it is effective. If violence in the name of justice doesn’t achieve its ends quickly, the expected result is not justice, but more violence, explaining the Arendtian declaration that “*The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world.*”<sup>205</sup>. This therefore paves way for a reflection on nonviolence and the possible pillars of its culture so as to design a more stable world and attitudes to be adopted towards a biosphere characterized by constant conflicts because “*if violence could settle social conflicts, revenge would become the miracle cure for most of our ills.*”<sup>206</sup>.

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<sup>203</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.76-177.

<sup>205</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, p.122.

## CHAPTER VIII: SURPASSING ARENDT'S IDEALIST AND ABSOLUTIST CONCEPTION OF POLITICS AND POWER

In the UNESCO official documents, culture is considered as a chain of values, attitudes, tradition, behavior and a lifestyle. In short, it is a summing of the material, intellectual and spiritual living manner of a given society. Nonviolence on its part is both a mindset and a method which aims at compelling an internal force if it didn't succeed in convincing at the first steps. According to Frantz Fanon, "*non-violence is an attempt to settle the colonial problem, around a green carpet before any irreversible gesture, any bloodshed, and any regrettable act*"<sup>207</sup>. In the same line of reflection, Alain J. Richard holds that: « *la non-violence est la force intérieure qui s'oppose aux violences physiques, morales ou psychologique. Elle se dresse en face de la contrainte destructive et entreprend de la désarmer partiellement ou totalement.* »<sup>208</sup> Following the above conceptual elucidations, this chapter focuses on expounding the possible pillars of the culture of nonviolence, mindful of the fact that Arendt condemns all forms of violence because "*if violence could settle social conflicts, revenge would become the miracle cure for most of our ills.*"<sup>209</sup>. Concern here is to first see reasons with Chomsky for the prevalence of nonviolence before inviting the historical preachers of nonviolence like Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King Jr. for enlightenment, and re-actualization in a contemporary society with Alain J. Richard.

### 8.1 –Avram Noam Chomsky's Utilitarianism as a Surpassment of Arendt's Absolutism

Avram Noam Chomsky<sup>210</sup> had a solid debate with Hannah Arendt in December 1967 during which he argued that the choice to violence is illegitimate unless the consequences are to eliminate a greater evil. To Chomsky, it is neither the absolute condemnation nor the absolute justification of violence or nonviolence that is important. To him, the question should be which of the two methods is beneficial or brings much happiness to a people; the violent or the nonviolent. In a conversation with Arendt, he insists that:

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<sup>207</sup> Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Preface of Jean-Paul Sartre, Paris, La Découverte, 1985, p.43.

<sup>208</sup> Alain J. Richard, *Piliers pour une culture de la non-violence*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2001, p.13.

<sup>209</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.122.

<sup>210</sup> This is an eminent American theoretical linguist, cognitive scientist and philosopher. Born in Philadelphia on 7 December 1928, he radically changed the arena of linguistics by assuming language as a uniquely human, biologically based cognitive capacity as he equally advocated newborn babies had a blank mind (*tabula rasa*) and that children acquired language by means of learning and mimicry. His ideas were similar to that of Darwin on evolution and biology.

*As to the NLF terror, I think Dr. Arendt and I agree in conclusion but probably disagree on the reasons. For me, her vision is too absolutistic. I don't accept the view that we can just condemn the NLF terror, period, because it was so horrible. I think we really have to ask questions of comparative costs, ugly as that may sound. And if we are going to take a moral position on this — and I think we should — we have to ask both what the consequences were of using terror and not using terror. If it were true that the consequences of not using terror would be that the peasantry in Vietnam would continue to live in the state of the peasantry of the Philippines, then I think the use of terror would be justified. But, as I said before, I don't think it was the use of terror that led to the successes that were achieved.<sup>211</sup>*

What one has to ask about a revolution is whether its success is based on its violence; and if we look at revolutions that have taken place, it's not at all clear that the success has been based on the violence. In fact, to a significant extent it seems that the successes have been based on the nonviolence. For Arendt, political attitudes are known as “moralistic” all over the world as moralistic attitudes in politics tend to provide moral justifications for crimes, quite apart from leading into pseudo idealistic enterprises which are obviously to the detriment of the intended beneficiaries. However, there is a qualitative distinction between the use of terror by oppressed peoples against the oppressors and their servants, in comparison with the use of terror by their oppressors in the interests of further oppression. Chomsky reiterates that if one carefully examines the studies that have been made of National Liberation Front's successes, it turns out that their success was *not* due to the use of violence but because of its *nonviolence* ground which had been well prepared. To the tactics of the peace movement, he thinks there are very strong reasons in favor of nonviolence.

The first reason is that the government happens to have a monopoly of terror. Therefore, violence is simply suicidal. There is no way of combatting the terror, the violence that the government can use in response to any use of violence that the peace movement might adopt. The second reason for nonviolence is that violence clearly antagonizes the uncommitted. What ought to be done is not to provoke them, but to attract and involve them in the resistance to the War. We have to get them to take part in active and future resistance. Toward this end, violence carried out by peace demonstrators would be a serious “counterproductive” tactical error. Chomsky thinks that these tactical considerations are not in the least to be belittled, but are actually the only considerations that ultimately have any moral character to them, because they are the

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<sup>211</sup> Noam Chomsky debates with Hannah Arendt, on *The Legitimacy of Violence as a Political Act*, para. 26, December 1967, available on <https://chomsky.info/19671215/>, consulted on June 30<sup>th</sup> 2022, at 10pm.

considerations that involve the human costs. Thus, the same is true even in the case of the confrontation with authority. Another very convincing reason for limiting oneself to nonviolent action is that in a way that's pretty hard to characterize, immense harm is done to the individual who participates in violent action. Almost consistently he becomes much the worse for it.

On the one hand, the participant in nonviolent action very often does achieve a kind of transforming effect which necessitates a moral revolution in certain sectors of the society. If these people are contaminated, and if their potential for transforming the society is destroyed, that'll be a terrible tragedy. On the other hand, if they can reach the kind of moral and human transformation, maturity, dignity, and wisdom that was in fact reached by many of the Southern Negro participants in the civil rights movement, it could be an enormous benefit to the society at large, and might even save the world from destruction. Consequently, if violence could be shown to lead to the overthrow of lasting suppression of human life that now obtains in vast parts of the world, which would be a justification for violence. But this has not been shown at all, thus, nonviolence is of utmost necessity.

## **8.2 – The Power of Nonviolent Action: *Mahatma Gandhi's Satyagraha, Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King Jr.***

The analysis of Arendt's argument of violence in contrast to power in phenomenological terms reveals that she wants to oblige herself to a position of nonviolence. Her theory can mainly be understood as an advocacy of "pragmatic nonviolence" but of a non-absolute kind for the obvious reason that she recognizes violence, and even supported it in the case of the death penalty for Eichmann. Comparatively, we examine Arendt and Gandhi's understandings of violence alongside Luther and Mandela, the relation of ethics to politics in their theories, their critique of sovereignty, and their different conceptions of political freedom and political organization. We challenge Arendt's understanding of nonviolence in terms of instrumentality, drawing on Gandhi's conceptions of nonviolence. Arendt, however, suggests a more explicit critique of sovereignty which enables us examine her theory of the council system as an alternative form of democratic organization that is not based on the principle of sovereignty and draw parallels to Gandhi's conceptions of political organization.



## 8.2.1 - Mahatma K. Gandhi and his Satyagraha: *Adherence to truth for Nonviolence.*

Born as Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi but popularly called Mahatma Gandhi, lived from 1869 to 1948 and had a great place for compassion in his nonviolence politics. Facing various forms of discrimination and racism in South Africa, he developed his doctrine of nonviolent resistance termed *Satyāgraha*<sup>212</sup>, which was then practiced by the local Indian community and extended, upon his return to India, to the struggle for independence from British imperialism. Nonviolent struggle, for Gandhi, consists of various practices of noncooperation and civil disobedience such as strikes, boycotts, mass demonstrations and marches, and also developing a self-sustained economy that does not rely on the British, and the willingness to be imprisoned and penalized.<sup>213</sup> He saw in these practices not only a workable instrument of political action but also a dynamic way to cultivate moral strength and integrity that are instructive for self-rule (*Swarāj*).<sup>214</sup> In his political treatises, *Hind Swaraj* and *Constructive Program*, he argued that self-rule is not exhausted in independence but must consist of internal change in the Indian society, including the treatment of marginalized populations within it and the relations with the Muslim minority in India. Gandhi formulated a moral argument for nonviolent struggle and moral foundations for economics and politics in his appeal not only to the people of India but also to the British and the Western tradition. He highlighted religious and cultural themes in the establishment of national identity but prioritized morality over any particular manifestation of religion. His political ethics draws on various sources from the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the ideal of non-injury (*ahimsā*)<sup>215</sup> endorsed by the religions of Hinduism, Jainism, and Buddhism to Christian morality. Thus, Gandhi proposed nonviolent resistance and posits that the respect of human dignity in the pursuit of any objective is fundamental in the construction of a sustainable culture of nonviolence. This explains why in his words, he clearly declares that “*the means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree.*”<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> *Satyāgraha* is the term Gandhi coined for the nonviolent practices of resistance and struggle which literally means “grasping upon” or “adherence” (*āgraha*) to “truth” (*satya*). He preferred to use the terms “soul-force” or “truth-force” as the equivalents in English over “passive resistance.” See M. K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*, ed. Anthony J. Parel (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 85. Hereafter cited as HS.

<sup>213</sup> M.K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, trans. Valji Govindji Desai, 1961, p.126.

<sup>214</sup> The term *Swarāj* is from the reflexive prefix *sva*, “of self” or “own” and *rāj*, “rule or sovereign.” Gandhi used the term *swaraj* in both its personal and political meanings as liberation or self-realization and national independence. Here, we omit diacritic signs only selectively since terms like *satyagraha* and *swaraj* entered into the political lexicon.

<sup>215</sup> *Ahimsā* from the prefix *a* “non” or “without” and *himsā* “injury” or “violence.”

<sup>216</sup> Gandhi Mahatma, *Hind Swaraj*, India, Indianno, p.115.

Gandhi seems to stand almost alone among social and political thinkers in his firm rejection of the severe separation between ends and means and in his extreme moral concern with the means to the extent that they, rather than the ends, provide the standard of reference. He was led to this position by his early acceptance of 'satya' and 'ahimsa', respectively referring to *truth* and *nonviolence*, as twin moral principles and his consistent view of their relationship. In *Hind Swaraj* he wrote that even great men who have been considered religious have committed grievous crimes through the mistaken belief that there is no moral connection or interdependence between the means and the end. We cannot get a rose through planting a noxious weed. It is not as though violence and nonviolence are merely different means to secure the same end. As they are morally different in quality and essence, they must necessarily achieve different results. Thus, the usual opposition between means and ends originates in, and reinforces, the view that they are two entirely different categories of action and that their relationship is mainly a technical matter to be settled by considering what will be effective and what is possible in a given situation, that the ethical problem of choice requires an initial decision regarding the desired end and the compulsory acceptance of whatever steps seem necessary to secure it or are most likely to do so depending of the prevailing factors. As such, Gandhi help to shed light on Arendt's deliberate or implicit neglect of significant factors like economic, psychological, religious, and racial in her articulation of the primacy of the political sphere. Gandhi's many successes in major struggles in India depended on the coincidence of his being both deeply religious and skilled as a politician and communicator. It is said that he once remarked, "*People describe me as a saint trying to be a politician, but the truth is the other way around.*"<sup>217</sup> Thus, an advocacy for the pillar of the culture of nonviolence.

### **8.2.2 - Nelson Mandela's Nonviolence: *From Prisoner to Hero.***

Born on 18 July 1918 in Mvezo Komkhulu and died on Wednesday, 4<sup>th</sup> December 2013 (95years), his clan was called "Madiba", his grandfather's name was "Mandela", his teacher Miss Mdingane gave him the name "Nelson", while his birth name was "Rolihlahla" meaning "*to remove a branch of a tree*" or "*troublemaker*" which "*he became just that, through his stubborn quest to obtain freedom and democracy for all*"<sup>218</sup>. Officially called Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, Madiba was the century's icon of nonviolence with high moral rectitude and human consideration. A man is shaped by his culture, religion and education, and it was in this way that Mandela became

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<sup>217</sup> Homer A. Jack, 'Introduction', *The Gandhi Reader: A Source Book of His Life and Writings*, New York, AMS Press ed., 1956, p. viii.

<sup>218</sup> Jean-Emmanuel Pondi, *Nelson Mandela: An example for humanity*, , Yaoundé, Afric' Eveil, 2014, p.28.

extraordinary and the world's most famous prisoner. Back in 1934 at the age of 16, Madiba was circumcised according to the traditional rites of the Thembu clan of the Xhosa tribe. At the end of this circumcision exercise, Chief Meligqili decided to speak to the young men in a language that forever changed the mindset of Mandela and developed his urge for liberation, social justice and general interest. The chief declared:

*“These are our sons, the flower of the Xhosa nation. We just circumcised them in accordance with a tradition that promises manhood, but it is only empty promise...because we Xhosas, like all the other blacks, we are a conquered people. These new men go to town ... and get drowned in alcohol in the mines of the white man ... I know Qamata (God) is omniscient and omnipresent, but I feel he is taking a nap. If this is the case, I hope to die soon. Because the sooner I die, the sooner I could go wake Him up to tell Him that Ngubengcuka children, the flower of the Xhosa nation, are dying”.*<sup>219</sup>

These were terrifying words to the ears of Mandela who was troubled and as a true African, realized and retained the role and place of African culture in his personal development. This developed his urge to fight for a common goal and the establishment of a democracy for all in South Africa, the arena of apartheid. However, he had to pay the price of a freedom fighter as he was arrested and imprisoned on June 12, 1964 in Robben Island. Here, he witnessed all forms of dehumanization and segregation, but remained truthful to his convictions and principles which rendered his philosophy of nonviolence outstanding in the world. Irrespective of the inhumane treatment suffered by Prisoner 466/64 and his comrades, Mandela always had an exemplary behavior towards all especially his persecutors and jailers.

Mandela stands highly distinguished and remarkable in his struggle for freedom copied from his predecessors. He was a practitioner of the principles of nonviolence preached by Gandhi, a patriarch full of love and void of vengeance despite his 27 years of incarceration, and a figure who lived in a continent known for its paradoxical aspects of “conflict-generation”. This pushed Jean-Emmanuel Pondi to question himself that *“how can one explain the fact, instead of hating the world for being imprisoned for his ideas on advocating justice for all, the old Patriarch rather feels pity – and even compassionate – for his captors by considering them as the true prisoners of their demeaning prejudices?”*<sup>220</sup>. This clearly means that the prisoner is not the captive but the captor, as seen with a continental icon who transformed the “Grapes of Wrath” into “weapons of forgiveness”, and who taught the world one fundamental lesson which is that *“anyone who is a leader must put aside his or her emotions and contingencies in the face of the torrent of collective*

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<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.29-30.

<sup>220</sup> Jean-Emmanuel Pondi, *Nelson Mandela: An example for humanity, Yaoundé, Afric' Eveil, 2014*, p.11.

history that s/he has the responsibility to write for the good of all.”<sup>221</sup> Madiba is one of the greatest historical figures whose philanthropic facet triumphed contemporary humanity because as a victim of apartheid, degradation and violence, he transformed his adversity into a great opportunity which gave the world new lessons on courage, tenacity and humility.

According to Mandela, the prison is a perfect place to get to know, to study continuously and in detail the workings of one’s mind and emotions<sup>222</sup>. While in prison, Madiba “*always tried to be okay with the guards because in his views, hostility was destructive*”<sup>223</sup> and not constructive. He challenged Rousseau’s declaration that man is born free but everywhere he is in chains and made it old in his view that man is still free behind bars, which was a strength of character that rose above recent opinions. He invited his comrades after their release from prison to have as a mission, to free both the oppressed and the oppressor from the chains of hatred. This is because he believed that the man who deprives another of his freedom is himself a prisoner of hatred who is locked behind the bars of his prejudices and narrowmindedness<sup>224</sup>. This remarkable icon and hero who lived his thought surprised the world after his election as President of the rainbow nation, South Africa through some vital moves. As Pondi highlighted, “*determined to reconcile the nation with itself, the new President, before his astonished family, invited his former jailers of Robben Island to his inauguration by giving them a special status: they were his special guests*”<sup>225</sup>. In addition to his incessant quest for national reconciliation and dialogue, he invited the wives of most present and past white and black South African political leaders to a banquet in his palace at Pretoria. Consequently, the rebel became the peacemaker, the nationalist transformed himself into a militant, and the traditional aristocrat became reincarnated as a Democrat. This philosophy of nonviolence made him the man of the people, continent and the world as one of the greatest advocates of peace and nonviolence for constructive development. Thus, the prisoner who became a hero declared in his own words that:

*“It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk. I am no more virtuous or self-sacrificing than the next man, but I found that I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed when I knew my people were not free. Freedom is*

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<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, p.13.

<sup>222</sup> Nelson Mandela, *Conversations avec moi-même, Lettres de prison, notes et carnets intimes*, introduction by Barack Obama, Paris, Editions de la Martinière, 2010, p. IX.

<sup>223</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>224</sup> *Le Point* N° 2152 du 12 décembre 2031, p.72.

<sup>225</sup> Jean-Emmanuel Pondi, *Nelson Mandela: An example for humanity*, p.62.

*indivisible; the chains on any one of my people were the chains on all of them, the chains on all of my people were the chains on me.*"<sup>226</sup>

### **8.2.3 - Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.: *The Principles of Nonviolence.***

Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was born on 15<sup>th</sup> January 1929 in Atlanta-Georgia, United State, and died in 1968 after his assassination. He was the symbolic leader of the American civil rights movement who used nonviolent struggle as a form of social protest and mobilization for legal reforms. Martin Luther King was a reluctant leader who arrive at leadership easily. He was a Baptist minister who sought to serve his congregation, and did not seek the mantle of leadership that was wrapped about his shoulders by the black people of Montgomery, Alabama. The civil rights struggle in the Southern United States was genuinely a mass movement; King would have shied from the notion of a single leader of a phenomenon diversified into many local movements, each with its own leaders, many of them were women who were very poor and lacking formal education. Yet, with his eloquence and ability to reach both the learned and the uneducated through his extensive and skilled preaching and oration, he came to personify a complex, cumbersome and unpredictable movement that was hardly able to plan anything more than a few weeks in advance. Just as Gandhi raised classical egalitarian traditions in Hindu religious thought in his fight against the class system, Martin Luther King too called on the traditions of resistance in the African-American Protestant Church, with its theology of freedom fused in the ovens of slavery. Martin Luther King was venerated for his rhythmic blending of a passionate African-American gospel with a powerful and contemporary political message. He was able to turn the deeply rooted faith of the black community toward social and political goals by ‘combining the image of Gandhi and the image of the Negro preacher, superimposing it with biblical symbols that *“bypassed cerebral centers and exploded in the well of the Negro psyche”*’.<sup>227</sup> He was a person with distinct powers of focus, possessed wise negotiating skills, an intelligent speaker in the corridors of national power, and a convincing force in the reporting rooms of the major newspapers and television networks who coined a variety of principles and steps of nonviolence.

Practically, King was guided by six (6) principles of nonviolence during struggle and protest for legal reforms in the USA. Primo, nonviolence to him is a way of life for courageous people. It is active nonviolent resistance to evil, spiritually, mentally, and emotionally assertive. Nonviolence represents the art of persuading the opponent of the justice of your cause which actors

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<sup>226</sup> Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*, Chicago Tribune, 2013, p.624.

<sup>227</sup> Lerone Bennett Jr., *What Manner of Man*, Chicago, Johnson Publishing Company, Inc., 1964, p. 72.

must always take into consideration wherein to be able to do this, the virtue of courage as seen in Plato's and Aristotle's philosophy is of utmost necessity because it drives fear. Secundo, nonviolence as King presents seeks to win friendship and understanding. This is because the end result of nonviolence is redemption and reconciliation wherein the objective is the creation of the Beloved Community. The third principle of nonviolence according to King is the drive to defeat injustice, not people. When movements or actions target people than the prevalence of the unjust acts, then violence will be inevitable. Thus, the injustice should be the target than the persons because nonviolence holds that evildoers are also victims. Quarto, King invites all the oppressed to adopt nonviolence because it holds that voluntary suffering can educate and transform, leading to forgiveness and not vengeance, striving for the cause and not the effects. Nonviolence willingly accepts the consequences of its acts and accepts suffering without retaliation. This fourth principle depicts a situation that wherein victims should voluntarily accept violence if necessary, but should never use or inflict it because of the consideration over another human. Unearned suffering is redemptive and has tremendous educational and transforming possibilities. Thus according to King Jr., the acceptance of suffering can have the power to convert the enemy when his/her reason fails. Sexto, with get transformed with King in this principle which holds that nonviolence chooses love instead of hate because it resists violence of the spirit as well as of the body. Nonviolent love gives willingly, knowing that the return might be hostility as a result no hate or hurt if positive response doesn't come. Nonviolent love is active, not passive, it does not sink to the level of the hater because love for the enemy is how we demonstrate love for ourselves. As such, love restores community and resists injustice as nonviolence recognizes the fact that all life is interrelated. Last principle of King is that nonviolence believes that the universe is on the side of justice, and the nonviolent resister has deep faith that justice will eventually win one day, irrespective of the duration it takes to come. It is a gradual process which must go through a procedure.

These procedures needed for the victory of nonviolence over violence is what King Jr. considers as the steps of nonviolence which are equally six (6). If these steps are not respected in any conflict we find ourselves in the society, then the application of the principles shall be in vein. The first step of nonviolence is the gathering of information. We need to learn all we can about the problems we see in our community through the media, social and civic organizations, and by talking to the people involved. Secondly, educating others is an inevitable step. Armed with new knowledge, it is a duty to help those around us, such as neighbors, relatives, friends and co-workers, better understand the problems plaguing the society. Build a team of people devoted to finding solutions, and be sure to include those who will be directly affected by the work. Thirdly,

advocates need to remain committed. Accept that one will face many obstacles and challenges as the actors try to change society. There should be a mutual agreement to encourage and inspire one another along the journey because it fortifies coexistence and driving force. The fourth step is that which is vital in conflict resolution; Peaceful Negotiation. As dialogue can never be evaded, talk with both parties, go to the people in your community who are in trouble and who are deeply hurt by the ills of the society. Also go to those people who are contributing to the breakdown of a peaceful society and sensitize them in a friendly way. Use humor, intelligence and grace to lead to solutions that benefit the greater good. King Jr. doesn't end at this level, he presents the fifth step which is the peaceful taking of action. This step is often used when negotiation fails to produce results, or when people need to draw broader attention to a problem. It can include tactics such as peaceful demonstrations, letter-writing and petition campaign. Last on King's nonviolence step is that of reconciliation. Human coexistence is boundless as men are compelled to live together. Thus, one need to keep all actions and negotiations peaceful and constructive. Agree to disagree with some people and with some groups as you work to improve society. Display all the benefits of changing, not only what they will give up by changing. Thus, King like Gandhi help to reshape the political sphere with the various tactics of nonviolence.

### **8.3 – The New Pillars of the Culture of Nonviolence: From Arendt to A. J. Richard**

The above analysed case-studies of the possible pillars of the culture of nonviolence has been enlightened by Gandhi, Mandela and Martin Luther King Jr. for a more sustainable development and peaceful society. As a result of these cases, one can clearly depict that Hannah Arendt was a good reader and practitioner of not only Marx but far-fetched, the *satyagraha* of Gandhi, which assisted to refine her ideology and option of nonviolence though implicit, as she condemns all forms of violence by saying “*if violence could settle social conflicts, revenge would become the miracle cure for most of our ills.*”<sup>228</sup>. We can equally be proud of the fact that her view influenced some successors like Mandela and King Jr. who were born after her, to blend these philosophies and not only preach but practice in their respective communities and impact the world on the idea of no revenge and no violence. As such, these thoughts presents ten (10) possible pillars for the foundation of the culture of nonviolence as summed by Alain J. Richard<sup>229</sup> in *Piliers pour*

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<sup>228</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.122.

<sup>229</sup> Alain J. Richard has been personally involved in active non-violence for over 35 years. The defense of human rights, the animation of workshops and conferences on non-violence led him to Canada, Australia, West Africa, Central America and South America. He is one of the founders of a Center for Nonviolence and Cultural

*une culture de la non-violence* in a contemporary society characterised by socio-cultural and economic diversity, leading to many political crisis which upsets the world.

The first pillar is *the respect of the relational ties of human beings*. It is through a set of relationships that an individual enters into his humanity, begins to exist and thus becomes a real person. The truth of relationships is essential to this birth. Hence, the relationships fundamental to these end are: interpersonal relationships, relationships with the truth that is beyond us, with our natural heritage, with the totality of our personality including the “shadow” side. The second possible pillar to nonviolence is that *human dignity is inalienable*. Everyone must affirm their own dignity and recognize that of others. It also means that those who, by their passivity, make themselves accomplices of violence and injustice undermine their own sanctity. They are called to rise up against this destruction and understand that their dignity is a specific treasure to our humanity. Even those who cause suffering and injustice must have their dignity and humanity respected as an entity, whatever evil they cause. This explains why even during the manifestations for civil rights by Martin Luther King and other black participants when their dignities were chartered, they wrote on their T-shirts “*I am a man*”.<sup>230</sup> Thirdly, for the reign of nonviolence in the world, *all natural heritage is sacred and must be respected by humans*. This respect must be at the heart of any sustainable development, totally excluding the spirit of domination and exploitation by one class on another.

In addition, for the culture of nonviolence to exist, *we must accept that the power of truth and love is greater than any other power*. Alongside Gandhi, Mandela and King Jr., Richard holds that the desires of the truth which surpasses us leads to the opposite by means respecting the adversary, to a brutal force, to the power of wealth, and to that of psychological conditioning. This power of truth and love has the ability to transform the protagonists engaged in conflict. Thus, only relationships that recognize the dignity of both protagonists can disarm their hostile behaviour as Gandhi declared that a *satyagrahi* doesn’t know failure because he fights for truth without losing his strength. If this happens, then violence won’t have a place in the society. The fifth pillar of nonviolence according to Richard is that *the demand for good with all its power exists deep within each of the protagonists engaged in a conflict*. When love and truth are paralyzed or enslaved in the hearts of the actors of injustice and violence, the respect they receive because of their humanity can awaken or reawaken in them this love and truth. This is because each being has deep within

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Transformation, located in Las Vegas (USA) with branches in Berkeley (USA) and Perth (Australia). Returning to France after 25 years spent in the United States, he shares by word and writing his passion for non-violence.

<sup>230</sup>Alain J. Richard, *Piliers pour une Culture de la Non-violence*, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001, p.29.



him opposing tendencies that divide him, and wherein violence can find a complicity in each of us. Thus Richard concludes on this by expressing in his words a strategy of nonviolence by saying that;

*« Ne pas diaboliser les opposants est un premier pas dans la vérité qui reconnaît la dignité de ses adversaires, et leur possibilité d'actions plus justes. L'écoute et la considération ont également une valeur stratégique importante : des êtres qui ne menacent pas le caractère précieux de leurs adversaires les incitent à baisser la garde, quelque importante que soit leur rivalité d'intérêts. »<sup>231</sup>*

The sixth pillar of the culture on nonviolence at this juncture according to Richard, after going through great minds like Gandhi is that *the use of means respectful of human dignity in the pursuit of any objective* is fundamental to the construction of a lasting culture of non-violence. This is clearly stated in Gandhi's *Hind Swaraj* that "*the means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree.*"<sup>232</sup> This directly links to the seventh possible pillar of the culture on nonviolence which is that *rather than responding to violence by inflicting suffering on others, let's accept the risks to one's own life*. The acceptance of these risks is a consequence of a culture of relationships. However, the defence of justice can lead to the use of violence that we reproach. It is important never to legitimize it and to recognize the damage it causes to those who resolve to do so. Be it in interpersonal, social or international conflict, nonviolent actors must carefully avoid any reappearance of a spirit of revenge that would destroy what their acceptance of the risk of suffering had made possible: getting out of spiral of violence. They must give unequivocal signs of moving towards reconciliation and forgiveness, even as their struggle for justice continues. This is therefore the culture of nonviolence which should be adopted for instance by victims of Boko Haram and the Ambazonian Crisis.

More so, the eighth pillar is that *no person or culture possess the whole truth*, thus the acceptance of the complexity of truth. Each person who serves the truth sees only a part of it. The relational links between people and cultures must be based on listening and mutual understanding which enrich the approach to truth. Consensus-type decisions that are more faithful to the complexity of reality are then made possible. At the ninth stage of the pillar is that *the construction of a culture of nonviolence is done by and for the greatest number*. The transformation of a culture where violence is dominant into a culture of nonviolence requires that a large number of people

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<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, p.49.

<sup>232</sup> Mahatma Gandhi, *Op. cit.*, p.29.

work together in particular to exert transformative pressure. A new culture can neither be shaped by the particular desires of a few nor result from actions that exclude the majority of people. Thus, « *Il en résulte que chaque être humain est directement interpellé par le développement d'une culture de la non-violence* ». <sup>233</sup> Lastly according to Richard through the help of Gandhi, Mandela and King Jr., the tenth pillar of the culture of nonviolence is that *the collective expression of the power of truth and love requires and develops social cohesion*. A minimum of social cohesion around the common values explained in the previous pillars is a prerequisite for the development of a culture of nonviolence. The challenge brought by groups and communities who experience these values is a contribution to the fight that guarantees the sustainability of this one. This fight strengthens social cohesion in the service of truth and love. Blending these together, mastered and practiced by all through education if possible, the world will become a more stable and convivial place for existence where humans will not have to kill one another and management will be communalistic and holistic for general interest and better cosmopolitanism.

Conclusively, our preoccupation in this chapter has been to illustrate the possibility of the pillars of the culture of nonviolence. Concern here was firstly to explain the essential reasons with Chomsky for the necessity of nonviolence before inviting the historical preachers of nonviolence like Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King Jr. for illumination, then ending with the re-actualization in a contemporary society of the above minds with Alain J. Richard by presenting ten possible pillars of nonviolence which the world urgently needs for cosmopolitanism. Though Arendt's nonviolence politics lacks the Gandhian quality of compassion, we acknowledge with her like Gandhi, Mandela, King Jr., Noam Chomsky, Alain J. Richard and most of her predecessors, pals and successors that man being the epicentre of existential phenomenon needs a humanistic inclination and obligation for better coexistence and a more peaceful society. Though at times justifiable, and at times legitimate, there is no greater justifiability and legitimacy than love, truth, humanism, tolerance for peace, for Ubuntu, for Swahili, and for Harambee.

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<sup>233</sup> Alain J. Richard, *Piliers pour une Culture de la Non-violence*, p.65.

## **CHAPTER IX: ACTUALISATION OF ARENDT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFRICA**

Africa known as the dark continent, has been plagued with a series of constant political instabilities through violence. Interpersonal and collective violence have been the order before, during and after independence of most African countries. Violent movements or acts have been perpetrated by either the governing authorities for power preservation or by the masses for reforms or liberation. Reactions by the authorities in response to citizen's reformatory movements have been repressive and mostly degenerated in outrageous conflicts or wars. However, nonviolent direct action has been used throughout the twentieth century as a means of projecting immense political power. It has been employed to secure independence, establish rights, open up closed systems, prevent military coups d'état, resist military occupations, and create new democracies or preserve old ones. Whether under communism, totalitarian dictatorships or democracies, nonviolent methods have been productive thanks to the ethics and politics of governance by some of the leaders, acts of governing violence and the moral, religious and political responsibility embodied by every entity for better contemporary cosmopolitanism. This is the urge Africa needs under the stewardship of democracy by consensus or Arendt's federal democracy for less violence in a continent characterized by *fearological* philosophy due to bad governance.

### **9.1 – Ethics and Politics of Good Governance**

Ethics comes from the Greek word "*ethos*" and the Latin word "*ethicus*" which both means custom, conduct, behavior. It is a normative science of the conduct of human beings living in the society. That is, a science which judges its conduct to be right or wrong, to be good or bad, or in some similar way, while a reminiscence on politics simply depicts the organization of the society. We are all aware of the fact that the main components of each society are human beings not irrational animals, who are compelled to co-exist for collective growth. This is therefore the epicenter of political philosophy which is concerned with the '*oughtness*' of societal organization and happenings, different from political science focusing on the assessment of the prevailing nature of things. Thus, the advent and revitalization of ethics and politics of good governance in the world, most especially Africa plagued with constant political instabilities through violence.

Good governance does not consist in lying and manipulating the people, in appropriating state property to the detriment of citizens, in using violence or scheming to govern, or even

inscribing one's power over time. Good governance consists rather in working for the well-being of the people, in serving the nation or the community. We talk of good governance, when the State ensures the security of goods and people, guarantees freedoms and fundamental human rights, ensures sound and transparent management of public goods void of corruption and to fight against poverty. But, when the policy is not intended for this purpose, it is totally disconnected from ethics and sees itself at the cost of delegitimizing its content. As Immanuel Kant had already warned that "*true politics cannot take any step without having first paid homage to morals*"<sup>234</sup>, wherever conflicts and wars manifest themselves, this is the place par excellence of the absence of the ethical will as the essence of political action. Defined by Plato as the administration of the city with a view to the common good, politics cannot subsist in rupture with ethics, which happens to be a critical observation mobilized around the values of the society. Ethics softens and humanizes the laws in the sense of orientation and especially in the context of updating standards to make life possible and easy. So, it must be the guide of political action towards an ideal transcending the personal and selfish interests of men, political leaders and even the international community for the sole interest of humans and their environment.

In this perspective, for nonviolence and cosmopolitan stability, the new principles of a new architecture of governance must transcend national borders by empowering States, companies as well as citizens, each according to their individual and collective possibility, responsibility and with regards to the general interest, which is that of the planet and its inhabitants. These principles set new conditions in terms of the legitimacy of collective action, competence, the exercise of citizenship in accordance with respect for human rights and the resolution of tensions between the local, the national and the global. It must be recognized that global governance is not a domain in its own right because the same principles of governance are applied at the global, continental and local levels. So, the humanization of governance is therefore a necessity for economic and political freedom to effectively increase the well-being and dignity of individuals. Being unreservedly against the political theory described as Machiavellian, Arendt like Plato, Spinoza, and others, especially the Cameroonian philosopher Lucien Ayissi proposes to articulate the political question around the ethical dimension. This is because the fundamental task of the State according to these authors, is to ensure the political responsibility of the citizens, to promote their security, and to defend their interests. In short, it is to safeguard the well-being of all by the laws and not by violence or trickery.

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<sup>234</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, India, Hackett Publishing, 2003, p.77.

The Dutchman Volk, argued that Arendt could actually be perceived as a philosopher of political order, notwithstanding the point that she never developed her own systematic theory of the state. For him, Arendt's "*thoughts highlight the importance of a durable, stable and free political order in and through which political struggle, debate and 'acting with one another' can happen, appear and be experienced*"<sup>235</sup>. Consequently, we can retain that the most important role of the state according to Arendt is to guarantee freedom and stability via freewillism because to be free and to act are the same. For Spinoza, defining the State as the ideal framework of governance is to elucidate that the structuring of society by laws, constituted on bases which guarantee its effective application is necessary. Political legitimacy then implies the creation and development of the relationship of reciprocity and exchange between the citizen and the State. Volk thus lays the foundations of an efficient policy by posing the laws as the soul of the State. It is situated in this framework not only from a political perspective, but also from an ethical dimension. This is because, in the political enterprise of the Dutchman, it is a question of a redefinition of politics in accordance with ethics for the creation of a space of freedom between Nations and individuals.

From the above analysis, we witness that states in Africa need democratization before posing ethics as a condition for emerging from the various crises. This is because politics in Africa is characterized by the neglect of this ethical dimension, which is supposed to create and supplement any political approach. The essential condition for the success of African governance lies above all in the integration of this dimension both in the action of national elites and in the interventions of the international community. Thus, the ethics and politics of good governance is of utmost necessity in Africa for sustainable socio-economic and political development. This can only be remedy by contextualizing the federal democracy of Hannah Arendt in Africa, but in the form of consensual democracy, which has been an embodiment of the ethics and politics of good governance in Africa.

## **9.2 – Managing Contemporary Violence in Africa**

There is no gain saying that a rapid rise of violence in contemporary societies at all levels has been witnessed in the world and most especially in Africa, masterminded by current developments. The triumph of the flaws of tribalism over its power, and the advent of androcity for instance have intensified this paradigm shift which damages the sense of Ubuntu and traditional techniques of management in both the old and the young. The media is an easy target, especially

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<sup>235</sup> Christian Volk, *Arendtian Constitutionalism: Law, Politics and the Order of Freedom*, Oxford, Bloomsbury, 2015, p.140.

since it portrays so much violence, and also because increasing reports from social scientists equate descriptions of violence in the media with misanthropic violent conduct. Politicians have resorted to Tweeting so as to express their plans of action on their methods of governance and governmental actions, terrorist and related groups equally mediatize their projects and use android means to reveal their ideologies, while the children alongside youths too have given greater focus and abiding to androicity than the regulations of the city-state. All these has intensified violence through behavioural changes and concerns, which needs to be governed as a prevailing phenomenon for nonviolence to have its place. Therefore, the ethics and politics of good governance is an utmost necessity for socio-cultural and political behavioural modifiers in Africa for effective and balanced qualitative and quantitative emergence.

### **9.2.1 - Controlling Media Violence.**

*“[t]he causes of behavior are complex and are determined by multiple factors, and the viewing of televised violence is only one in a constellation of determinants or precipitating factors involved in anti-social or aggressive behavior.”*<sup>236</sup>. Many believe that there is a fundamental connection between viewing violence on television (TV) or social media and antisocial violent behaviour because violence on TV shows, movies and social media is harmful to society. This is almost not shocking when one considers some of the truly unpleasant portrayals of violence shown in horrible detail on television or social media, and the sheer ubiquity of less realistic presentations. Violence is shown as an accepted way of life whereby weapons are plentiful and people kill each other on a whim, for any reason or no reason at all. Not only is human life shown not to be sacred, the media message is just anti-humanistic: if someone has something you want, take it from him; if he resists, give him a good beating; if he complains or reports you, then destroy his home and family, rape his wife, and blow him away. This frightens us in Africa as these acts betrays our indigenous African ethics and politics on the values of communalism, patriotism, respect of humans and environment, because we now know that:

*“...television is... a socializing agent almost comparable in importance to the home, school, and neighborhood in influencing children’s development and behavior. The medium is a formidable educator, the effects of which are both pervasive and cumulative. Research findings have long since destroyed any illusion that television is merely innocuous entertainment ....”*<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> David Pearl, *Familial, Peer, and Television Influences on Aggressive and Violent Behavior, in CHILDHOOD AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE*, David H. Crowell et al. eds., 1987, p.238.

<sup>237</sup> David Pearl, *Op. cit.*, pp. 236-37.

As a result, many adults wonder whether even good parental guidance can overcome these despicable messages from media sources, and many parents fear that, because the trash coming from the media is so pervasive, their children will succumb to the belief that violence is their heritage. The endless news reports of violent crime, especially among young people, tend to confirm these fears, referring again to the *fearolotical* philosophy raised above. People feel justly horrified by the callous disregard for human life-whether seen on social media, in the movies, on television, or in the streets, and are weary of media attempts to market violence for a profit. Indeed, some would say that, even if social scientists failed to demonstrate a direct link between media violence and human behaviour, it is morally harmful to expose viewers, especially young viewers, to extreme violence. As such, the urgent need for ethics of good governances to curb this deviation by the legislative, executive and judicial core. For a proper governance, the legislative need to do banning, balancing, labelling, and user blocking. The first of these proposals would involve either a ban of certain types of violent programming from television entirely or alternatively, a permissible zone of time during which such programs could be shown out of children's viewing hours.<sup>238</sup> The second approach would require programmers to provide balanced programming by offsetting violent shows with nonviolent ones. The third proposal would direct programmers to disclose the violent content of individual shows to viewers by means of violence advisories, and the final proposal would require television manufacturers to install circuitry in new sets that would enable viewers to block out violent programs at their individual discretion.<sup>239</sup>

Governmental regulation of violence in the media at this juncture is equally of great importance because the question of violence in the media should be considered a health care and child protection issue, rather than as a free speechmaking issue. Viewing television violence contributes to a child's anti-social behaviour and probably increases a child's aggressive tendencies. Other behavioural variables such as poverty, joblessness, drugs, parental neglect, decay of the city, breakdown of family life, lack of education and jobs, and the proliferation of guns also contribute to the increasing violence in society, especially in Africa. As such, media are not to blame for all of the violence even though in the android generation it occupies a vital position in the society. Self-regulation of the media, rather than governmental regulation, is advocated.

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<sup>238</sup> See "*Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act*," Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (prohibiting distribution of violent programming during children's viewing hours); "*Television and Radio Program Violence Reduction Act*," H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (requiring FCC to promulgate rules directing broadcasters and cable operators to reduce violent programming, such rules to be enforced by fines and revocation of broadcast or satellite licenses)

<sup>239</sup> See "*Television Violence Reduction Through Parental Empowerment Act*," H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.1811, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Rep. Markey's much-discussed "V-Chip" proposal is discussed infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.

Also encouraged are increased support for research by introducing the study of violence and behavioural building subjects into the curriculum and the publication of articles, books, and speeches about the dynamics of the effects of violence in the media; notification of advertisers that the public does not welcome violent content in its media; increased interaction between media principals and researchers, psychologists, and others to develop creative alternative strategies to violent programming; and the development of a code of ethics that addresses the representation of violence by the media.

Thus, this ethics will however go a long way to preach and project nonviolence in Africa, and reduce the rate of juvenile violence mostly witnessed in schools and in the quarters. This will equally revitalize the education and sensitisation of the masses in general of all age groups against violence perpetrated by androcity and multiculturalism plaguing most communities in the world today, most especially 21<sup>st</sup> century Africa. Though by no fault of Arendt, many of her illustrations are old-fashioned as they are better understood through different means. Arendt's impossible distinction between violence and politics emanates from her quick rejection of strategic considerations which inevitably entail violence. This is evident today with media violence which she didn't envisage and its connection to power, without forgetting the turns it is taking today in Africa.

### **9.2.2 - Governing Socio-cultural and Political Violence.**

Social conflicts are an inevitable eater of every community, omnipresent and inherent in organized social life. How violence should be regulated and the socio-political consequences of such regulation should be the main concern of political organisations alongside all citizens in the world, most especially in Africa. Hence, the constraining, directing, and repression of violence through institutional rules and understandings, without forgetting inclusive national dialogue, consideration, sharing of the national cake, eating together and not only living together, should be vital aspects in the governing of socio-cultural and political violence in Africa. Tribalism has been one of the cankerworms serving as the foundation of contemporary African political quagmires wherein its flaws are more exploited than its power for continental interest. One of the key findings is that conflicts involving religious, ethnic, or national identity are inherently more violence disposed to and require distinctive methods of regulation. Identity is a question both of power and of integrity. This means that both material and symbolic needs must be addressed in order to constrain or regulate these conflicts. As a result, a redefinition of a politico-economic approach in



Africa, which places primary emphasis on resources, organization, and interests, alongside a cultural approach focusing on how identities are constructed, grievances defined, blames attributed, and redress articulated. For the regulation of identity conflicts to be effective, it necessitates the involvement of both traditional and modernized bodies for a fair, transparent and inclusive dialogue for peace and reconciliation void of any bias or inclination. This is where Africa and its leaders have failed to holistically embrace and implement these parameters objectively without subjectivism.

Political and cultural leaders, most especially those from Africa, have a herculean task and great role to play in contemporary States. Many countries are faced with the problem of the management of cultural and political diversity as some parts of the community don't identify themselves with the ruling class. There is a denigration of some ethnic groups; some considered inferior, others superior whereas all are equal humans with the same ontological rights and desires. This leads to hate speeches, antagonisms, xenophobia, jingoism, separatism, terrorism and many other violent actions against established political institutions in Africa. This is an example of what has been examined in this thesis above with the holocaust condemned by Hannah Arendt, and other genocides in Africa. Therefore, when violence erupts, the attitude of both the oppressed and the oppressor should be reciprocally considerate and the interest should be geared towards conflict resolution and peace-making either at the national, continental or intercontinental level. The principles of nonviolence are the only remedy at this juncture to quench all burning flames for respective parties to understand that they are all equals and deserves equal opportunities. The inner strength of love and truth must have primacy, not to be held captive by the chains of hatred and revenge towards another but to handle violence with love, reproach violence with dialogue and inclusion, and kill violence with forgiveness and reconciliation. This was the vital tool used by Mandela as expounded upon in this thesis above, and venerated by political and religious leaders out of responsibility. Hence, an invitation by Arendt and the actualisation of her federal democracy in the African way through democracy by consensus for nonviolence.

### 9.3 - Federal Democracy and Consensual Democracy for Nonviolence in Modern Africa

We earlier mentioned that the essential condition for the success of African governance lies primarily in the integration of the cultural and ethical dimension both in the action of national elites and in the interventions of the international community. But there exists a contemporary challenge about the intervention of international communities to the affairs of Africa and the gradual loss of cosmopolitanism and African traditional organization which can't be ignored.

Firstly, we witness the case of France and Russian military intervention into local affairs of Mali, leading to other intrusions. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and al-Qaeda's affiliate, called Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), carried out terror attacks in the region which led to the death of thousands of people, displaced tens of thousands of others and caused the shutdown of thousands schools. Other jihadist groups equally active in the Sahel are the Ansaroul Islam and Boko Haram. After the ousting and killing of Libya's leader Muammar Gaddafi, Tuareg mercenaries<sup>240</sup> who had been fighting for him, returned home to Mali in January 2012, determined to fight for the independence of the north of the country. With Gaddafi's weapons, they formed an alliance with al-Qaeda-linked Islamists who were to become the stronger partners. Together they took control of the north and threatened to seize control of the whole country. Faced with this threat, Mali being a French colony until 1960, solicited for the assistance of her former colonial master France, who sent 5,000 troops to Mali in 2013 and took the opportunity not only to protect the Malian population but the 6,000 French citizens living there. Things fell apart when the presence of France in Mali instead led to more harm than good, an increase in terrorist insurgencies was witnessed because of the involvement of France who caused the death of Gaddafi and came to neutralize them in Mali. The Mali regime then proposed inviting Russian mercenaries for collective assistance. This was rejected by France as its Armed Forces Minister Florence Parly said that "*we will not be able to cohabit with mercenaries*". Consequently in February 2022, the withdrawal of the French troops involved in Operation Barkhane<sup>241</sup>, leading

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<sup>240</sup> The Tuareg political leaders had asserted that the nomadic Tuareg people were marginalized and consequently poor in both Mali and Niger, and that mining projects had damaged important pastoral areas. Issues such as climate change and a rooted background of forced modernization onto the northern Nomadic areas of Mali have caused much tension between the Tuareg peoples and the Malian government. Tuareg separatist groups had staged previous unsuccessful rebellions in 1990 and in 2007. Many of the Tuaregs fighters in the rebellion received training from Gaddafi's Islamic Legion during his tenure in Libya. Hence many of the combatants are experienced with a variety of warfare techniques that have posed major problems to the national governments of Mali, Niger and the entire sub-region.

<sup>241</sup> Operation Barkhane is an anti-insurgent action that started on 1 August 2014, led by the French military against Islamist groups in Africa's Sahel region. It roughly consists of 5,000 French force, which is permanently headquartered in N'Djamena, the capital of Chad. It is co-operative movement with five countries, all of which are former French colonies that span the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, and are collectively referred to as the "G5 Sahel".

to political vacuum, regional instability and the United Nations urged to preserve its peacekeeping force in Mali and the sub-region.

Secondly, the loss of cosmopolitanism and neo-nationalism can't evade our analysis as we live in politically troubled times. After a few decades of discussions on the declining importance and significance of nation-states in light of increasing globalization and economic interdependence, nationalist sentiments seem to be back with a vengeance. The "America first" - rhetoric of the Trump presidency; the increasingly authoritarian governments of Russia, Turkey and Hungary; the growing influence of right-wing populist parties in countries such as the Netherlands and France; and the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, clearly indicates that nationalism has returned as a significant force in domestic and international politics.

It is as a result of these that African countries are striving to be responsible for neo-nationalism against neo-colonialism. Through the enlightenment of Arendt's political philosophy, we realize that contemporary African countries faced with a lot of socio-economic and political crisis serving as the foundation of their underdevelopment, needs moral, religious and political responsibility. This was found in the ideologies of Gandhi, Mandela, and King Jr. as pillars of the culture of nonviolence out of responsibility which Africans are refining amidst new challenges. According to Arendt, the notion of race would never have existed except for political struggles. In other words, people turn to the idea of race because they need its explanatory power to achieve a goal. On Race and Culture, Arendt misrepresented the Africans in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* as culturally underdeveloped. She apprehended the races mentality of the white settlers in South Africa through an act of narrative ventriloquism. Her opponent of imperialism places her as an anticolonial thinker but her attitude towards sub-Saharan Africa makes her be like the very European imperialists. Joined to criticisms of race are criticisms of nationality, and the widespread nationalism that Arendt thought could only destroy politics. Rather than defining themselves culturally or ethnically, states should instead embrace all individuals within their borders with equal rights. According to Arendt, there is a dissimilarity between state and nation: "*states exist to protect the rights of everyone within their borders, while nations are based on national consciousness, the identity of people with the same genes and the same culture.*"<sup>242</sup> Thus, the activists of nationalism argued that, since states were impermanent, but nations permanent, the state should serve the nation.

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<sup>242</sup> Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, *Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader*, USA, Blackwell Publishers, 1997, p.163.

### **9.3.1 - Political, Moral and Religious Responsibility: A Refined United State of Africa.**

In *Africa Must Unite*, the great Pan-Africanist leader, Dr. Francis Nwia Kofi Kwame Nkrumah called for the total liberation and unification of Africa. In May 1963, 32 Heads of independent African States met in Addis Ababa Ethiopia to sign the Charter creating Africa's first post-independence continental institution, The Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was the manifestation of the pan-African vision for an Africa that was united, free and in control of its own destiny and which was solemnized in the OAU Charter in which the founding fathers recognized that freedom, equality, justice and dignity were essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples, and that there was a need to promote understanding among Africa's peoples and foster cooperation among African states in response to the aspirations of the Africans for brotherhood and solidarity, in a greater unity transcending ethnic and national differences. The guiding philosophy was that of Pan-Africanism which centered on African socialism and promoted African unity, the communal characteristic and practices of African communities, the ambition to embrace Africa's culture and common heritage, and the desire to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid.

Following the 1999 Sirte Declaration calling for the establishment of an African Union, with a view of accelerating the process of integration in the continent so as to permit Africa to play its rightful role in the global economy while addressing complex socio-economic and political problems, the African Union (AU) officially saw its birth in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. The decision to re-launch Africa's Pan-African organization was the outcome of an agreement by the 55 African leaders that in order to realize Africa's potential, there was a need to redeploy attention from the fight for decolonization and to eradicate apartheid from the continent, which had been the focus of the OAU, towards increased cooperation and integration of African states to drive Africa's growth and economic development. The AU is therefore guided by its vision of "*An Integrated, Prosperous and Peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.*"<sup>243</sup>, and to equally promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States; promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance

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<sup>243</sup> AU, *The Agenda: The Africa we Want*, on <https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview>.

with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments; are just a few amongst the numerous aim of the AU.

Moral responsibility is about human actions, intentions and consequences. A person or a group of people is morally responsible when their voluntary actions have morally significant outcomes that would make it appropriate to blame or praise them. This explains why the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes argued that the only condition necessary for free will and moral responsibility is that there be a connection between one's choices and one's actions. Religion is one of those spheres which provides a main source of free-will doctrine advocated by Arendt. Ideas of moral responsibility originate in religious views of right and wrong and the belief that followers have the capacity to make the correct choices. Their free-will capacity makes them morally accountable. Leaders who exhibit religious responsibilities are likely to detect an ethical problem facing an organization as opposed to leaders who lack religious background.

On the part of the responsibilities of our religious leaders, they can have an enormous influence on their followers, and are well placed to help bring about a change in mindsets that can lead to progress in society. By spreading messages of respect, compassion and love, citizens can combat bigotry and hatred, and foster greater tolerance and trust. It should equally be retained that African Traditional Religion (ATR) also has the belief that good and bad spirits do exist and that these spirits are what make communication with the Supreme Being possible. Above all, it holds a moral sense of justice and truth and the knowledge of the existence of good and evil. Thus, the world is in a crumble and is going badly because the true children of God have renounced their mission of evangelization by investing circles of power, no longer as mere spectators and stooges, but as true pivots and cornerstones, following the example of Jesus. For there to be a fairer world, the faithful, be it in ATR or Christianity, must illuminate the world with the light of faith and love, they must take their political card, each in his/her heart, for the happiness of all.

Consequently, to take up to its continental responsibility to curb the various ills in the dark continent plaguing its development, and to ensure the realization of its objectives and the attainment of the Pan African Vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, Agenda 2063 was developed as a strategic framework for Africa's long term socio-economic and integrative transformation. Agenda 2063 calls for greater collaboration and support for African led initiatives to ensure the achievement of the aspirations of African people and the Unity of Africa as dreamt by Nkrumah. However, the geopolitical structure of the continent would not allow for such unification. African society is too complex to work under a unitary system. There are preferred modes of administration peculiar to each tribe and country, and if European countries

being master colonizers haven't been able to receive real unity, then it is hardly impossible for Africa to achieve real unity. This is therefore serving as an impediment to this dream which all African leaders need to be politically responsible and genuine for the achievement of continental unity with nonviolence, which has most often been materialized by civil disobedience. According to Hannah Arendt, civil disobedience in contemporary society plays a vital role than we think, which brings about the problem of its compatibility with judicial systems in place. To her, civil disobedience is manifested through the rejection of political authority, contestation of religious and laic authorities due to their irresponsibility. Thus the necessity for responsible authorities in Africa's politics through the blending of Arendt's federal democracy and Africa's democracy by consensus for a new politics in modern Africa void of violence and ravages of (neo)colonialism, so as to achieve continental pillars of the culture of nonviolence and emergence.

### **9.3.2 - Federation and Consensus: Actualizing African Traditional Politics.**

According to the former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, food cooked in a foreign pot can never quench hunger. As such, after having dined with Arendt on her political ideologies, we are invited to face Africa's realities and picture the future despite our author's misrepresentation of the Africans in The Origin of Totalitarianism. Her caricature of Africans could have stemmed from her little knowledge about the indigenous existential mannerism of the Africans which we stand to correct despite her brilliant humanistic thoughts on governance. Hence, Nyerere again reminds us that "*in African society the method of conducting affairs is by free discussion*"<sup>244</sup>. One of the most persistent causes of political instability in Africa comes from the fact that, in many contemporary African states, certain ethnic groups have found themselves in the numerical and political minority. This means that even with all the precautions under a system of majoritarian democracy, they will constantly find themselves outside the corridors of power with lots of frustrations. There is no gain saying that the disappearance of democracy as a form of government by power structure from global governance is a dream farfetched as this has proven to be the root of societal organization especially as depicted by the precolonial era with consensus democracy. Conversely in the West, colonial and postcolonial governance has witnessed more successes with federal democracy as opted by Arendt, which are borrowed tentacles of consensus from African traditional politics as depicted in indigenous African politics of the Zulu's and Ashantis .

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<sup>244</sup> Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, *Op. cit.*, p.303.

The role of consensus in African life is that it describes political decision-making in Africa and acts as an expression of a pending approach to social collaboration. Consensus takes several forms, one of which is reconciliation, but which exist only as a result of two entities in dispute. However, the dispute can be resolved without necessarily triumphing reconciliation of parties. This is because reconciliation is a restoration of good will through a review of the consequence of the initial bones of contention, which doesn't absolutely involve a complete identity of moral opinions. In the same line of reflection, consensus doesn't absolutely entail total agreement. Where the will of consensus prevails, dialogue can lead to a willing suspension of disagreement, making possible agreed actions without essentially attaining agreed notions. This depicts the Ubuntu, Harambee, and Swahili spirit of togetherness in the philosophy of the Africans, expressed by Nyerere as Ujama'a. But while in the 21<sup>st</sup> century faced with the constant manifestation of violence, we are not returning to an old socialism or communalism. We are hereby embracing the challenges of modernity and its diversity of socio-economic and political violence, and finding refuge with the pillars of the culture of nonviolence via the light of Arendt, Gandhi, King Jr., Mandela, Alain J. Richard, Nkrumah, Nyerere, and many other Western and African great minds, to do a blending of federal democracy of Arendt and the African democracy by consensus, so as to overcome the continental growth of violence out of manipulations in the political ship for personal goals.

*"If we were to look at the way many "modern" African dictators have manipulated the traditional ideal of consensus politics to centralize power in their arbitrary hands, we would know that political practices in Africa today are a more flexible and often highly eclectic or syncretic mélange of the African and the Western, the old and the new, the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial, and so forth."*<sup>245</sup>

Under the light of Kwasi Wiredu's analysis of "consensual" democracy and Emmanuel Chukwu Eze's response, we observe how the many despotic practices in Africa that prevail under the umbrella concept of "national unity" or "consensus" of one-party governments are undeniably not democratic at all, and very brutal of opposition. According to Wiredu, the desertion of these "one" party form of government, even by means of the exoteric forms of democratic pressure should be approved and implemented particularly in Africa and the world at large. This is because *"the consensual democracy advocated by Wiredu is not that of one party exercising all the power and - to use Wiredu's words 'murdering' opponents; it is, rather, a framework for sharing with every party the exercise of governing power."*<sup>246</sup> Wiredu, considers the democracy of the West to

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<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*, p.314.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, p.315.

be “...imported or imposed forms of democracy...” which can’t be out rightly rejected if it “...succeed in saving Africans from political repression.”<sup>247</sup> However, we just cannot neglect the fact that African leaders are not democrats but rulers who have designed artifices to counterattack such external pressures. They have successfully established pseudo (fake) multiparty elections to deceive the Western governments they see as masters, into remaining constant in satisfying their egoistic desires, while keeping intact and untransformed the mechanisms of autocratic, dictatorial, and abusive exercise of state power. Hence, the need to explore other models of, or models for, African democracy.

This is relatively what Oumarou Mazadou, while questioning the problem of democracy in Africa calls “Pandemocracy”, a “Kamit” democracy, Kamitic Philosophy or Kamitism, as a new orientation aimed at reforming and redefining African political philosophy grounded on the solid foundation of African traditional political perspectives and cultural heritage. This therefore stands as the real African democracy rooted in power and equality amongst humans in a nation-state as a result of an intercultural dialogue.<sup>248</sup> As such, the idea of consensual democracy is a substitute to both one-party dictatorship and multiparty where the winner-takes-all, creating a lot of adversarial political malpractices which always leads to violence as the ravages have always been noticed to be farfetched. The petition of consensus politics in contemporary *Res publica* in Africa mainly lies in the fact that it promises not just formal, but substantive or practical representation. In a classical, multiparty democracy like in the USA or current South Africa, the rule of the majority is the norm of governance, but the issue at stake has been how to defend the rights of the minority parties who did not “win” elections. However, in democracy by consensus, there is no “winner” and no “loser” because every party is a party of the government, and the norm of governance is the reconciliation of competing social interests. Reconciliation, agreement, consensus, the rule of the majority party would make up the political axiom and watchdog for men’s coexistence in Africa as it was in the precolonial Africa, and the world didn’t get any noise of violence. Therefore, the declaration of Wiredu that:

*“Consensus was . . . the order of the day in African (political) deliberations, and on principle”; “the elders sit under the big trees, to talk until they agree”; “majority opinion is not in itself a good enough basis for decision making, for it deprives the minority of the right to have their will reflected in the given decision”.*

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<sup>247</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>248</sup> Oumarou Mazadou, *La Question du Politique : Une Perspective Africaine*, Thèse PhD, Résumé, 2012, p.iv.



As such, considering the non-party alternative, and visualizing a dispensation under which governments are formed not by parties, but by the consensus of elected representatives, portrays the federal democracy of Arendt, and the traditional African societal organization which necessitates urgent synchronization. This synchronization is what we can, in a neologism, call “Afrocracy”, from the adjective “*Afro*” and the suffix “*cracy*” which respectively mean “of or relating to black tradition or culture”, and “rule or form of government”. Thus, a form of government regulated by black traditional and cultural values of Swahili, Ubuntu, Harambee, and Ujama’a. Government, in other words, becomes a kind of coalition, coalition not as in the mutual acceptance of parties, but of citizens. Thus, there is the representation of a given constituency in council, and the representation of the will of a representative in the making of a given decision. Hence, let’s consider the first to be formal representation, and the second substantive representation. At this juncture, practical or substantive representation is a matter of a fundamental human right. Each human being has the right to be represented not only in council, but also in counsel in any matter relevant to his or her interests or those of their groups. This explains why consensus is so important, and this has been the traditional African politics which needs to be revived and co-exist with federal democracy, encompassing the principles of nonviolence for a better Africa, a people who were even unknown to some like Arendt but already seen to embody disaster as perceived from imperial preaching that:

*“Whether these [Africans] represent ‘prehistoric man’, the accidentally surviving specimens of the first forms of human life on earth, or whether they are the ‘posthistoric’ survivors of some unknown disaster which ended a civilization we do not know. They certainly appeared rather like the survivors of one great catastrophe which might have been followed by smaller disasters until catastrophic monotony seemed to be a natural condition of human life.”<sup>249</sup>*

Which Arendt recognizes this consideration as a crime against humanity and the violation of precisely the right to rights emanating as a product of political association. Hence, federation and consensus uplifts the principles of equality, freedom, constitutional and communicational necessities that reinforces political modernity on the organization and management of people for stability. Here, the inner strength of love and truth must have primacy, not to be held captive by the chains of hatred and revenge towards another but to handle violence with love, reproach violence with dialogue and inclusion, and kill violence with forgiveness and reconciliation. With Arendt, nonviolence is a form of communicative power that progresses external of simple

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<sup>249</sup> Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, p.192.

constitutional democratic contexts<sup>250</sup>. Consequently, democracy by consensus is a possible gateway to solving the cancer of nation-states found in totalitarian democracy which tolerates and promotes discrimination and exclusion. A synchronization of democracy by consensus (traditional African politics) with federal democracy in contemporary States with a lot of political quagmires, in dying need of ethics and humanism in the management of *res publica*, could lead to a new model of government herein called Afrocracy, a form of government regulated by black traditional and cultural values of Swahili, Ubuntu, Harambee, and Ujama'a, for possible pillars of a culture of nonviolence and more stable coexistence of humans in the world.

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<sup>250</sup> Mark Stanislaus Balawender, *Power, Ethics, and the Possibility of Nonviolence*, A Dissertation Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophy, Michigan State University, 2015, p.iii.

## PARTIAL CONCLUSION

This third and last part of our essay was grounded on the path moving from Arendt's conception on violence with deductions about her standpoint against ferocity, brutality and violence, to the establishment of possible avenues for the culture of nonviolence. In order to know if Arendt contributed to the growth of modern States, give reasons for the necessity of nonviolence, ponder on the renowned world icons of nonviolence, establish pillars of nonviolence in the contemporary society, and actualise Arendt's ideas in a needy Africa, we had to invite a good number of thinkers for enlightenment. It was scrupulously arrived at the indubitable fact that Arendt's ideas have been of great help to the progress of modern States as it added fuel to the car of nonviolence as she decried the occurrences of events during the war periods and its aftermath. This nonviolence trumpet, invited Noam Chomsky to inform us on the reasons why nonviolence is vital as we discovered that no country or community has ever been freed from, and thanks to violence. If that was the case, what has become of that entity comparatively to those who embodied the power of nonviolent actions? The case-study as evaluated in this third part of the actors of nonviolent actions were no other persons than Gandhi and his philosophy of *satyagraha*, Mandela and his indivisible freedom, reconciliation and spirit of forgiveness, and King Jr's regular blending of a passionate African-American gospel with a powerful contemporary political message which led to his six principles of nonviolence as examined in this dissertation. After evaluating these icons, we had no choice than to realise that nonviolence is supreme to every political deviation and left with the only option of establishing with Alain J. Richard the pillars for a better cosmopolitanism, society or living together despite all the diversities and differences. One vital pillar we uphold is that of holistic reconciliation and forgiveness which is that need by the victims of conflict and wars in the world in general and Africa in particular plagued with many political ills like the Boko Haram insurgencies and the Anglophone Crisis. Hence, this paved way for us to conclude this part and dissertation as a whole, with an actualisation of the Arendtian thoughts on politics and violence in contemporary societies whereby the synchronization of Arendt's federal democracy and the African democracy by consensus are of utmost necessity for a new model of contemporary political organization, and as a pillar of the culture of nonviolence in the world which is herein called Afrocracy. Hence, an embodiment of Ubuntu, Harambee, Swahili, "Kamitism" or "Pandemocracy" of Oumarou Mazadou, Ujama'a Socialism of Nyerere, federal democracy of Arendt, and African democracy by consensus.



## GENERAL CONCLUSION

*“Political questions are far too serious to be left to the politicians”<sup>251</sup>*

*“All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence.”<sup>252</sup>*

*“Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance . . . . Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it”<sup>253</sup>*

*“...violence can be justifiable, but not legitimate.”<sup>254</sup>*

*“The practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world.”<sup>255</sup>*

*“if violence could settle social conflicts, revenge would become the miracle cure for most of our ills.”<sup>256</sup>*

*“Our most powerful nonviolent weapon is . . . also our most demanding, that is organization.”*

**Martin Luther King Jr.**

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<sup>251</sup> Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*, p.74.

<sup>252</sup> Arendt, *On Violence*, p.35.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*, p.56.

<sup>254</sup> Arendt, *Crisis of the Republic*, p.151.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, p.177.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*, p.122.

Our intellectual journey so far, from the start to the end of this epistemic adventure, has been to understand the why and how of violence in the society, especially in the political realm, fundamentally through the reading of Hannah Arendt in *Crisis of the Republic*. The aim of our study was to explain the thought of Hannah Arendt's political philosophy, that is, bringing out her analysis of violence and lies in politics, its challenges in the society, and a legal way out of the crumbling nation-state. As such, a reflection on violence, lies and power was fundamentally crucial for the understanding of current political practices so as to arrive at a better society and management of people through nonviolence. We observed with Arendt that violence is action taken to vehemently coerce support from a group, lies as a disruption and caricature of politics in general, and both as that which can destroy politics without being able of any replacement. Our work was divided into three main parts so as to ease the structural remedy to our epistemic diarrhea, to know if violence and lies can be ultimately excluded from the political realm, how it manifests itself, and the necessity and principles of nonviolence in a devastating cosmopolitanism while proposing new model of a system or governance.

In the first part titled *Violence and Politics*, we began with an archaeology and trajectory of violence, presented the framework of Arendt's political philosophy on the question of violence, power and lying in politics and its status in *Crisis of the Republic*. It was concluded with the criticisms she made to Frantz Omar Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre and the Black Powers.

The second part of this work was titled *Problems of the Arendtian conception of political philosophy* wherein, we first centred on the legitimacy of the usage of violence in politics, moved onto presenting some critique on the political unrealism of Arendt's conception of violence, and finally a critique of Arendt on counter-violence in the struggle for freedom wherein her misconception of philosophers like Sartre, Fanon and the black movements were uncovered.

The third and last part of this work was titled *From the Arendtian conception of violence and politics to the possible pillars of nonviolence*. Our first concern here was to acknowledge and expose the contributions of Hannah Arendt in the progress of modern States, and highlighted furtherly on proposed solutions to the problem of violence which was that of establishing the pillars of the culture of nonviolence through Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King Junior, furtherly enlightened by Alain J. Richard. To end the last part, we actualized Arendt's political philosophy to the development of Africa, showing how violence could be governed as it is inevitable, while echoing the moral, religious and political responsibilities in contemporary African States vis-a-vis violence and lies in governance.

At the end of our reflection, we retain that for Hannah Arendt, it is possible to design a public space via transparency, visibility and nonviolence though violence is inevitable and at times justified. She defines politics as a regulator of coexistence, public space of publicity, transparency and visibility in which men are equal, speak to each other and are bound to valorize one another irrespective of race and religion. According to Arendt, it is urgent to restore the true face of politics as it is a public space embedded in dialogue, consensus, understanding and nurtured by the engagement of citizens in the city. The fundamental principle of action is initiative, which corresponds to consent and living together. Action is therefore for political ends, and power is nothing but the public expression of action. Action and words constitute the space without domination in which men are in mutual relation, debate and persuade each other. Politics is hence the art of relations between men, the result of their free and responsible actions, which pushes her to propose a federal democratic system in contemporary states to have a more stable society.

As such, on the aetiology or origin of violence, we can retain that our genes, words and actions lead us to chaos or order, strives or stability, war or peace, violence or nonviolence depending on the particular social environment in which we live. Environmental pressures, opposition, and density in population influence human progress which eventually inclines us to violence. Thus, cultural origins accounts more for the origin of violence than natural origins, and it is of utmost necessity to stand against self-directed violence, interpersonal violence and most especially collective violence which has been the ravage of several generations out of injustice, rage, and lies. Despite Arendt's justifiability of violence which isn't legitimate, she still held strong to her conviction and condemnation of the use of violence especially in freedom fighting and socio-economic aspirations.

Consequently, to the world at large and Africa in particular, Hannah Arendt thought present her as a humanist of nonviolence who knew how to take sides with the oppressed, the persecuted and the victims of daily political lies and violence. Likened to Alexis De Tocqueville who said that a new world requires a new policy, the originality of Arendt's thought resides in the particularity with which she rethinks political modernity grounding it on the principle of equality, freedom, and following the communicational requirement that underpins it to the organization and management of people for stability. Her opposition to modernity and nation-state is rooted in a philosophy inspired by many ideologies and experiences like that of Gandhi on nonviolence. Alongside others like Mandela and King Jr. we invite through Arendt, nations to moral, religious and political responsibility so as to reshape and inspire the contemporary man who is replacing natural breath with violence. This call is embodied in what Arendt calls federal democracy while

in Africa we call it democracy by consensus. As such we are all invited to play respective roles as individuals in the fight against violence by being epitomes and warriors of the principles of nonviolence because violence is psychosomatically and socially destructive and not constructive. Violence is economically and politically regressive and not progressive. Out of the possible pillars for the culture of nonviolence proposed, urgently needed is that of holistic reconciliation and forgiveness, which is that required by the victims of conflict and wars in the world in general and Africa in particular plagued with many political ills like the Boko Haram insurgencies and the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon. Thus, the world needs many like Gandhi, Mandela, King Jr. Alain J. Richard, and above all Arendt to understand the etiology of violence, how it can be managed as an existing phenomenon, and preach the pillars of nonviolence for the eradication of the *fearological* philosophy of Hobbes, and the dictum “*homo homini lupus est*”<sup>257</sup>, in favor of the Ubuntu, Harambee, and Ujama’a spirit<sup>258</sup>. This spirit we observe can only be realized in the political organization of the 21<sup>st</sup> century states through a “...*syncretic mélange of the African and the Western, the old and the new, the precolonial, colonial and postcolonial*”<sup>259</sup>, found in the federal democracy of Hannah Arendt blending with the indigenous African traditional politics of democracy by consensus, which Oumarou Mazadou calls “*Pandemocracy*” or “*Kamitism*”, and we herein term “*Afrocarcy*”.

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<sup>257</sup> The Latin declaration; “*homo homini lupus est*” means a man is a wolf to another man which refers to situations where people are known to have behaved in a way comparably in nature to a wolf.

<sup>258</sup> African indigenous existential principles found in the writings of *Ujama’a Socialism* of Nyerere and Nkrumah’s *Consciencism*, alongside other cultural maxims from the Southern part of Africa.

<sup>259</sup> Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, *Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader*, p.314.

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